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Abstract

Pictorial Communication
by
Nada Gatalo

Adviser: Professor Noël Carroll

The primary goal of my dissertation is to reconcile an anti-intentionalist account of depiction
with an intentionalist account of pictorial communication. I begin by providing an account of
depiction and then provide an account of communication and, specifically, pictorial communication. Accordingly, I begin by defining depiction, and reject what I call the “ambiguity view”
which holds that terms like “depiction” and “representation” are ambiguous. I argue that P
depicts O if the design of P visibly manifests O. This definition of depiction sets up the central
task for a theory of depiction: to explain how it is possible for a marked surface to facilitate
a visual experience as of O. To answer this question I defer, partially, to Dominic Lopes’s
recognition view. I agree with his claim that a picture, P, depicts something, O, if and only
if P is able to trigger the capacity for a suitable perceiver in suitable conditions to recognize
an O by its appearance. However, I don’t adopt his second condition which requires a causal
connection between O and P. Additionally, I argue that recognition alone does not provide an
adequate theory of depiction because it does not explain the visual experience characteristic
of engagement with pictures. I suggest that the recognition view should be supplemented by
a view that explains visual experience. Specifically, I argue that a picture acts as a functional
surrogate for O. The design features ground, sustain and constrain visual experience of O. I
argue that by grounding and sustaining a visual experience as of O, while not itself being O,
a picture’s design effects an illusion. In the second chapter I discuss communication which
I define as an intentional and purposeful activity involving at least two participants: U and
A. It is necessarily mediated by a public utterance—symbol, signal, sense bearing sign—that
U produces. Communication succeeds when A understands what U means—more precisely
what U means by what U says. Based on this Gricean account I arrive at three theses that
I expect to inform my discussion of pictorial communication. These are: (a) when a picture
iv

is used as a vehicle of communication, its meaning and the goal of pictorial interpretation
are determined by the picture maker’s intentions; (b) a picture can bear nonnatural meaning
so interpreting it correctly would require recognizing this; and (c) a picture may implicate,
or suggest, some meaning over and above its “literal” meaning. In the second chapter I develop these three theses. The first two are closely related. Insofar as a picture is used as a
vehicle of communication it bears nonnatural meaning. A picture’s nonnatural meaning is
essentially the embodiment of picture maker’s meaning. So the goal of pictorial interpretation
(when the goal is communication) is to identify the picture maker’s meaning. With respect
to the third thesis, I consider Catherine Abell’s account of pictorial implicature and reject
it on the grounds that it fails to distinguish between what a picture implicates and what it
depicts and she holds that the latter determines the former. I distinguish between two kinds
of implicature: those that rely on symbolic cues and those that rely on perceptual cues (plus
the reality principle and Gricean maxims). A picture’s content furnishes these cues. Pictorial
implicatures are generated by depictive content. Nevertheless, what a picture implicates is
part of maker’s meaning. Finally, I consider the objections to the claim that communication,
as I have described it, is a legitimate goal of pictorial interpretation.
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Pictorial Communication
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Introduction

In my dissertation I consider the means of pictorial communication. Ultimately my goal is
to outline and defend a Gricean account of pictorial communication. There are two tasks
entailed in this project. First I will have to put forth an adequate theory of depiction and
pictorial representation. Pictures are, most basically, used to show viewers how objects look.
To say that a picture is of an object or that it depicts this object is to say that it makes
the object–at least those salient features that the picture maker wants to emphasize–visually
present to the viewer. A picture depicts an object or event in two ways:

(i) in virtue of its ability to trigger the viewer’s recognition ability for that object; and
(ii) by sustaining an (illusory) visual experience as of the object.

In the first chapter of my dissertation I will expand on this claim and defend it against
possible objections. I will argue that pictures do not necessarily fulfill their function in
virtue of their resemblance, either actual or experienced, to the objects and scenes they
depict. This explains why many pictures are able to present visible features of objects
despite the fact that the pictures do not look like these objects. Additionally, I will argue
that picture maker’s intentions do not necessarily determine what a picture depicts. Facts
1

other than picture maker’s intention are paramount. So, the theory of depiction that I defend
can be characterized as anti-intentionalist.
Secondly, I will have to show how this theory of depiction can serve as the basis for a Gricean
account of pictorial communication. Following the Gricean account, I will argue that communication succeeds when an audience (or viewer) correctly apprehends a speaker’s (or picture
maker’s) intentions. The theory of communication that I endorse can be characterized as
intentionalist. A central goal of my overall account will be to reconcile an anti-intentionalist
theory of depiction with an intentionalist theory of pictorial communication.
Philosophical study of the nature of depiction has gained traction in recent years as philosophers recognize the increasing prominence of visual media. Visual modes of communication
have proliferated in the last century, first as photographic media became widely available
and to a greater extent more recently as digital media has come to dominate the manner in
which information is transmitted and taken up by a vast segment of the population. This
is why philosophers have suggested that studying the nature of depiction and pictorial representation should be given similar attention as the study of language. There has been a
great deal of work done on explaining the nature of depiction and pictorial representation.
I’m following a line of inquiry that has its origins in the work of E.H. Gombrich, Nelson
Goodman and Richard Wollheim, although it is sometimes traced as far back as the work
of Plato and Descartes. More contemporary theorists who focus on the nature of depiction
include Kendall Walton, Dominic Lopes, Robert Hopkins, Michael Newall, John Kulvicki
and Catherine Abell.
However, despite the increased attention given to understanding pictures and how they work,
there has been far less interest–with some notable exceptions–in investigating how pictures
are used as vehicles of communication. There are theories of linguistic communication that
take the study of language beyond the domain of formal syntax and semantics, but the
philosophical investigation of pictures has not probed further than understanding the basic
2

mechanisms of picturing. My goal in the dissertation is to build on the work that has
already been done to understand how pictures work and extend this further to understand
how pictures function to facilitate communication.
My discussion of pictorial communication relies on a specific definition of communication.
There are many dimensions of the activity of picturing–creating and using pictures–that do
not count as properly communicative according to my definition. My understanding of what
is entailed in communication is rooted in the work of H.P. Grice. Grice’s theory allows us to
understand the success conditions for communication: communication between a speaker,
S, and her audience, A, succeeds when A apprehends what S means. Normally this entails
apprehending the meaning S intended by what she said. Thus Grice’s account offers the
conditions for successful linguistic communication. However, Grice’s theory does not need
to be limited to linguistic communication and his conditions on successful communication
can be applied to non-linguistic contexts, including, I believe, pictorial communication. My
task will be to apply his view to the case of pictures. Specifically, it will entail determining
if and how the following sets of distinctions, which are central to Grice’s theory, apply to
the case of pictures. These are: (i) the distinction between utterer’s meaning and utterance
meaning; (ii) the distinction between natural meaning and nonnatural meaning; and (iii) the
distinction between what is said and what is implicated. It’s possible that these concepts do
not apply cleanly to the case of pictures and may need to be adapted or abandoned. For
example, it’s not clear that the concept of utterance meaning has a meaningful application
when discussing pictorial content. Moreover, the Gricean view of linguistic communication
is not without its critics. Stephen Neale questions whether utterance meaning is a valid
concept even in the case of linguistic communication. Other details of Grice’s account have
also been the subject of debate. Thus, I will have to defend the Gricean account against
some of the most damaging criticisms–specifically those of Dan Sperber and Dierdre Wilson–
before I can apply Grice’s model to the case of pictures.

3

Ultimately there are likely to be many dimension to pictorial communication. The communicative ends that are achieved by means of pictures may vary from case to case and they
may be more wide ranging than what is suggested by Grice’s narrow conditions on successful
communication as I outline them. It is by no means clear that applying the Gricean framework to the case of pictures will be neat or seamless. It may be possible that some of the
goals of pictorial communication are not captured by the Gricean formula.

2
2.1
2.1.1

Pictures
Terminology
Depiction

Under most circumstances we have little problem understanding the claim that a picture
depicts its subject, e.g. that a painting depicts a horse, that a pound note depicts Queen
Elizabeth II. Yet, there are philosophers who claim that the term “depiction” is fundamentally ambiguous—as are related terms like “representation” and “pictorial representation”.
Malcolm Budd (2008) prefaces his discussion of depiction by noting that the concept itself
is ambiguous. He contends that “depiction” can be used in two senses. These are, what he
calls, the relational and the non-relational senses of the term. The relational sense of the
term “can be understood to license existential generalization (217)”—to say that a picture,
P, depicts an object, O, in this sense, implies that O exists—whereas the non-relational sense
does not. Thus in one sense of “depicts” a picture that depicts Obama stands in a particular
relation to Obama–a relation that can only hold if Obama exists. I don’t think the nature of
the depicting relation is self-evidently obvious. It may be the same relation as the relation
of representation. The relation of representation is variously described as the relation of
“standing for,” “referring to,” or “denoting.” Some theorists may take it to be the relation
4

of “resembling.” John Hyman (2006) makes a similar point about the term “represents,”
arguing that it is sometimes used to express a relation and sometimes not. However, his
contention is essentially the same as Budd’s insofar as he takes “represents” to be basically
synonymous with “depicts”—although he allows that “depicts” has a less relational connotation than “represents” (65). Both Budd and Hyman credit Nelson Goodman with first
drawing attention to this distinction in Languages of Art, where he claims that “saying that a
picture represents a soandso [is] highly ambiguous as between saying what the picture denotes
and saying what kind of picture it is (1976, 22, emphasis added).” For Goodman, the difference between these two senses of “represents” chiefly concerns their logical form. Sometimes
“represents” is a two-place predicate. To use “represents” as a two-place predicate amounts
to expressing a relation—i.e. a relation of denotation—between P and O, which implies the
existence of O. On the other hand, “represents” can be used as a one-place predicate and it
must be so used for pictures that represent non-existent or fictional entities, e.g. a picture
that represents a unicorn. In such cases, to say that P represents O is to specify the kind
of picture that P is: it is an O-representing-picture, or O-picture. Goodman argues that
a picture can be of a certain kind—e.g. a unicorn-picture or a Pickwick-picture—without
denoting anything. A unicorn-picture is distinguished from a Pickwick-picture in virtue of
how the picture looks. The two pictures cannot be distinguished by the fact that they bear
relations to different objects—i.e. the fact that they have different denotations—because
neither picture bears a relation to any actual object. Or, as Goodman puts it, both pictures
are “representations with null denotation (21),” so, in the relational sense of “represent”,
both pictures represent the same thing: nothing. For Goodman Figure 1 would be a picture
of Beebo in both senses: it denotes a particular cat whose name is Beebo and it is a Beebopicture. I will call the view defended by Budd, Hyman and Goodman the ambiguity view
(AV). AV maintains that terms like “depiction,” “representation,” “picture of” and “pictorial
representation” are ambiguous between a relational and non-relational sense. Note that AV
rests on the implicit premise that these terms are effectively synonymous.

5

Figure 1: A picture of Beebo
Apart from the discussions outlined above, the status of AV is rarely explicitly addressed
in the literature on depiction. Among the few notable exceptions are Raphael De Clercq
(2015) who directly attacks AV, arguing that “depiction” and related terms only have one
semantic sense and this is the relational sense. David Novitz (1977) also presents an argument
against AV, however he outright rejects the relational sense of these terms and maintains
their unambiguous non-relational meaning. In contrast, Catherine Abell (2009) seems to
implicitly deny the ambiguity of “depiction” when she plainly asserts that the primary task
for any account of depiction is to “specify the relation between picture and object in virtue
of which the former depicts the latter (183, emphasis added).” Abell is only justified in this
contention if AV is false and “depiction” is construed in the relational sense. If AV is true
then a theory of depiction that only takes account of the relational sense of “depiction”
would be, at a minimum, incomplete. If Budd is correct, such a theory would completely
miss the point. While Budd maintains AV, he insists that “[t]he primary task for a theory
of depiction is the characterization of what it is to be a picture...in the non-relational sense
(217).” He argues that non-relational depiction is what distinguishes pictorial representation
from other modes of representation. According to Budd, the relation that pictures bear to
the objects they depict is a relation of reference. He insists that this relation is the same
6

for pictures as it is for any other mode of reference and therefore doesn’t call for special
explanation (ibid.) In any case, I take this to show that an adequate theory of depiction
must take account of AV, either by disambiguating the terms at issue or by providing an
explanation that encompasses the multiple senses of these terms.
The previous discussion of Goodman’s view offered some insight into the motivation behind
AV. Insofar as the relational sense of “depicts” has existential implications it is necessary to
maintain the non-relational sense to account for the depiction of non-existent and fictional
entities. De Clercq outlines two additional motivations for maintaining the ambiguity of
“depicts” and related terms. First, is the problem of depictive misrepresentation (2015, 97).
The following example illustrates the problem: Suppose, for instance, that I take a picture
of my dog under blacklight and in the resulting photograph my dog appears to have bright
purple teeth. There is a sense in which it would be accurate to say that: (i) The photograph
depicts a dog that has bright purple teeth. This is plausible insofar as this when one looks
at the picture one sees a dog with bright purple teeth. However, it also seems correct to say
that the picture depicts my dog who does not have bright purple teeth, she has white teeth.
To the extent that this is right it follows that: (ii) The photograph depicts a dog that does
not have bright purple teeth. Since (i) and (ii) are contradictory, they cannot both be true
unless “depicts” has dual senses, and different senses are meant in (i) and (ii). Specifically,
(i) uses the non-relational sense of “depicts” and (ii) uses the relational sense. Secondly,
there is the problem of depicting non-particulars (ibid). The illustration in a dictionary that
accompanies the definition for “horse” obviously depicts a horse, but it is not a picture of
any horse in particular. This is a problem for the relational construal of “depicts” to the
extent that, if depiction is a relation, it must hold between two particulars. A picture cannot
stand in relation to some, but no particular horse. Thus, the only way to make sense of the
claim that the dictionary picture depicts a non-particular horse is to posit the non-relational
sense of “depicts.” As De Clercq points out, in all three of these cases AV is motivated
by the failure of the relational sense of “depicts” to conform with common usage, which
7

necessitates reverting to the non-relational sense and declaring the term ambiguous. In light
of the problems it entails, he suggests simply giving up the relational sense of the term in
favor of the non-relational sense. Although De Clercq quickly rejects this idea, I believe this
suggestion has merit and points toward the most promising response to AV.
I agree with De Clercq that AV is false and that the terms in question can be disambiguated.
However, my response to the problem ultimately runs counter to his—he argues that the
terms, particularly “depicts,” should be uniformly construed as having a single relational
semantic sense while allowing that they may be pragmatically ambiguous (2015, 99-100). In
fact, I believe that it is possible to resolve the ambiguity altogether and it’s not necessary
to make De Clercq’s pragmatic concession. Moreover, it is possible to do this while also addressing the issues, discussed in the previous section, that motivate AV. In my view, the first
step in rebutting AV is to reject the underlying implicit premise that the terms “depiction,”
“representation” and “pictorial representation” are synonymous. Treating these terms as
synonyms—as De Clercq does—creates the impression of ambiguity where, in fact, there is
none. Once these concepts have been distinguished, they can each be defined individually
as follows:

Representation: P represents O if P is used to, e.g., stand for, pick out, denote, refer to
O1
Depiction: P depicts O if the design of P visibly manifests O2
Pictorial Representation: P pictorially represents O if P is used to represent O and P
depicts O3
1

To the extent that standing for O, picking out O, denoting O or referring to O entail that O exists, the
fact that P represents O entails that O exists.
2
One might want to add the stipulation that P is a picture–i.e. P exists for the purpose of facilitating
experiences of seeing-in–rather than a natural phenomenon like a water stain
3
This definition precludes the possibility of pictorial representation of unicorns. I don’t think this is a
problem. We can still depict unicorns even if we can’t pictorially represent them, if, in fact, we can only
represent existents.
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On my definition P represents O if P is used to represent O. A marked surface that depicts
O can be used to represent O. However, many other things can also be used to represent
O. A saltshaker, a dot, or the letter O can be used to represent O. For any object to
represent O it is necessary and sufficient for somebody to (at least implicitly) stipulate that
the object is being used to represent O. Accordingly a picture can represent anything it is
stipulated or used to represent—as Goodman famously remarks “almost anything can stand
for almost anything else (5).” A picture of my dog can represent my bedroom if I put it
on the table relative to other objects to show you the layout of my apartment. A picture
can also represent O in a distinctive way in virtue of the fact that the picture depicts O.
My definition of representation is unambiguously relational. In contrast, my definition of
depiction is unambiguously nonrelational and it involves the concept of seeing-in. The term
seeing-in was introduced by Richard Wollheim, but I do not use it in any strict sense that
entails the details of his theory of depiction. Essentially, to say that O can be seen in P is to
say that P is a (normally man-made) marked surface that facilitates a visual experience as
of O. This definition of depiction is compatible with several prominent theories of depiction
(e.g. “illusionist” views; Robert Hopkins’s (1998) “experienced resemblance” view; Dominic
Lopes’s (1996) “recognition view”; Michael Newall’s (2011) theory of “non-veridical seeing”),
while potentially ruling out theories that presume that depiction is fundamentally relational
(e.g. “actual resemblance” theories of depiction). This definition of depiction allows us to
precisely home in on the primary task for a theory of depiction. It is to explain how it is
possible for a marked surface to facilitate a visual experience as of its subject. A theory
of depiction need not presume, let alone explain, any kind of relation between the marked
surface and the subject it depicts. Of course there is a difference between using a picture that
depicts my dog to represent just anything (e.g. laying the picture flat next to other objects
to represent the position of my bedroom relative the rest of my apartment) and using it to
represent my dog—i.e. using it to represent what it depicts. The convergence of depiction
and representation is the essence of pictorial representation.

9

With these definitions in hand we can address the issues that motivate AV. First, the problem of depicting or representing non-existents dissipates when we separate the concepts of
depiction and representation. A picture of a unicorn is a picture that depicts a unicorn but
does not represent anything–since it doesn’t represent anything it does not pictorially represent a unicorn. Secondly, the problem of depictive misrepresentation—illustrated by the
blacklight photograph of my dog, in which she appeared to have bright purple teeth—can
be explained as a case in which a picture that is used to represent my dog does not (at least
not accurately) depict her as she is. It would be part of a theory of depiction to explain
what constitutes accuracy in depiction, but I am confident that it does not entail muddying the boundaries of the non-relational concept of depiction as I have defined it. Finally,
representing non-particulars—e.g. the dictionary illustration accompanying the entry for
“horse”—also stems from a divergence between depiction and representation. It consists in
the depiction of a particular token horse being used to stand for, and thereby represent,
the type or class of horses. It is a particular horse that is depicted insofar as it must be
a particular in order to be seen—the type horse is invisible—and it is depicted as having
determinate features—it is brown rather than white, it has a long face rather than a blunt
face, etc. It is not a particular horse in the sense that it is based on an existing real-world
model or in a sense that would imply that it stands in any type of relation to some particular,
existing horse.
Using “depicts” in this way may put me at odds with other philosophical accounts of the
subject. As noted, Abell contends that the primary task for any account of depiction is
to specify the type of relation that constitutes depiction. For Abell, depiction is a relation
between a picture and object and a philosophical account of depiction—or pictures, more
generally—is required to accurately characterize this relation. I do not define depiction as a
relation, therefore I disagree with Abell about the primary task for a theory of depiction.

10

2.1.2

Subject, Design, Content

I will rely on the terminology and distinctions that Dominic Lopes (1996: 3-5) draws between
a picture’s design, subject and content, although I have adapted the meaning of each term
to reflect the conclusions of the previous section. We can distinguish between the following:

Subject: a picture’s subject is the real-world counterpart of the object or event that it
pictorially represents. According to this definition not every picture has a subject
because not every picture represents some actual object or event.4
Design: A picture’s design is the collection of physical properties by means of which it
depicts whatever it does, and which thereby make it the kind of picture it is. The
components of a picture’s design include the marks on its surface and their contours,
colors, hues, degrees of contrast...etc. The design of the picture of Beebo consists of
the contoured adjacent areas of contrasting shades of gray. Depending on the medium
in which the picture appears, the design could be formed by painted brushstrokes, an
arrangement of LCD pixels or aggregated dots of toner. The picture depicts Beebo in
virtue of its design.
Content: I diverge substantially from Lopes’s definition of pictorial content. I will take the
content of a picture be what it depicts. The content of a picture is made manifest by
a picture’s design. For a viewer to understand a picture, she must see it correctly; she
must see what the picture is of, which requires seeing the picture’s design displaying
the picture’s content. In other words, she must see the content in the design. A
picture’s content determines whether it is an F-picture, a Beebo-picture, a Madonnapicture...etc. Given the way that I define depiction, I can say that a picture’s content
determines whether it depicts an F, depicts Beebo or depicts Madonna. The content
4

It is possible for a picture’s subject to be hypothetical. An architectural rendering represents (perhaps
in the sense of standing for?) a hypothetical subject. I don’t know if we should say that it hypothetically
represents its subject, or that it represents a hypothetical subject.
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of the above picture of Beebo is the likeness of Beebo and his visible characteristics
(his expression, his markings) that are visible in its design. Every picture5 has content
insofar as in order to qualify as a picture it must be possible to see something in its
design. We can call this something the depictum.

Note that the difference between the picture’s subject and its content is that the subject
is external to the picture itself. Obama himself is the subject of a picture that pictorially
represents him. The content of a picture is internal to the picture, it is what is made visibly
manifest by the picture’s design. The content of a picture of Obama is the likeness of Obama
that can be seen in the the picture. It is also vital to remember that the depictum is a part
of the picture’s content and, as such, is distinct from its subject. As quoted at the end of
the last section, Abell described depiction as a certain type of relation between picture and
object. Using the terminology just introduced we can state her principle claim to be that
the relation that is of chief concern to a theory of depiction is that between the picture’s
design and its subject. Accordingly, for a basic resemblance theory of depiction, depiction
depends on objective resemblances between a picture’s design and its subject. According to
this theory the picture of Beebo depicts Beebo because the physical features of its design
resemble certain of Beebo’s actual features.
In contrast to Abell, I don’t define depiction as a relation between a picture and object and I
am not concerned with examining possible affinities between a picture’s subject and design.
I’ve argued for using “depiction” as a one place predicate, in the non-relational sense, so that
to say that a picture depicts an F amounts to saying that it is an F-picture. Moreover, I have
claimed that depicting an F or being an F-picture is a matter of having the right content.
Consequently, as I investigate the nature of depiction my primary goal is to understand
what determines pictorial content. I am especially interested in the relationship between a
picture’s content and its design. If Abell is right, most philosophical accounts of depiction
5

Thus, I would not count a purely abstract painting as a proper picture.
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assume a different definition of depiction than the one that I have emphasized. Nevertheless,
these accounts very well could address the issue of pictorial content determination—or, in
Lopes’s words, “what sorts of facts determine what content [a picture] has (2006, 169)”–and
how and to what extent it depends on properties of the picture’s design.
The relation between a picture’s design–the arrangement of marks on its surface–and the
picture’s content–the objects and scenes that can be seen in the picture’s design is, in my
view, the central problem for a theory of depiction. The theory must explain how these
marks make the experience of seeing these objects and scenes possible. In what follows I will
use the term “depiction” to refer to the manner in which a picture’s design makes manifest
meaningful content. This is the essence of the non-relational sense of the term.

2.1.3

Taxonomies

Three recent books about pictures and depiction—Abell and Bantinaki (2010); Newall
(2011); and Kulvicki (2014)–begin with surveys of existing theories of depiction and sort
them into categories. These taxonomies are summarized in table 1. There is significant
overlap between these taxonomies. Each list recognizes the following four types of theory:

(1) Conventionalist/structural theories
(2) Experiential/phenomenological theories
(3) Recognition theories
(4) Resemblance theories

Kulvicki and Newall each add one additional category. These are, respectively:

(5) Pretense theories
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Newall (3-4)

Abell and Bantinaki (1-2)

Kulvicki (1-2)

1

Resemblance theories

1

Structural accounts

1

Experience theories

2

Conventionalist theories

2

Phenomenological accounts

2

Recognition theories

3

Experience-based theories

3

Recognitional accounts

3

Resemblance theories

4

Recognition theories

4

Resemblance accounts

4

Pretense theories

5

Hybrid theories

5

Structural theories

Table 1: Taxonomies
(6) Hybrid theories

There is some disagreement about how to classify certain theories. For example, whereas
Abell and Bantiniaki classify Kendall Walton’s “make-believe” theory with phenomenological
theories, Kulvicki assigns it its own category as a pretense theory and Newall does not
mention it at all. Similarly, Hopkins’s account is alternately characterized as a resemblance
theory by Kulvicki, as an experiential theory by Abell and Bantiniaki, and as a hybrid theory
by Newall. Yet there are distinct points of agreement across all three taxonomies. These
include:

· They agree on the first four classifications, as outlined above.
· They agree in identifying Nelson Goodman’s (1976) theory as the paradigmatic conventionalist theory.
· They agree in categorizing Richard Wollheim’s (1990) and E.H. Gombrich’s otherwise
inconsistent views as experiential theories.
· They agree in attributing the recognition view to Dominic Lopes (1996), and agree
that it is an extension of Flint Schier’s (1986) recognition theory.

How we interpret and compare these taxonomies depends on whether or not the theories
of depiction they categorize are all concerned with the same thing. On the one hand the
difference between these theories may be that they offer rival explanations of the same
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phenomenon. In this case, if two incompatible theories purport to offer the ultimate explanation of depiction, the truth of one would rule out the others. So, if, in fact, depiction
depends on conventions, and resemblance is not conventional, it would follow that the the
resemblance theory is false.6 On the other hand, these classes of theories may be distinguished by the fact that they are about different things. If conventionalist, resemblance,
recognition and experiential theories explain different phenomena—or different aspects of
the same phenomenon—these theories are not necessarily incommensurate with each other.
For example, Michael Newall (2011) contends that recognition theories explain sub-personal
cognitive processes engaged by pictures, whereas experiential theories explain the distinctive
phenomenology of looking at pictures. He argues that these are both essential to understanding depiction, therefore a complete theory of depiction must integrate both recognition
and experiential accounts. According to Newall’s theory of depiction these two theoretical
approaches complement each other to provide a comprehensive account. This example introduces the possibility that the theories cataloged in the above taxonomies don’t necessarily
represent alternative explanations of a single phenomenon, but rather that the scope of these
theories reflects the many dimensions of the problem of picturing. Moreover, it’s possible
that these theories are concerned with different concepts of depiction insofar as they take
different senses as primary.
Therefore, before evaluating the comparative merits of each theory, it might be useful to spell
out precisely what they purport to explain. Since I am interested in theories of depiction
insofar as they account for pictorial content determination, for me the merits of any theory
depend on whether or not it offers a persuasive explanation of, depiction, as I have defined
it. Ultimately, I adopt two theories–Schier’s and Lopes’ recognition view and a version of the
illusion view that is based on E.H. Gombrich’s theory of pictures as substitutes or surrogates
for their subjects. When taken together, I will argue, these two theories provide a functional
6

I contrast resemblance and conventional views merely as an example. There are theories of depiction
that take resemblance to be, at least in part, conventional (see Novitz 1977 or Abell 2009).
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account of depiction. This could suggest an amendment or reorganization of the taxonomies
that I listed above.

2.2

The legibility of pictorial content

In Chapter 2 of Painting as an Art (1990) Richard Wollheim posits the following two conditions on pictorial representation. In order for some marked surface to be a picture of
x:

(i) it must be possible for some viewer to see x in that surface, and
(ii) someone (viz. the picture maker) must intend for x to be seen in that surface.

The second condition distinguishes pictures from non-pictures. Some objects accidentally
satisfy (i). For example, it’s possible that one could see the face of Jesus in a pierogi (e.g.
see Figure 2). Wollheim would argue that while it may be possible to see the face of Jesus in

Figure 2: Jesus’s face in a pierogi
the charred surface of the pierogi, the pierogi does not represent Jesus because the apparent
image of Jesus does not satisfy (ii). Wollheim writes that representation entails “a standard
of correctness” which is “set [for any given representation] by the intentions of the picture
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maker insofar as they are fulfilled (1990, 48).” A marked surface counts as a representation
for Wollheim only if it satisfies (i) in virtue of satisfying (ii). The pierogi is not a picture
of Jesus, because a picture is a manmade artifact which must be intentionally created, and
must satisfy (ii). We may therefore want to maintain that in virtue of this neither does the
pierogi depict Jesus. However, an intentional depiction, as I understand it, is essentially
the same as the manifestation of Jesus in the pierogi, it occurs when some object becomes
apparent in the marked surface of another. Moreover, I think there is a sense in which the
process of creating a picture is not unlike the experience of discovering Jesus in a pierogi. The
picture maker discovers that certain manipulations and transformations of design have the
effect of making certain content manifest in that design. This doesn’t mean that a practiced
and skilled picture maker cannot do this intentionally, or that it is necessarily accidental.
However, I would contend that depiction essentially exploits a perceptual accident–i.e. that
a marked surface can cause a viewer to have a visual experience of something other than the
surface itself.
Generally, Wollheim’s first condition distinguishes picturing from other means of representation—e.g. linguistic representation that depends on semantic and syntactic conventions.
Philosophical accounts of depiction consistently stress the difference between depiction and
description, or more generally, between pictures and language. The difference between language and pictures is relevant to my project. The intentional theory of meaning and communication that I adopt is primarily concerned with language, and understanding the differences
between language and pictures will be helpful to understanding how to apply this theory
to the unique case of pictures. Wollheim’s first necessary condition for depiction explains
the difference between pictures and language in terms of the legibility of their contents. According to (i), for a marked surface to count as a picture its content must be legible—it’s
necessary for someone to actually be able to see x in that marked surface. This is not a necessary condition on linguistic representation. Language is often inscrutable, any utterance
in a foreign language or a character in an unfamiliar alphabet attests to this. Pictures are
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not inscrutable in the same way. Although pictorial styles vary greatly across historical and
cultural contexts, there is no pictorial analogue of an undeciphered ancient writing system
like Linear A. My claim is that there could not be such an analogue in virtue of how the
class of pictures is defined. Insofar as the legibility of a representation requires that its audience possess the competence necessary to interpret it, it follows from the essential legibility
of pictures that there could not be a system of depiction that lacks a suitably competent
audience, because without a competent audience the system of depiction would be illegible,
and it would not qualify as a system of depiction. Whereas the illegibility of Linear A is
consistent with its classification as a system of writing, it precludes its classification as a
system of depiction.
While there are diverse styles of depiction, legibility defines the boundary of depictive stylization. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the contemporary Chinese characters for sun,

Figure 3: Evolution of Chinese characters
mountain and horse. As E.H. Gombrich (2000) notes, the early pictograms (in the leftmost
column) are rudimentary images (xxxi), which are depictive, whereas the contemporary characters (in the rightmost columns) are not. The transformation of these pictograms into the
contemporary characters does not reflect the emergence of a new system of depiction, but
rather is due to the shift to a system of writing, the rules of which dictate each character’s
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form. Interpreting the content of the contemporary characters calls on a different set of skills
from those required to interpret the pictograms. Interpreting the pictograms calls on the
same skills required to interpret other styles of pictures–chief among these being looking. No
amount of looking could render the contemporary Chinese characters legible. As the pictograms transform into the modern characters they turn into linguistic symbols, the contents
of which are obscured by the conventions of the Chinese writing system.7 There certainly are
some pictures that are not fully legible without prompting. Examples include Figure 4, one

Figure 4: Droodle
of Roger Price’s droodles. Before reading the caption that tells us that this depicts a spider
doing a handstand, it might not be obvious that this is anything more than an abstract
composition of lines. However, what the caption provides is nothing more than a prompt
that allows the viewer to attend appropriately to the relevant features of the design. The
prompt does not provide the viewers with the keys to decipher the meaning of the picture,
it simply provides a reorientation of the viewer’s own act of looking in which the content of
the picture becomes immediately legible.
7

The pictorial and linguistic symbols may also be distinguished by how they are intended to be interpreted. The pictorial symbols are intended to be interpreted as pictures–using the skills appropriate to this
task–whereas the linguistic symbols may be intended to be interpreted at text–using the corresponding skill
set.
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2.3

The naturalness of pictorial interpretation

The essential legibility of pictorial content can be explained by what Flint Schier (1986)
describes as the natural generativity of pictorial interpretation (43). According to Schier
two things are necessary and sufficient for the ability to interpret a novel picture:

(i) a basic competence in a system or style of depiction; and
(ii) the ability to recognize the picture’s subject.

On Schier’s view pictorial competence in a system can be attained by successfully interpreting
a single picture in that system. He argues that the ability to interpret a single picture in
a particular style or system of depiction naturally generates the ability to interpret novel
pictures in that system. He writes:

[O]nce you have succeeded in an initial pictorial interpretation, perchance as the
result of some tuition, you should then be able to interpret novel icons without
being privy to additional stipulations given only that you can recognize the object
or state of affairs depicted (43).

Schier introduces the requirement that one first attain basic competence in a pictorial system
in order to avoid committing to the view that pictorial competence is an innate endowment.
It may be necessary to have some exposure to and familiarity with modes of depiction before
one is able to naturally generate interpretations of novel pictures. Yet pictorial competence is
distinguished from linguistic competence insofar as success at interpreting a single utterance
in a natural language is by no means sufficient to successfully interpret novel utterances in
that language. Competence in a language requires mastery of vocabulary and grammatical
rules. Neither of these are necessary for pictorial competence. Rather what is necessary
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for pictorial competence is recognitional ability, which entails familiarity with the visible
features of the depicted subjects. If one possesses the ability to recognize cats, and basic
competence in interpreting paintings, one should be able to interpret Figure 1 as a painting
of a cat.

2.4

The recognition view

Schier is one proponent of what is referred to in the literature as the recognition view of
depiction. This account is further developed by Dominic Lopes who sums up his theory of
depiction as follows:

A picture P depicts something O if and only if (1) P is able to trigger the capacity
of a suitable perceiver in suitable condition to recognize an O by its appearance,
and (2) the satisfaction of (1) is a consequence of a causal relation of the right
kind between O and P (2006: 169).

The second condition on depiction is essentially a standard of correctness like that posited
by Wollheim. Lopes first condition distinguishes his view from Wollheim’s and he avoids
explicit reference to seeing-in in favor of “recogniz[ing] an O by its appearance”. Lopes
argues that identifying what a picture depicts exploits sub-personal, perceptual recognition
skills (1996: 144). Perceptual recognition skills are dynamic. We can recognize the same
individual from novel view points and as it undergoes dramatic change–e.g. we can recognize
a person’s face despite changes in expression or aging. He explains that, “[p]ictures are visual
prostheses; they extend the informational system by gathering, storing, and transmitting
visual information about their subjects in ways that depend upon and also augment our
ability to identify things by their appearance (144).” In many cases the recognition skills
employed in interpreting pictures overlaps with the recognition skills employed in ordinarily
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recognizing things that we see in real life. Pictures can present the same features of their
subjects that we would ordinarily see and we recognize these features the same way that we
would ordinarily recognize them. But pictures can show us their subjects in ways that we
could never see them in real life, and in such cases pictures stretch and augment our ordinary
perceptual recognition skills (146-7). Lopes writes:

The dimensions of variation across which pictorial recognition is dynamic go far
beyond those across which ordinary recognition is dynamic. Pictures can be recognized when they represent their subjects as having combinations of properties
quite unlike those their subject could be seen to have. Pictures’ subjects can
be recognized when skewed and bent out of shape, when shown in reversed or
curvilinear perspective, and when shown inside out or rearranged, as in X-ray
and split-style pictures. Finally, the ability to recognize faces distorted by the
satirist’s pen seems hardly surprising when considered an extension of our ability
to recognize faces changed by growth and age (147).

In one respect, at least, a picture necessarily requires us to recognize its subject in a way
that we would never see it face-to-face–viz. in two dimensions (2006: 170). Our ability to
do this testifies to the dynamism of our perceptual recognition skills.
Lopes contends that the virtue of the recognition-based account of depiction is that it explains
the diversity of possible pictorial styles. It also explains the “transference” of recognitional
abilities. We can learn to identify things in the world by seeing pictures of them, and can
learn to identify pictures of things by seeing their subjects in the world (1996: 149). This
is because the same recognition skills are employed in either case. I would add that the
transference of recognitional abilities further explains why pictures are naturally legible to
a viewer who is familiar with, if not the precise individuals or types of individuals depicted,
the kinds of visual properties that are shared by objects in the world and and objects in
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pictures. The ability to perceive and recognize these properties in the world translates to an
ability to perceive and recognize these properties in a picture.
Schier argues that it is not possible to depict objects that do not exist. For example, he
argues, it is not possible to depict a unicorn because there are no actual unicorns. This
conclusion follows from his account of the role that recognitional skills play in pictorial
interpretation. He writes that, “[u]nfortunately, given that unicorns do not exist and have
never existed, there can be no such thing as an ability to recognize unicorns (109).” If there
is no such thing as the ability to recognize unicorns, then this recognitional ability cannot
play the necessary role in either the creation or interpretation of a picture of a unicorn.
What the picture can depict is a set of properties that are stereotypically associated with
unicorns, which are recognizable, and the picture maker and the viewers can pretend or
imagine that this representation of stereotypical properties constitutes a picture of a unicorn.
However, I would argue that we don’t have to make this move to accommodate non-existent
pictorial subjects if we allow that recognitional abilities can be generated by pictures. This is
precisely what is suggested by Lopes’ account of transference. If recognitional abilities can be
transferred both from the real world to pictures and from pictures to the real world, we should
expect that our recognitional abilities for some objects can originate in our engagement
with pictures–and then be transferrable to our experience with other pictures. A picture
is of a unicorn because it triggers our ability to recognize unicorns, but this ability need
not necessarily be something we possess prior to seeing the picture. This is obvious if we
consider all of the pictures whose subjects we can recognize despite never having seen any
of these subjects except in pictures, e.g. pictures of Obama or deep-sea anglerfish. It would
be accurate to say that it is not possible to pictorially represent a unicorn. A picture of a
unicorn does not bear any kind of relation to an actual subject and thus it does not represent
anything. It should, however, be clear from the preceding discussion that there is a difference
between the criteria for pictorial representation and depiction.
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Lopes explains the diversity of pictorial styles and systems in terms of the different “aspects”
of an object they present. Lopes defines aspects as Lopes argues that pictures are necessarily
selective in the properties of objects that they can show. Lopes defines the aspect that a
picture presents as the total of all of the pictures commitments and non-commitments (1189). For any possible property of a depictum a picture can be committal or non-committal.
The picture is committal if it shows an object as either F or not-F. For example, a picture is
committal about a depicted individual’s headwear if it shows them either wearing a hat or
not wearing a hat. It can be non-committal in either of two ways: implicitly non-committal
or explicitly non-committal. It is implicitly non-committal if it simply does not go into the
matter. A stick-figure drawing can be implicitly non-committal about whether the individual
it depicts is wearing a hat. A picture is explicitly non-committal if it represents an object
in a way that precludes the possibility of its being committal about certain properties. For
example, a picture of a tiger that is obscured by vegetation would in virtue of this necessarily
be non-committal about the number of stripes it has. A picture of a building rendered in
linear perspective would be explicitly non-committal about the appearance of the sides of
the building that are facing away from the viewer. A picture’s content, according to Lopes
includes not only its commitments, but its non-commitments–it includes the things that it
does not or cannot say about the object or scene it depicts. Pictures are necessarily selective
because every picture is explicitly non-committal about some properties, i.e. “every picture
represents its subject as having some property that precludes it from making commitments
about some other property (125).”

2.5

Seeing-in

We might ask what the difference is between seeing something in a picture and recognizing
it in a picture, and whether the ability to recognize an object in a picture, in itself, amounts
to the fully fleshed-out, robust experience of seeing-in. Most basically recognition entails
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a feeling of familiarity with something that is perceived and an ability to identify it as
something–or as a kind of thing–that one has seen before (Lopes 1998, 143). Where in this
experience do we locate the actual seeing of the rendered objects and scenes that is such
a central feature of our engagement with pictures? Michael Newall (2011) argues that in
ordinary seeing recognition of an object is causally prior to visual experience of the object.
He writes:

Seeing X is a process that includes the following related items:
(i) stimulation of the visual system;
(ii) a consequent engagement of the subject’s ability to visually recognize X and
(iii) a consequent visual experience of X by the subject (20).

Newall argues that just as in ordinary experience recognition is a catalyst to seeing, this is
also the case for seeing the content of a picture, although, in the case of a picture, the seeing
is “non-veridical”.
According to Newall, in general, seeing includes an experiential dimension that can be distinguished from the recognitional dimension. This is evident from the fact that recognition can
occur without visual experience. Recognition, according to Newall, essentially amounts to
classification of visual stimuli into groups. It “allows [an individual] to visually identify objects, kinds or properties as ones previously encountered (21).” Recognition occurs without
visual experience in the phenomenon of blindsight. Blindsight is a neurological condition
in which an individual who is presented with an object is not able to see it or have any
visual experience of it, yet is able to derive and make use of information about that object
in virtue of their visual contact with the object. Despite having no visual experience of an
object presented to their visual field, a blindsighted individual will be able to accurately
answer questions about the object. This indicates that they are able to recognize the object
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and derive information about it through visual contact, but in a way that bypasses visual
experience. Newall considers other examples that similarly illustrate that recognition can
occur absent visual experience (22-3). However, he does not allow for the possibility that
visual experience can occur without recognition. Newall claims that “visual experience is the
conscious record of the information processing that constitutes recognition,” and it therefore
follows that “experience of X cannot occur without recognizing X (21).”
There are multiple aspects of this account of visual experience that are potentially problematic. First, if recognition is a necessary condition for visual experience, or seeing, and
recognition entails identifying the object that is seen as one that has been previously encountered, then it appears to follow that it is not possible to have a visual experience, or to see,
genuinely novel phenomena. Moreover, unless we can visually experience novel phenomena
it’s not clear how we attain familiarity with the objects, kinds and properties to which future visual stimuli are compared and with which they are classified by our recognition ability.
There must be some way that visual encounters with novel objects, kinds and properties are
processed so that they can facilitate future classifications that form the basis for recognition,
however Newall does not address this.
Additionally, Newall’s insistence that recognition is necessary for visual experience belies the
fact that both in pictures and in life one might see something that one doesn’t recognize.
Looking at a particular Francis Bacon painting, for example, one might have no idea what
kind of entity one is confronting, but one wouldn’t doubt that they see the entity. Similarly,
one may come across an amorphous mass in the darkness and not be able to tell if it’s a
raccoon or a shrub. One still sees it and has a visual experience of it. Newall might respond
that, in order to see the amorphous mass, one does not need to recognize precisely what kind
of object it is, but rather one must, at a minimum, recognize its constituent properties–e.g.
recognize that it has mass. He might argue that unless one can recognize this, then one
cannot truly be said to have a visual experience of something. However, its possible to
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imagine an example of seeing something that is composed wholly of nebulous properties, of
which, for example, the viewer cannot say whether it is solid or liquid or has some other
unfamiliar property. This inability to recognize the object’s properties or recognize the kind
of object one is confronting does not seem sufficient, contrary to Newall’s suggestion, to
negate the fact that one sees.
More generally, I would argue that Newall offers an unsatisfactory account of the nature of
visual experience, and of seeing, by characterizing it as consisting of nothing over and above
the concurrent, conscious awareness of recognition–particularly if recognition is defined as
the process by which the visual system classifies stimuli into groups. Visual experience
has a qualitative content that is not reducible to the awareness that what is seen belongs
to a particular class or is reminiscent of something one has seen before. This qualitative
dimension is, I would argue, constitutive of visual experience. This is why we are inclined to
allow that a visual experience of a wholly unrecognizable object counts as a visual experience
and as seeing. We do not even need to be able to conceptually grasp what is seen in order
to genuinely see it. Experiencing the redness of a tomato has a distinctive quality that is
not reducible to the recognition that the color is red, that it has been seen before, or that
it belongs to a tomato. This aspect of visual experience is not reducible to the whatness of
the object or phenomenon that is seen. It is rather a matter of what the experience is like,
and is potentially inarticulable. It is also something that pictures are especially well-suited
to conveying–pictures do this more directly and naturally than descriptions.
Pictures not only facilitate recognition of the objects and the properties that they depict, but
they also facilitate seeing these objects and properties in the picture’s design. I take Newall’s
point that recognition alone is insufficient to account for visual experience–the recognition
theory may explain what determines the content that we see in the picture, but it doesn’t
adequately characterize the subsequent rich visual experience of the picture. However, neither does Newall’s characterization of visual experience offer an adequate explanation of the
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phenomenal quality of this experience.
The accounts of depiction that are most concerned with the nature of seeing-in are the experiential views and Wollheim’s is the most influential of these. Wollheim (1990), who coined the
term “seeing-in,” describes it as “a distinct kind of perception” which is “triggered off by the
presence within the field of vision of a differentiated surface (46).” The differentiated surface
can be something like a stained wall or it can be a picture. However, Wollheim “doubt[s]
that anything significant can be said about exactly what a surface must be like for it to
have this effect (ibid.).” The phenomenology of seeing-in is characterized by “twofoldness”.
Wollheim explains that when seeing-in occurs one is aware of both the differentiated surface
itself and of something else, an object or a scene, standing out from or receding behind that
surface. Of these two facets of the phenomenology of seeing-in, Wollheim writes:

They are two aspects of a single experience [which are] distinguishable but also
inseparable. They are two aspects of a single experience, they are not two experiences. They are neither two separate simultaneous experiences, which I somehow
hold in the mind at once, nor two separate alternating experiences, between which
I oscillate–though it is true that each aspect of the single experience is capable
of being described as analogous to a separate experience. It can be described
as though it were a case of simply looking at a wall or a case of seeing a boy
face-to-face. But it is error to think that this is what it is (46-7).

So, seeing-in has a unique, complex phenomenology, the two parts of the complex phenomenology are somewhat analogous to ordinary perceptual experiences, yet utterly unassimilable with such ordinary experiences. He labels the two aspect of seeing-in the configurational aspect and the representational aspect (73). The configurational aspect of seeing-in
is the aspect that is like the ordinary experience of seeing a differentiated surface directly,
yet unlike the ordinary experience because it is always, no matter how subtly, permeated
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with the awareness of an object or scene manifest in the surface. The representational aspect
of the experience is like the ordinary experience of seeing an object or scene directly, yet is
unlike the ordinary experience insofar as it is always accompanied, no matter how subtly,
with awareness of the differentiated surface. This complex phenomenology makes seeing-in a
distinct form of perception and, Wollheim seems to suggest, a distinct perceptual capacity.
One could argue that what distinguishes the configurational from the representational aspects
of, e.g. the complex experience of seeing the boy in the wall, is that the representational
aspect requires recognition of the boy. This would mean that recognition is necessary for
seeing-in. I would agree with this. If it’s not possible to recognize something manifest in
the design of a picture the picture fails to have legible content and so it does not depict
anything. In the case of the Francis Bacon painting we could say that the nebulous entity
does not constitute legible content, except to the extent that some of its properties are
recognizable, e.g. the fact that the entity has teeth or that is has mass. However, recognition
is not sufficient for seeing-in. Newall makes this very point about pictorial experience.
Newall maintains that recognition plus the concurrent, conscious awareness of recognition
are together sufficient to sustain the type of visual experience characteristic of looking at
pictures. I disputed this. Wollheim’s account of seeing-in might suggest an alternative to
Newall’s proposal. On this view, while recognition is necessary to seeing-in insofar as it
underpins the representational aspect, we must also experience the configurational aspect of
a picture. These two experiences combined are sufficient for seeing-in. I believe that there
is something to this: pictorial experience includes seeing elements of the picture’s design in
addition to recognizing the depictum. However, pace Wollheim, I don’t believe it requires
seeing the design as a design. Wollheim contends that for seeing-in to occur we must be
aware of the differentiated surface (i.e. the design) in its own right. I think this is false.
It is simply the case that the phenomenology of looking at a picture is grounded in and
constrained by the experience of seeing the picture’s design–viz. seeing the colors, contours,
textures...etc. constitutive of the design.
29

Wollheim catalogues the types of things that can be seen in a surface. They include both
objects and events–which are, more or less, of a kind with those that we can see directly.
They also include not only particular objects and events, but types of objects or events.
This suggests an additional difference between seeing-in and seeing directly. We can only
see particulars directly, we can never see types of objects or events directly except insofar
as we see them instantiated as particulars. Wollheim stresses that insofar as it makes types
of objects and events visually available, in their own right, the capacity for seeing-in is even
further distinguished from the conventional capacity for seeing directly (68-71).
Lopes (1996) labels Wollheim’s position “strong twofoldness” because it holds that twofoldness is essential to seeing-in (47). Any experience of seeing-in must be twofold. Insofar
as seeing-in is necessary for ascertaining the content of a picture, pictorial experience must
itself always be twofold. However, this condition on seeing in and, by extension, pictorial
experience is, I would argue, too strict for two reasons: First, there are clearly familiar
examples of pictures that are not experienced as twofold. When looking at a photograph,
whether it is printed or on a screen, I am generally not aware of the design features, or the
picture surface in its own right. These become transparent and all that I see is the depicted
individual or scene. One who wishes to defend strong twofoldness might argue that I am
necessarily aware of these design features even though I may not consciously attend to them.
However, I don’t see what would motivate this argument except the prior stipulation that
twofoldness is necessary for seeing-in. Unless we presuppose the necessity of twofoldness for
seeing-in, there’s no reason to insist that twofoldness is a feature of experiences that seem
to manifestly lack twofoldness.
Secondly, even in the case of pictures that have design features that are more prominent,
like a rough sketch or a painting with highly visible, expressive brushstrokes, I would argue that while it is possible that we experience the design and its content simultaneously,
there is a natural tension between attending to one and attending to the other. Oscillation
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between them is inevitable. They are not fused seamlessly into a single, unique experience.
Wollheim accuses E.H. Gombrich of denying the very possibility of twofoldness by stressing
the tension between these two levels of pictorial experience (46n6, 77). Lopes similarly notes
that Gombrich’s apparent denial of the very possibility of twofoldness threatens to undermine the credibility of Gombrich’s view. Lopes terms the view that twofoldness is consistent
with–although not essential to–seeing-in “weak twofoldness” (1996: 47). Lopes argues that
twofoldness plainly is a feature of our engagement with some pictures, and a plausible theory of pictorial representation must accommodate this possibility (42). I agree with Lopes
that it would be difficult to categorically rule-out the possibility of twofoldness. If this were
entailed by Gombrich’s view, it would count strongly against it. However, I don’t think that
this is the case. We can maintain weak twofoldness, we don’t need to strictly rule out the
possibility of twofoldness in pictorial experience, and this is not entailed in pointing out, as
Gombrich does, that there is a natural tension between attending to pictorial content and
attending to pictorial design. Generally, one comes at the expense of the other, but they
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In any case, Wollheim’s theory of seeing-in maintains
strong twofoldness. Strong twofoldness is not consistent with the way that we experience
many pictures, and this is a problem for Wollheim’s theory of seeing-in.
Over and above its twofoldness, Wollheim argues that seeing-in is a distinctive perceptual
capacity because it allows us to see things that simply could not be seen face to face– viz.
types of objects and events (70-1). I don’t find this argument persuasive. For a picture to
represent a type of object, for example a 19th Century Parisian café-patronizing-type rather
than a particular 19th Century Parisian café patron, it must depict a particular 19th Century
Parisian café patron. The particular café patron that it depicts is the one that can be seen
in the picture. It is a particular café patron with a particular determinate set of properties.
It is a particular because it is visible, whereas the type café-patron is not. The particular
café patron who is depicted may be used to represent the café-patronizing-type. However,
we don’t need a special perceptual capacity to perceive the content of the picture–i.e. the
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particular depicted. We could very well perceive the café patron in the picture the same way
that we ordinarily would. In general, I am skeptical of Wollheim’s suggestion that seeing-in
is a distinct perceptual capacity. Rather, I would argue that if we are to retain the concept
of seeing-in it has to be explained as continuous with ordinary visual perception, rather
than–to use Wollheim’s own term–incommensurable with it.

2.6

Make-believe

Kendall Walton (2008) suggests that his own account of depiction can supplement Wollheim’s
account of seeing-in (134). Walton argues that Wollheim fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of the experience of seeing-in because Wollheim’s description of the “representational”
aspect of the twofold experience of seeing-in–i.e. the aspect that reveals the picture’s content–is inadequate. As discussed above, Wollheim describes this aspect of seeing-in as in
some sense comparable, but ultimately unassimilable with the type of experience one would
have when seeing a picture’s subject face to face. Walton contends that this dimension of
seeing-in can be construed as seeing the subject in a way that is “colored by” imagination
(138). Unfortunately, Walton is not very clear on what is entailed in this manner of seeing. Moreover, Walton’s amendment to Wollheim’s theory can only overcome the problem
I identified with Wollheim’s account of seeing-in if the manner of seeing that Walton has
in mind is essentially continuous with ordinary seeing and doesn’t constitute a sui generis
perceptual capacity of the kind Wollheim describes.
Walton’s suggestion is grounded in the theory of depiction that he presents in Mimesis as
Make-Believe (1990). He argues that depictions are props for perceptual games of makebelieve, and he defines depiction in terms of having this function. This, in his view, makes
pictures similar to verbal fictions, which are also props in games of make-believe. However,
pictures are different from verbal representations in virtue of the types of games that they
serve. When a viewer looks at a picture, they participate in a game of make-believe in
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which it is fictional that they, themselves, see the objects depicted in virtue of looking at
the picture’s design. Looking at the picture the viewer makes-believe, or imagines, that they
are looking at the scene depicted (293). For example, in virtue of looking at the picture of
Beebo in Figure 1, it is fictional that the viewer looks at Beebo. What is distinctive of the
game of make-believe proper to a picture is the nature of the viewer’s participation in the
game. The viewer is part of a fictional world of the game that she plays, and her actual acts
of observing the picture make it fictionally true in this game that she is observing the objects
it depicts. If she spends a long time looking at, for example, the part of the picture that
depicts Beebo’s eyes, it is fictionally true in the game that she spends a long time looking
at Beebo’s eyes (304). Walton explains:

Traditional disputes about the role of resemblance in depiction concern similarities between pictures and the things they picture. We will do better to look
for similarities in a different place–between lookings at pictures and lookings at
things, between the acts of perception rather than the things perceived. The
process of investigating the “world of a picture” by examining the picture is
analogous in important ways to the process of investigating the real world by
looking at it. Visual examinations of picture men and picture mountains, to
speak loosely, are like visual examinations of real men and real mountains (302).

Although Abell and Bantiniaki (2010) classify Walton’s view as a phenomenological account,
I would argue that this is not an accurate reading of the position that Walton sets forth.
The similarity between a picture and its real world counterpart is not explained by the
phenomenal quality of the experience of looking at each–Walton does not think that the
two look the same. Rather the similarity has to do with the activities characteristic of “the
process of inspecting pictures to ascertain what is fictional and the process of inspecting
reality to ascertain what is true, between visual investigations of picture worlds and visual
investigations of the real world (304).” The types of visual activities that constitute visually
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Figure 5: Giannis Antetokounmpo
inspecting a picture are the same as the types of visual activities that constitute inspecting
a scene. Our eyes scan the details contained in the picture as they would scan the details of
a scene. We see more in the picture the longer we inspect it. The order in which we discover
the details corresponds to their visual prominence.
Walton asserts that the “depictive content of a work is a matter of what sorts of thing
it is fictional (in appropriate sorts of games) that one sees when one looks at the picture
(297).” The objects that are contained in the picture are determined by what fictional
truths the picture is capable of generating (ibid.). When looking at the picture one is not
free to imagine anything that they want, if they are playing the game correctly, rather,
the picture prescribes very specific imaginings (303).

The games of make-believe that a

picture authorizes are constrained by the content of the picture which is itself limited to,
what Lopes calls, the particular aspect of its subject that the picture presents. For example,
Figures 5 and 6 present two aspects of Giannis Antetokounmpo. They authorize different
games of make-believe. I can make-believe that I see Giannis as he really is when I look at
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Figure 6: Giannis Antetokounmpo
the stick-figure rendering, but this is not authorized by the content of the picture, because
no act of looking at the picture’s design could count as looking at, for example, the definition
of his muscles or the uniform he is wearing. The picture only authorizes a game in which I
can make-believe that I am looking at the selective aspect of Giannis that is portrayed–as
a sneaker wearing man, who is holding a basketball aloft. The content of the picture of
Giannis in Figure 6 is much richer than the content of Figure 5 because it serves a much
richer game of make-believe.
The stick figure of drawing of Giannis is potentially a problematic example. It is questionable
whether or not one can actually see Giannis in this picture and thus questionable whether or
not it does actually depict Giannis. It might be the case that it simply depicts a figure who
is as thin as a stick, and this figure is used to represent Giannis in some context. Alternately
we might say that it does depict some (very impoverished) aspect of Giannis. In general, to
depict some subject it is not necessary for a picture to present an aspect of the subject that
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conforms precisely to how that subject would appear in real life. I am not completely certain
about which of these alternatives is correct. In the latter case there would be features of
the actual design that I overlook in my interpretation of the stick-figure. One would have to
take the picture to be non-committal regarding, for example, Giannis’s build and clothing.
However, if the drawing is non-committal about all the features that make Giannis himself
recognizable, then we could not recognize Giannis in the picture and it would not depict
him.
Schier (1986) suggests two objections to Walton’s make-believe view of depiction. First, Walton’s account of the nature of a game of make-believe seems to require that correspondence
rules are stipulated and understood in advance by the game’s participants on the basis of
which the rules of the game spontaneously generate new fictional truths. For example, in a
game of mud pies it is stipulated that globs of mud correspond to pies, and that pebbles in
these globs of mud correspond to raisins. Therefore, according to this stipulation it is fictionally true in the game of make-believe that someone who has a glob of mud with pebbles in it
has a raisin-filled pie. Schier questions whether there are any such stipulated rules governing
our engagement with pictures. There do not seem to be predetermined rules that correlate
marks on the design surface with fictional truths about looking at the depicted subjects of
pictures (23). Schier is correct about this. We are able to understand pictures without having an explicit prior knowledge of any set of overarching rules governing our engagement with
them. However, I would suggest that in order to understand a picture as a picture one must
understand the picture maker’s intention that it serve a particular function, as the focus of
the viewer’s imaginative projection. While no stipulated rules govern our engagement with
pictures, there is an implicit expectation that the viewer will respond imaginatively to visual
cues that are present in the picture’s design. The viewer responds to these visual cues in
virtue of recognizing the picture maker’s intention that these cues serve this function–that
they are meant to illicit the viewer’s imaginative response. While we might allow that there
is an interplay between the picture’s design and the viewer’s response, this does not depend
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on stipulated rules and thus it seems inaccurate to characterize it as a rule-governed game
of make-believe. Thus, there is an aspect of Walton’s view that seems to genuinely capture
a dimension our engagement with pictures. Pictures prescribe certain types of imaginings
in virtue of their design and their content. However, these prescriptions do not serve as the
basis for rule-governed games of make-believe.
Secondly, Schier points out that according to Walton’s account anything can be stipulated
as an appropriate prop in a visual game of make-believe. For example, two arbitrary marks
X and Y can be stipulated to stand for pies and raisins. Based on this stipulated correspondence, looking at XY would count as looking at a raisin pie. This would be a problem for
Walton’s view because clearly the arbitrary marks XY should not count as a picture of a
raisin pie. The reason that XY do not count as a picture of raisin pie is that a viewer cannot
see a raisin pie in virtue of looking at the marks XY. Part of this has to do with the fact
that the marks XY do not trigger our recognition ability for raisin pie. But, as Newall has
shown us, there is another dimension to seeing the raisin pie in the picture. Recognizing the
content of a picture is not identical to seeing the content in the picture because the two can
come apart, as they do in cases of blindsight where an individual is capable of recognizing
an object despite having no visual experience of it. I’ve argued that Newall fails to fully
appreciate the qualitative aspect of this experience, as he doesn’t regard visual experience
as anything over and above the conscious record of recognition. However we ultimately construe visual experience, looking at the marks XY does not furnish a visual experience as
of a raisin pie, and this is the other part of the reason why the marks XY don’t count as
a picture. Moreover, as the quote above suggests Walton seems to side-step the question
of pictorial experience by placing emphasis on looking–i.e. on the types of visual activities
typical of looking at pictures and their affinity with the visual activities that constitute ordinary looking. The fact that the visual experience one has when looking at a picture is
enacted in a particular way does not tell us anything about the phenomenological character
of the experience itself. It certainly does not indicate that the pictorial visual experience
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will be phenomenally similar to an ordinary visual experience of the pictured object. On
my reading, Walton himself seems to make this much clear, and this is why I denied that
Walton’s was actually a phenomenological account.
Ultimately, as Schier’s objection makes clear, Walton’s account of visual games of makebelieve does not provide us with a way of distinguishing pictures from non-pictures–like
the marks XY. It therefore cannot, on its own, serve as an adequate theory of depiction.
Additionally, I have argued his theory does not get us any closer to understanding the
phenomenal quality of pictorial experience. Therefore, this theory cannot supplement the
recognition view in this respect. Nevertheless, as I will argue in a later chapter, parts of
Walton’s view, particularly his account of the imaginative engagement elicited by pictures,
do help to explain how we understand and interpret pictures.

2.7

Substitution and Illusion

Walton’s view is inspired by E.H. Gombrich’s argument, in the essay “Meditations on a
Hobby Horse,” that representational artworks are substitutes for the objects they represent.
In this essay Gombrich asks what makes a crude toy hobby horse, consisting of little more
than a stick to ride on, an adequate representation of a horse. He argues that the hobby
horse is not an abstraction from a real horse–the child does not think of it as a stripped down
replica of a real or imaginary horse. Rather the hobby horse, no matter how minimal its form,
is a representation of a horse because it is a substitute for a horse, and it is an adequate
substitute for a horse because it fulfills the specific function of being ridable. Gombrich
writes, “[i]t needed two conditions [to] turn a stick into our hobby horse: first, that its form
make it just possible to ride on it; secondly–and perhaps decisively–that riding mattered
(7).”
Gombrich argues that the same thing that holds for the hobby horse holds for images. He
argues that image making is creative rather than imitative. The image maker does not copy
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the subject that she depicts, but rather she creates a substitute for the subject, that exists
in its own right. The substitute serves as a representation of the subject because it fulfills a
particular function. He writes of substitutes:

[T]he common factor [is] function rather than form. Or, more precisely, that
formal aspect which fulfill[s] the minimum requirement for the performance of
the function...‘substitutes’ reach deep into biological functions that are common
to man and animal. The cat runs after the ball as if it were a mouse...In a
sense the ball ‘represents’ a mouse to the cat...[But] ‘representation’ does not
depend on formal similarities, beyond the minimum requirements of function.
The ball has nothing in common with the mouse except that it is chasable...As
‘substitutes’ they fulfill certain demands of the organism. They are keys which
happen to fit into biological or psychological locks, or counterfeit coins which
make the machine work when dropped into the slot (4).

In this quote Gombrich is discussing how substitution is key to representation–not specifically
to depiction. I have argued that depiction and representation are distinct concepts. As I
have construed representation it entails the stipulation that a picture stands for, picks out,
denotes or refers to something. It is possible that Gombrich has here identified another mode
of representation: acting as a perceptual surrogate. However, I don’t think this is the case
for two reasons: First, it cannot simply be stipulated that something acts as a perceptual
surrogate. For it to fulfill this function it must fit into the right kind of “biological or
psychological locks”. Secondly, Gombrich contrasts his view of representation with one that
stresses formal similarities. This suggests that he’s offering an alternative to the resemblance
view, which I take to be primarily a theory of depiction rather than representation. Thus, I
would argue that Gombrich’s functional account of “representation” might yield legitimate
insights for a theory of depiction.
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Gombrich’s functional view suggests the foundation for a theory of depiction that would
contrast with resemblance theories of depiction. Whereas a resemblance theory stresses the
formal similarities between a picture and its subject, Gombrich suggests that the only formal
similarity that is necessary is that which is required to secure similarity in function. In fact,
there can be no discernible formal similarity if the relevant functional similarity is present.
The hobby horse is a paradigmatic example of this. However, we might ask whether the
minimum similarity required for a substitute is sufficient for depiction. While the hobby
horse and the ball the cat chases may both act as functional surrogates for a real horse or
mouse, neither counts as a depiction of that for which it substitutes. One might argue that,
in fact, these examples fall short of the threshold for depiction because they fail to resemble
a horse or a mouse. I would respond that the reason these examples are not depictions is
not that they lack formal similarities, but rather that they fail to possess the relevant kind
of functional similarity. They are not the right kinds of substitutes.
A picture of a horse is not ridable like a hobby horse. As a picture, rather than a toy, it
is a different kind of substitute for its subject. It must fulfill a different kind of function.
While it might be possible to roll up the picture and ride it like a horse, this would not be
using the picture as a picture. As a picture it must fulfill a visual function. Its function is
to elicit a visual response that is, in certain respects, like that elicited by a horse. Similarly,
it is possible to ball up a picture of a mouse and throw it on the ground for a cat to chase
it, fulfilling its role as a substitute mouse, but this is not to treat the picture as a picture.
A picture of a mouse is a purely visual substitute for a mouse. The picture fulfills its role
as substitute in two ways. First, it does so by engaging the viewer’s ability to recognize
the mouse or horse in the picture. But it also grounds the viewer’s visual experience of the
mouse or horse–the picture’s design is such that it can sustain this experience. This is the
sense in which pictures are “keys which happen to fit into biological or psychological locks,”
as Gombrich puts it. It may be the case that under normal circumstances recognition is
causally prior to and informs visual experience, as Newall suggests. However, as follows from
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the previous discussion of the gap between recognition and visual experience, the picture’s
design can ground a phenomenally rich visual experience even absent recognition. Granted,
if it fails to prompt recognition a picture cannot be said to have legible content and thus
does not depict anything.
Additionally, Gombrich’s functional view suggests a contrast to theories of depiction which
emphasize pictorial reference. Depiction is obviously not necessary for reference. The
paradigm of reference is a proper name, which clearly does not depict its referent. However, it could be argued that depiction is sufficient for reference, and, conversely, it could be
argued, along the lines of Goodman, that reference or denotation is necessary for depiction.
This argument would clearly rely on the relational sense of depiction, which I have rejected.
In any case, Gombrich’s substitute theory makes it clear that reference is extrinsic to depiction. What is required for successful depiction is that a picture satisfy its function as a visual
substitute for the object it depicts. We have seen how a substitute for x is functionally similar to x: because it engages similar psychological and perceptual capacities as x. A referring
expression is not functionally similar to its referent in the same way. It brings its referent to
mind, but we do not engage with the referring expression in a way that is at all similar to the
way that we engage with the referent. A referring expression is not functionally analogous
to its referent, whereas a picture is functionally analogous to it subject. A picture furnishes
more direct access to its subject and this access does not rely on the mechanism of reference.
There is a potentially serious problem with adopting Gombrich’s view. If we simply accept
the claim that a picture depicts x insofar as it acts as a visual surrogate for x we seem to be
construing depiction as a kind of relation: the relation of acting as a substitute for. I have
argued against construing depiction as a kind of relation–particularly as a relation between
a picture and its subject. Moreover, if acting as a substitute for is the kind of relation that
entails the existence of the depictum it cannot account for the depiction of non-existents.
Thus, we cannot uncritically adopt the central precept of Gombrich’s view. A picture’s
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design properties are such as to facilitate recognition of the objects or events that make up
its content. That is, its design is capable of engaging a viewer’s ability to recognize x despite
the fact that:

(i) the design is not itself x; and
(ii) it is typically x that engages the ability to recognize x.

The observations in (i) and (ii) make the substitution view seem attractive: the picture’s
design is essentially doing the job of x. The picture’s design does another job: it determines
and constrains the phenomenal quality of pictorial experience. The colors, contours, patterns, textures...etc. that constitute the design are the literal object of our visual experience
and they ground our experience of pictorial content. To use an oversimplified example, when
we look at a painting of a tomato, we don’t simply recognize the depictum as a tomato but
we have a visual experience of its redness. This visual experience is not simply reducible to
the concurrent, conscious awareness of recognition, as Newall claims. It has a distinct phenomenology that entails experiencing the tomato’s redness. The experience of the tomato’s
redness is literally an experience of the redness of a painted area of canvass.8 This colored
patch of paint is experienced as something other than it is, it is experienced as the redness of
a tomato. Again, this makes it tempting to say that the swatch of color serves as a substitute
for the tomato–by sustaining the type of experience that would typically be sustained by
looking at a red tomato. However, insofar as substitution implies a kind of relation between
a picture’s design and an existent subject, it cannot be central to a theory of depiction that
takes the non-relational sense of the term as primary.
Is it possible to construe a picture as a substitute or a surrogate for x without taking x
to be the necessarily existent subject of the picture? For example, does it make sense to
8

Of course, the way that we experience the colors of a painted composition is much more complicated
than this simple example suggests. Composition, contrast, and the effects of color constancy all affect how
we experience colors. In any case, however, what we do experience is determined and constrained by features
of the picture’s design.
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say that a picture is a substitute or surrogate for a unicorn? It seems that the hobbyhorse could be replaced with a hobby-unicorn without invalidating Gombrich’s point. Much
like a hobby-horse, a hobby-unicorn fulfills its function by be being ridable–and perhaps by
performing some other function central to its role in imaginative play. It is a functional
analog to a non-existent being–albeit, a non-existent being that does have hypothetical or
fictional functions, which the surrogate replicates. Could a picture of a unicorn similarly
serve as a functional analog to a non-existent being. The relevant function here is to evoke
and sustain a visual experience as of a unicorn. There is no actual entity–except for another
picture of a unicorn–that fulfills this function. There is a fictional, or hypothetical entity
that could fulfill this function were it to exist. We know from the mythology of unicorns
more or less what it would mean for this creature to fulfill this function. It would facilitate
a visual experience of a unicorn. Does fulfilling this function make a picture of a unicorn a
surrogate or substitute for a unicorn? I think that it does. The substitute theory of depiction
does not entail the relational sense of depiction–specifically it does not require us to construe
depiction as a type of relation between a picture and an existent subject.
The fact that a picture’s design can elicit and sustain a visual experience of something
other than itself might be interpreted to mean that the picture effects an illusion. In fact,
Gombrich’s view is often described as an “illusion theory,” although Gombrich himself does
not present anything that could count as a fully developed illusion theory of depiction.9 I
would argue that this is an apt way to characterize our experience of a picture. In virtue of
recognizing an object in a picture–e.g. recognizing it as a flower or as a cat–we experience
the marks that constitute the picture’s design as the visible features of the depictum–e.g. as
the textured petals of a flower or as a cat’s whiskers. Although we literally see the picture’s
design we experience it as something other than it is. I think it is appropriate to describe
the experience that the picture’s design facilitates as an illusion.
Lopes (1996) dismisses illusion theories of depiction based on his interpretation of what
9

Certainly, no such theory is presented in Art and Illusion (1977).
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is entailed in illusion. He takes the illusion view to hold that a picture of x causes an
experience that is visibly indistinguishable from the experience seeing x in the flesh. This
type of experience is such that it could lead one to believe that x is present. He writes:

As I construe it, then, the illusion theory states that a picture depicts such-andsuch if and only if there are circumstances in which a viewer looking at the picture
might, on the basis of her experience of it, come to believe she sees such-and-such
(1996, 38).

If this is what is entailed by an illusion theory of depiction, then the theory must be false
since we generally look at pictures of objects with the full awareness that they are pictures
and that the objects depicted are not actually present. However, I think this interpretation
of the illusion view is incorrect. The viewer can experience an illusion without believing that
the picture’s subject is present, and even with full awareness that their experience of the
subject is caused by a picture. In contrast to Lopes, Catherine Wilson (1987) argues:

No survey of the ordinary applications of the term ‘illusion’ [...] will establish
the existence of a logical connection between illusion and false belief. Nor will
unbiased survey establish that having the illusion of x must be visually indistinguishable from the experience of really seeing it (216).

Rather, she contends, pictorial illusion occurs when “something which is not x nevertheless
presents the characteristic appearance of x (216).” This is precisely what happens when
the elements of a picture’s design sustain the experience of the depictum. The design makes
possible an experience as of the that object. This experience counts as an illusion because the
elements of the picture’s design are experienced as though they were something other than
what they are. This is sufficient for the experience to count as an illusion. The viewer can be
fully aware of the fact that they are looking at a picture, and in some cases they can even be
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aware of the marks and textures of the design as such–they can simultaneously experience
them as the marks that they are while they experience them as constituent features of the
depictum.
However, the picture’s design can effect an illusion only in virtue of the fact that it triggers
the viewer’s recognition ability. This is the sense in which, as Newall contends, recognition
is a catalyst for visual experience. In virtue of the viewer’s recognition of a picture’s subject,
the marks that constitute its design are transformed, in the viewer’s experience, into the
depictum’s visible features. Lopes (2006) himself describes this mechanism using the picture
in Figure 7 as an example. In the picture of the Dalmatian, the curve that forms the top

Figure 7: Dalmatian
edge of the dog’s back consists of dots and spaces that are not visible as a curve until the
form of the Dalmatian is visible. Seeing the Dalmatian transforms the viewer’s experience
of the design properties of the picture. What otherwise appeared to be empty white space,
punctured by random black dots, now appears as the curved edge of the dog’s back, which
stands out from the background of the image. Seeing the picture’s design properties as the
contour of the dog’s shape is a consequence of first recognizing the dog in the picture (2006:
167).
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Gombrich’s functional theory of pictures as substitutes for their subjects helps to illuminate
the way that pictorial design underpins both recognition and pictorial experience. The design
elicits and sustains the experience of the picture’s depictum–i.e. the design is experienced as
something other than itself. Although it might be tempting to say that the design thereby
acts as a functional substitute for the picture’s subject, this would be misleading insofar as
it suggests a kind of relation between the picture and an extra-pictorial subject. Rather
we can say that the picture’s design properties have the capacity to elicit experiences of
things other than themselves. They fulfill the function of sustaining a visual experience of
an object in lieu of that object. This object may be real, hypothetical or fictional (perhaps
even impossible). Additionally, I have argued that we should think of the way that pictorial
design presents pictorial content as a kind of illusion. This is not only consistent with the
recognition view, but supplements the view insofar as the recognition view, as Newall points
out, does not in itself offer a satisfactory account of pictorial experience.

2.8

Resemblance

Lastly, it will be useful to briefly discuss the resemblance view. It’s clear at first glance that
the resemblance view is inconsistent with my own theoretical commitments. Specifically,
the resemblance view cannot but construe depiction as a kind relation–it is the relation of
resemblance. However, as is frequently noted, this view has considerable pre-theoretical intuitive appeal. Additionally, proponents of the resemblance view offer compelling arguments
in its favor and if these arguments are ultimately viable, then the resemblance view could be
an attractive alternative to the view that I have defended. Resemblance views hold that a
picture depicts its subject in virtue of the fact that a viewer perceives a resemblance between
the picture’s design and the subject. This basic tenet of the resemblance view is, arguably, a
natural construal of the claim that a picture “looks like” its subject. Catherine Abell argues
that there are various possible dimensions of resemblance that can hold between a picture’s
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design and its subject. The list of possibilities includes “occlusion shape, texture, tonal relations, apparent size relations of parts relative to a point, relative spatial location of parts,
local color and aperture color relative to a point (196).” She groups these dimensions of
resemblance into three categories: (i) objective intrinsic features, like texture; (ii) objective
nonintrinsic features, like occlusion shape; and (iii) response-dependent features like apparent color contrast. By including response-dependent features Abell allows for the possibility
that the resemblances that hold between a picture’s design and its subject may not be actual
resemblances but rather only experienced resemblances. For example, a painting of a sunset
may represent the contrasting tones and hues of the sunset in a way that does not faithfully
capture the true intensity of the brightness and color of the actual scene. It may still be
experienced as resembling that scene, if, for example, the picture maker represents color and
light contrast in a sufficiently evocative way.
For any resemblance view what really matters is that the resemblances are apparent and
experienced as resemblances. This is where the explanatory value of resemblance resides. It
is not especially relevant that the resemblances actually hold between a picture’s design and
its subject as long as, for the viewer, they appear to hold. One could propose the view that
the there are similarities between the picture’s design and its subject which are not evident
to the viewer but are nevertheless responsible for the fact that the viewer sees the subject
when they look at the picture’s design. However, this view would not be a resemblance view.
For any resemblance view what matters is that the resemblance is experienced and that the
experience of the resemblance explains why the subject can be seen in the picture. Thus, the
distinction between actual and experienced resemblance views is not particularly meaningful.
Moreover, there are at least two reasons to forego discussion of actual resemblance. First,
given that experienced resemblances are the relevant resemblances, there is no reason to seek
out actual resemblances unless there is a reason to believe that experienced resemblances
must rest on underlying actual resemblances. It’s not clear that there is any reason to
believe that this is the case. It is possible to experience two things as resembling each other
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without knowing what actual properties the two objects share. This is a common experience
that occurs when we experience one person as resembling another but we can’t precisely
say wherein the resemblance lies. I might think that an acquaintance reminds me of Daniel
Day Lewis, but I can’t say for sure what shared features are responsible for this impression.
On the other hand, it’s possible to experience two things as resembling each other with the
full knowledge that they aren’t actually similar. For example, when I look at the picture of
the sunset I know that its colors don’t truly resemble in intensity or brightness those of the
actual scene, but I can nevertheless experience a resemblance between the picture and the
scene. For the sake of dispelling the impression that experienced resemblances must rest on
underlying actual resemblances it is useful to formally divorce the two, as Robert Hopkins
does, by explicitly framing his view as an experienced resemblance view, which simply does
not take actual resemblances into consideration. One might hesitate to embrace this view
due to the worry that if experienced resemblance does not rest on actual resemblance then
we must regard this resemblance as illusory. This might give us pause if we are wary of
basing our theory of depiction on a view that embraces aspects of illusionism. While I’m
not sure that the experienced resemblance view entails illusionism, I don’t think that it is a
problem if it does.
Secondly, when it is construed as concerning actual resemblances, the resemblance view is
most vulnerable to objections. There are multiple, exhaustive accounts of its shortcomings
as a viable theory of depiction. Nelson Goodman (1976) is perhaps the most influential
among the opponents of the view. Among his criticisms of the view is his observation that
resemblance is often construed as the faithful copying of an object as it is. This, he argues,
is problematic because the notion of the object as it is is itself problematic. He writes: “the
object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool
and much more (6).” It is unclear in which of these respects a faithful depiction should
or could resemble the object. A general lesson we can take away from this is that there
is no resemblance simpliciter. Rather, resemblance is always resemblance in some respect.
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However, when we try to home in on the respects of resemblance that sustain depiction we
run into difficulties. Pictures resemble their subjects in many ways that are not relevant.
For example, a book and a pen and ink sketch of the book are both made of paper; they
can both be damaged if exposed to fire; they are both subject to the laws of gravity...etc.
None of these resemblances have anything to do with depiction. Conversely, we also find the
the book and the picture are dissimilar in various respects: the book is three dimensional
whereas the picture is flat; the book is a colored object whereas the drawing is black and
white; the book can be picked up and handled whereas the image of the book cannot...etc.
The actual respects of resemblance between a picture and its subject are simultaneously too
broad to be relevant, yet inadequate to explain the apparent similarity between them.
Hopkins (1998) identifies a further problem for the actual resemblance view. It concerns
what he terms the “logical framework” of depiction (50). Actual resemblance is a relation
that holds between two particulars, whereas it is possible to depict a type of object while
not depicting any particular object. I can create a drawing of a book that is not a drawing
of any particular book. There may be no particular book that my drawing resembles. If
resemblance is always a relation between particulars then resemblance cannot explain how
my picture depicts a book. As Hopkins puts it:

The problem is that resemblance is a relation between two particulars–one resembling the other. It is hard to know how to make sense of resemblance between
a particular thing and some, but no particular, item of a certain sort (10-11).

Hopkins argues that a theory that stresses experienced rather than actual resemblances can
overcome this problem for the resemblance view. He argues that it is possible to experience
a resemblance between something and some other, but no particular, kind of thing. For
example, on can experience the sound of one’s car engine failing, as resembling the sound
typically made when car engines fail without identifying any specific instance of car engine
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failure that the sound resembles (50).10
For these reasons, it is best to focus on experienced resemblance. The experienced resemblance view still faces the challenge of specifying precisely which dimensions of resemblance
are relevant to depiction. However, it can immediately rule out any that aren’t part of how
we experience–or more precisely, how we see–the content of the picture. The experienced
resemblance view holds that there is some feature of the picture’s design that we experience
as resembling some feature of the picture’s subject and in virtue of noticing this resemblance
we see the subject when we look at the picture. Hopkins posits that, for all pictures, the
relevant feature is outline shape–we experience the picture’s design as resembling its subject
in outline shape and in virtue of noticing this we see the subject in the picture. Abell’s discussion suggests that any of a variety of sufficiently salient features could potentially serve
this function. In any case, I question the experienced resemblance view on other grounds
that don’t hinge on how these details are resolved. Rather, I am skeptical of how this account
characterizes the phenomenology of seeing a picture and the broader mechanisms underlying
this experience.
Hopkins proposes the most developed account of the experienced resemblance view. He
characterizes the experience of seeing a picture’s content in the design of the picture as an
experience of seeing-in. When I look at the picture of Beebo I see Beebo in the picture’s
design. The reason that I see Beebo in the picture, according to this view, is that I see the
design as resembling Beebo. Hopkins explains that my experience of the design is transformed
when I notice Beebo in picture (1998, 17). Rather than seeing the design as a bunch of
amorphous marks on a surface I see the design as manifesting Beebo. This transformation
in my perception of the marks is effected by my awareness of the resemblance between these
marks and Beebo’s visible properties and I come to experience the marks as resembling
Beebo, and thereby see Beebo in the marks. The experienced resemblance view stresses the
10

On my view depiction is always of particulars, however it’s possible for a picture that depicts a particular
to be used to represent a type, class or kind of thing.
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fact that we see the marks as resembling–in whatever respect they do–Beebo. The view
stresses that it is, ultimately, the marks that we see because (1) this explains the difference
between the experience of seeing Beebo in the picture and seeing Beebo in the flesh; (2)
it explains the causal role that the design plays in our experience of seeing Beebo in the
picture; and (3) it explains the two-foldness of pictorial experience–i.e. the fact that the
marks are, in some way, part of the experience of seeing Beebo in the picture in a way they
are not part of the experience of seeing Beebo in the flesh.
I dispute this characterization of the experience of seeing Beebo in the picture. Although
I have argued that it is in virtue of directly seeing the marked surface of a picture that we
have a visual experience as of its subject I do not think the experienced resemblance view
accurately accounts for this. I do not think we see the marks as resembling Beebo, rather we
simply see Beebo while, perhaps, although not necessarily, being aware that it is the marks
that sustain our experience of seeing Beebo. It is not the case that we see the marks and
then, because we experience the marks as resembling features of the cat, that we see Beebo
in the picture. We see Beebo in a way that is as immediate and automatic as the way we see
him when he is sitting before us. Moreover, I would argue that it is a mischaracterization of
the experience to say that we experience the picture or its design as resembling Beebo. We
don’t see the picture as resembling Beebo, we simply have the experience of seeing Beebo
when we look at the picture. In fact, I would argue, there is a distinctive phenomenology
characteristic of experiencing resemblance between a present object and an absent, familiar
object. This is the kind of experience you might have when you see my brother and realize
that he resembles me. Some of his features bring me to mind and you can see aspects of the
way I look in my brother’s features. This is not the phenomenology characteristic of seeing
Beebo in the picture. The phenomenology of seeing Beebo in the picture is simply a matter
of seeing that cat. The mechanism by which we see Beebo, or any other object, in a picture
and in virtue of which we recognize that it is Beebo, or whatever other object, that we see
is the same whether we see Beebo in the flesh or we see him in a picture. There may be
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situations when we come across objects in the world and we can’t immediately identify what
kinds of things they are. For example, if I’ve never seen a red panda, but I know that it is an
animal that resembles a cross between a reddish raccoon and a little bear and I notice that
the animal before me bears resemblance to this kind of thing, my identification of it as a
red panda may rely on my noticing this resemblance. However, in a normal situation when I
come across a familiar type of object, for example a cat runs past me on the sidewalk, I don’t
identify the kind of thing it is on the basis of my observation that it resembles a cat. Rather,
based on my familiarity with cats, I immediately identify it as a cat. Similarly, it seems
unnatural to characterize my identification of Beebo in the picture in virtue of my noticing
the picture’s resemblance to Beebo. This seems to posit an extra step in my recognition of
Beebo that the experience, in fact, lacks.
There’s an even greater disparity between seeing Beebo in the picture and seeing Beebo
sitting on the couch if the experience of seeing Beebo in the picture hinges on experienced
resemblance in some very specific respect. Hopkins, for example, argues that I see Beebo in
the picture because I experience the picture’s design as resembling Beebo in outline shape.
When I see Beebo sitting on the couch I don’t see that it is Beebo–rather than a pile of
laundry, or another cat–because I notice the cat sitting on the couch resembles Beebo in
outline shape. I simply recognize that it is Beebo, and it’s quite likely that I don’t even
consider his outline shape at all. Moreover, it is possible for me to perceive my cat, in his
totality, despite the fact that I cannot fully grasp the contours of his outline shape, e.g.
because I view him through the slats of a picket fence.11 My contention is that the way I
identify and visually pick out Beebo when I see him on the couch is sufficiently similar to the
way that I see him in a picture–and similarly immediate and automatic–that it is reasonable
to expect these modes of identification are grounded in similar processes. It is a problem for
the experienced resemblance view if it posits drastically different mechanisms underlying the
experience of seeing x in a picture and the experience of simply seeing x. However, I don’t
11

See Alva Noë, 2004, 60-68 for a discussion of this phenomenon.
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claim to know precisely what these psychological mechanisms and processes are. The task of
identifying and fully fleshing these out ultimately falls to psychology rather than philosophy.
As I mentioned above the experienced resemblance view takes seriously the fact that what
we literally see when we look at a picture is a marked surface. This is obviously true. I
briefly touched on my objection to the implications that the experienced resemblance view
draws from this fact. Although we literally see the picture’s design, which is composed, in
most cases, of marks on a surface, it doesn’t follow that in all cases we have an experience
in which we see these marks qua marks as manifesting the picture’s content. When I see the
marks as Beebo, my experience can efface the marks seen as marks and see them instead
as features of Beebo. Because the resemblance view maintains that the marks continue to
be seen as marks, it must explain how it can simultaneously be the case that the marks
are seen as Beebo. The explanation is that the marks, while still being seen as marks are
experienced as resembling something else. This explanation allows for the marks to continue
to be registered in experience as marks. There is nothing preventing the possibility of seeing
a mark as a mark and also seeing it as resembling something else. We can see many things
as the kinds of things that they are, while seeing them as resembling other things. I don’t
cease to see a my friend as himself when I notice his resemblance to Daniel Day Lewis.
However, the consequence of maintaining the resemblance view is a mischaracterization of
the phenomenology of pictorial experience, and, I’ve suggested, the mechanisms underlying
this experience. I would argue that this mischaracterization lies precisely in maintaining
that we continue to experience the marks as marks when we see the content manifest in the
picture. If there is a transformation of the marks on the picture’s surface before and after we
register the content of the picture, as Hopkins suggests there is, it is that they cease to be
seen as marks, but as features of what is depicted. This doesn’t mean that we aren’t aware
that the marks that constitute the picture’s design sustain our experience of the picture’s
content. It also doesn’t mean that the marks themselves cannot enter into our experience
of the content. It simply means that although we do literally see the marked surface that
53

constitutes the picture’s design, it is not the case that experiencing this marked surface as a
marked surface is always fundamental to the way that we experience the content of a picture
and it cannot be fundamental to an explanation of depiction.
Thus, I maintain, the experience of seeing Beebo in the picture is not explained by experienced resemblance between the picture’s design and Beebo. Nevertheless, there is a sense
in which the experiences of seeing the picture of Beebo and seeing Beebo on the couch do
resemble each other. The experiences resemble each other insofar as both experiences are
of Beebo. Furthermore, it may be the case this resemblance between the two experiences
is grounded in an actual resemblance between Beebo and the picture. At a minimum the
marks that constitute the picture’s design are similar to Beebo insofar as both cause me
to have an experience as of Beebo. However, awareness of the nature of this similarity or
resemblance need not enter into my experience of the picture of Beebo, or ground the fact
that I see Beebo when I look at the picture. It could ultimately turn out that the properties
shared in common between Beebo and his picture are response-dependent but I do not experience the similarities–they are similar in virtue of the fact that they have the same kind
of effect on my visual system, one which causes me to see Beebo. The similarities between
these experiences do not amount to experienced resemblance. As I briefly touched on above,
a view that maintains that a similarity that I do not experience explains depiction would
not be a resemblance view. For the resemblance view it is essential that the resemblance is
experienced.
Finally, I have stressed that depiction is not, primarily, to be construed as a relation between
a picture and its subject and it is therefore not the primary goal of a theory of depiction
to identify nature of this relation. Rather, I have argued that depiction should be primarily
understood as the manner in which a design manifests meaningful, legible content in virtue
of sustaining a viewer’s visual experience of seeing-in. The resemblance view is particularly
suited to explaining depiction construed as a relation because what it offers is precisely a
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way of characterizing this relation–as a relation of resemblance. The resemblance view’s
suitability to this task could itself be used to motivate the view. However, I think that if
we don’t construe depiction as a kind of relation between a picture’s design and its subject
we undermine the plausibility of the claim that we experience the picture as resembling
Beebo. Unless we have a prior, independent commitment to the resemblance view, this way
of describing the experience loses its appeal.

2.9

Upshot

In summary, I have proposed that for a picture, P, to depict an object, O:

(i) it must be possible to see O in P, because
(ii) P triggers a recognition ability for O, and
(iii) recognition of O catalyzes a richer experience of seeing O that is sustained by the fact
that the design properties of P can be seen as properties of O.

I believe that these three points amount to necessary and sufficient conditions on depiction.
Unlike many theories of depiction this list of conditions does not include, what Wollheim
calls, a standard of correctness. I do not believe that an intentional or causal standard
of correctness necessarily determines the content of a picture. I think that the picture’s
content is determined solely by what can be seen in it. In essence, I have adopted an
anti-intentionalist theory of depiction. I don’t completely deny that knowledge of picture
maker’s intentions might influence pictorial interpretation. As I see it, the only way that
picture maker’s intentions might have a role in determining pictorial content is if knowledge
of these intentions influences what a viewer sees in a picture. There is plenty of background
information that may influence what a viewer sees in a picture. Knowledge of picture maker’s
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intentions has the same status as any other kind of potentially pertinent knowledge. Because
the pictorial content is determined by what can be seen in a picture, the content of some
pictures may be ambiguous. However, I do not think that this consequence is problematic
and I will address it below. I will leave further discussion of the role of picture maker’s
intentions for my later discussion of communication. One thing I have tried to emphasize is
that depiction is not a kind of relation between a designed surface and an existent subject;
a picture is not limited to depicting an existent subject by, e.g., resembling or referring to
it.

3
3.1

A theory of communication
Defining communication

My goal is to present a developed discussion of the means of pictorial communication. This
will require a examination and elucidation of the nature of communication itself. Ultimately,
once we have a sense of what is entailed in communication in general, we can extend this
understanding to the particular case of pictures. I am concerned with communication as an
intentional and purposeful activity that requires at least two participants. Most basically
there must be the speaker, or, more generally, “utterer,” U, and their interlocutor, who we
can call the “audience,” A. Communication between U and A is also, necessarily, mediated
by the public utterance–the signal, symbol or sense bearing sign–that U produces. Communication can be defined in terms of its success conditions: communication between U and A
succeeds when when A understands what U means. One might ask what it is exactly for A to
understand what U means. According to one view, which we can call the classic code model
of communication, the task for U is to encode an intended message, ideally using a code
that is mutually understood by U and A, and the task for A is to decode U’s utterance to
retrieve U’s intended message. For example, if U’s intended message is the proposition that
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Figure 8: One view of communication.
the dinosaurs are extinct, U would code this proposition into the publicly available sentence
“The dinosaurs are extinct” and then utter this sentence. A would then take up the publicly
available utterance and decode it to retrieve the proposition that the dinosaurs are extinct.
I take it that, on this view, when this transmission succeeds the result is that U’s private
uncoded mental content–i.e. the idea that the dinosaurs are extinct–is replicated in A. Thus,
when U’s mental content has been replicated in A, we can say that A has understood what
U means: communication has succeeded.
This model of communication is problematic. Beginning with the idea that the input to U’s
coding activity and the output of A’s decoding activity must match–i.e. that U’s mental
content must be replicated in A–for A to be said to have understood what U meant. For
these to match both A and U must have an identical understanding of the proposition that
the dinosaurs are extinct. This would, in part, require U and A to entertain the same thought
to fill out the concept of dinosaur as part of this proposition. However, it’s quite plausible
that U and A fill out this concept differently–perhaps A takes the term to refer to a class of
giant lizards that existed millions of years ago, whereas U doesn’t know anything about the
history of dinosaurs and thinks of them as the giant creatures that he saw at the AMNH.
Insofar as they do not entertain the same thought to fill out the concept of dinosaur, U’s
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input does not match A’s output. If this match is necessary for A to properly apprehend
U’s meaning, then this transmission would fall short of successful communication. In fact,
the very processes of coding and decoding seem to pose a challenge for this “matching”
or “replicating” criterion of successful communication. Two people can both be said to
properly understand–and thus be capable of decoding–a word like like “dinosaur” despite
their interpretations yielding different thoughts associated with the term. The meaning of
“dinosaur” is broad enough to accommodate this diversity. Understanding the meaning of
“dinosaur”–i.e. decoding this symbol–requires apprehending at least one out of a range of
acceptable thoughts–or fleshed out concepts–that can fall under the term. The inverse is
true for using this symbol–many possible thoughts or ideas or other type of uncoded mental
content can be appropriately coded and expressed by “dinosaur”. The flexibility of the term
puts further pressure on the notion that coded communication succeeds by replicating U’s
private, uncoded mental content in A.
If this coding and replicating model of communication falls short, how else can we explicate
the success conditions for communication? What is required for A to understand what
U means? We could weaken the code model’s requirement that the U’s uncoded mental
content be replicated in A. Perhaps we can allows for some, presumably limited, amount
of divergence between the precise mental content that U intends to convey and the content
that A apprehends. We might say that communication succeeds when A’s mental state
gets close enough to replicating U’s. While it would probably prove challenging to define
the precise parameters of this criterion, there are additional serious challenges for even this
watered-down version of the code model. Consider the fact that an utterance like “The
dinosaurs are extinct” is amenable to not only a literal but also a figurative interpretation.
The term “dinosaur” has an alternative sense. It can be used to designate a person whose
views and beliefs are utterly outdated and out of touch. The sentence may rely on this
sense of the term and may be properly interpreted figuratively rather than literally. The
figurative interpretation of the sentence might be that some group of outdated and out of
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touch people are no longer relevant. Grasping this figurative meaning requires more than
basic decoding of the utterance. The classic code model cannot account for the figurative
use of language and its interpretation. In general communication entails more than decoding
coded utterances. Analogously, there is more to understanding an interlocutor’s meaning
than retrieving the contents of their encoded utterances.
In light of figurative meaning it’s clear that speakers do not always mean what they literally
say. Insofar as decoding can only retrieve the literal meaning of an utterance it cannot account for how A understands what U means in cases when U means something other than
what U literally says. It’s important to note that the success conditions for communication
require A to understand what U means, not what U’s coded utterance means. However,
as noted above, A’s uptake of U’s meaning is necessarily mediated by the sign, symbol or
utterance that U employs. Given this, I think it would be appropriate to slightly revise the
success conditions for communication. We can say that communication between U and A
succeeds when A understands what U means to convey by the signal, symbol or utterance
they produce. As I understand his view, H.P. Grice construes communication in terms of
precisely these conditions. Grice’s theory offers an explanation of how successful communication–defined in these terms–is possible. He does so, first and foremost, by explaining
what is required for U to mean something by a signal, symbol or utterance–it turns out
that meaning something amounts to having a particular type of complex intention. Grice’s
account is developed in his discussions of:

(i) utterer’s meaning, which he contrasts with utterance meaning, and
(ii) the distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning.

Grice also provides an account of the mechanism by which A manages to apprehend what
U means to convey. This comes to the fore in his discussion of:
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(iii) the distinction between what is said and what is implicated.

In the following three sections I will provide a cursory outline of each of these three distinctions, which are central to Grice’s theory of communication.

3.2

Grice’s view

3.2.1

Utterer’s meaning and utterance meaning

According to Grice (1989) communication succeeds when an audience correctly infers an utterer’s intended meaning. Grice defines utterer’s meaning in terms of the utterer’s intentions.
He writes:

“U [i.e. the speaker] meant something by uttering x” is true iff for some audience
A, U uttered x intending:
(1) A to produce a particular response r;
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1);
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2) (92).

Grice characterizes utterer’s meaning–i.e. the “something” that U means by uttering x–as
the response or effect that U intends to produce in A (1989, 220). For example, U may
intend for A to believe some proposition, p, on the basis of x, in which case we would say U
meant that p by uttering x. Additionally, for Grice, U only means that p if the intention to
produce the belief that p is accompanied by intentions corresponding to (2) and (3) above.
U’s intentions must be transparent and U must intend for A to produce r “on the basis” of
A’s recognition of these intentions. By this, Grice explains, he means that it’s necessary that
“[A’s] thinking that U intends him to produce r is at least part of his reason for producing
r (92).”
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3.2.2

Natural and nonnatural meaning

Utterer’s meaning is a species of what Grice calls “nonnatural meaning”–abbreviated as
“meaningNN ”–which he contrast with “natural meaning” (1989, 214). Utterance meaning is
also a form of nonnatural meaning. So, according to Grice, not only does U meanNN p by
uttering x, but, in virtue of this, x itself meansNN p. Grice writes that he uses “utterance” to
designate “any act or performance which is or might be a candidate for nonnatural meaning
(1989, 92),” which, it should be noted, is different than identifying it as the product of the
act or performance. This is the difference between the act or performance of producing a
sign or symbol, and the sign or symbol itself. In his discussion of natural and nonnatural
meaning he seems to be primarily concerned with the meaning of signs or symbols in their
own right–the meaningNN of the x that is uttered. Thus, within Grice’s account the term
“utterance” is ambiguous between these two senses–i.e. we can distinguish utterance as act
from utterance as symbol. In discussing the meaning of pictures either of these two senses
can come into play. We can discuss the meaning of the picture itself or we can discuss
the meaning of the act of producing or displaying the picture–although, perhaps it is more
natural to discuss what is meant by the act of producing or displaying the picture.12
Grice proposes the following criteria for distinguishing between natural and nonnatural meaning:

(1) The fact that x naturally means that p entails p (Grice 1989), whereas the fact that x
meansNN p does not entail p (214).

So, for example, “[t]hree rings of the bell (of the bus) [i.e. an utterance] meansNN that the
bus is full (ibid, 214),” whereas dark clouds naturally mean that it will rain. One cannot
12

Noël Carroll (2008) uses the term “sense-bearing sign” as an alternative to “utterance” (in the sense of
utterance as symbol) in his discussion of motion pictures to avoid the linguistic connotation of “utterance.”
We can follow his lead or, in keeping with the terminology employed in our discussion thus far, we might
alternately use “content-bearing design.”
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consistently maintain that x naturally means p but that p is not actually the case. If rain
doesn’t follow dark clouds, then the clouds did not, in fact, (naturally) mean rain. On the
other hand, no inconsistency follows from say thing that although x meansNN that p, p is
not the case. For example, one can say that although the three rings meanNN that the bus is
full, the bus isn’t full. The three rings still having this meaningNN , even if on this occasion
the bus driver mistakenly believes the bus is full when it isn’t.

(2) It is possible to argue from what x meantNN to what was meantNN by x (214). However,
one cannot argue that anything was meant by x on the basis of the natural meaning
of x (Grice 1989, 213).
(3) Similarly, while it is possible to argue from what x meantNN to what someone meantNN
by x (214), one cannot argue that anyone meant anything by x on the basis of the
natural meaning of x (Grice 1989, 213).

In other words, utterer’s meaning and utterance meaning are inextricably linked. A symbol
or sign is a bearer of nonnatural meaning in virtue of being attributed to a rational agent.
Three rings only meanNN the bus is full insofar as someone (e.g. the bus driver) meansNN
“the bus is full” by ringing the bell three times. In this respect, Grice suggests, his sense
of meaningNN is similar to “conventional” meaning (1989, 215)–a convention does not mean
anything independently of it use by someone (e.g. a person who establishes or learns how to
use it) to communicate or express something. Grice contends that his notion of meaningNN
has a broader application than the notion of conventional meaning because it accounts for the
many symbols, signals and utterances that are genuinely meaningful but not conventionalized
(215).

(4) It is possible to restate a sentence like “x meansNN that p,” as a sentence “in which the
verb ‘mean’ is followed by a phrase in quotation marks (Grice 1989, 215).” No such
restatement is possible for a sentence like “x naturally means that p.”
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(5) Conversely, Grice notes, for any sentence of the form “x naturally means that p,” “a
restatement can be found beginning with the phrase ‘The fact that...(1989, 214).’” No
such restatement is possible for a sentence describing nonnatural meaning.

The essence of (4) and (5) echoes the observations that Grice makes in (2) and (3). Nonnatural meaning is conceptually dependent on the possibility that something (i.e. a state of
affairs or something that can conceivably be represented with a phrase in quotation marks)
is meantNN by the symbol or utterance that bears nonnatural meaning. But a sentence like
“the three rings meanNN the bus is full,” cannot be rephrased as “the fact that the bell
has been rung three times means that the bus is full.” Grice tells us that although “[b]oth
[sentences] may be true, [they] do not have, even approximately, the same meaning (1989,
214).” The former sentence describes the communicative intention of the person who rings
the bell–the utterance meansNN “the bus is full” because the utterer–the bus driver who
rings the bell–meansNN that the bus is full. The latter sentence describes the correlation
between the ringing of the bus bell and the fact that the bus is full.
Like the conditions Grice outlines that constrain utterer’s meaning, this distinction between
natural and nonnatural meaning distinguishes, what Sperber and Wilson (2012) call, overt
communication from other types of information exchange. These conditions on overt communication rule out certain ways of conveying information. For example, Grice writes:

I might leave B’s handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the
detective to believe that B was the murderer; but we should not want to say
that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meantNN anything or that I had
[meantNN ] by leaving it that B was the murderer (Grice 1989, 217).

The detective is supposed to see the handkerchief and recognize it as a good reason to
believe that B was the murderer because he takes the handkerchief to naturally mean that
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B was present at the scene. Although Grice tells us that he leaves the handkerchief at
the scene with the explicit intention of producing this response, this intention can only be
realized if it is kept hidden from the detective. The handkerchief does not provide good
evidence of anything it if it interpreted as an utterance or a signal meaningNN “B was at the
scene.” Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (2012) contend that a significant portion of human
interaction involves “covert–or at least not manifestly overt–attempts at influencing others
(274).” Covert attempts at conveying information do not necessarily involve shady motives
or outright deception. We employ covert strategies for influencing the beliefs of others by
presenting them with evidence that leads them towards an intended conclusion. But this, of
course, does not count as genuine communication. For example, Sperber and Wilson write,
“Peter opens the current issue of Time Out, intending not only to see what films are on, but
also to provide Mary with evidence that he would like to go out that evening. Mary chooses
not to stifle a yawn, thereby providing Peter with evidence that she is tired (ibid.).” Peter
and Mary each try to influence the other by directing their attention towards what would
normally be reliable evidence for the conclusions that Peter wants to go out and Mary is
tired. They are exploiting the natural meaning of their respective gestures, because they are
familiar with and can predict the effects of these natural signs.
In fact, Grice explains the continuity between nonnatural and natural meaning, and the
evolution of the former from the latter, in terms of a subject’s increased awareness and
anticipation of her audience’s response to natural signs. These signs become utterances that
bear meaningNN when both utterer and audience recognize their deliberate use to produce the
desired response (Grice 1989, 292-3). However, I would argue that signs that bear nonnatural
meaning can similarly evolve into signs that are interpreted as though they natural. The
three rings of the bell is an arbitrary sign that meansNN “the bus is full.” However, someone
who is familiar with the convention will interpret the fact that the bell has been rung in the
same way she would interpret a natural sign, e.g. the appearance of black clouds. Black
clouds mean that it will rain, so when she sees black clouds she knows to bring her umbrella.
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Similarly, the fact that the bell has been rung three times means that the bus is full, so when
she hears the bell she knows that she may as well take a seat back at the bus shelter. She no
longer registers the sign’s nonnatural meaning because (i) she doesn’t actually care about he
bus driver’s beliefs, intentions or other mental states, and (ii) she understands and implicitly
trusts the correspondence between the three rings and the state of affairs it signifies.
In general, when we rely on other people’s utterances for information about the world, we
often treat the utterances as we would natural signs. We’re generally not concerned with
the reason that U produced x (e.g. U’s beliefs, intentions or other mental states), but with
the fact that x, or U’s uttering x, means that p. While this may itself be due to a tacit
assumption that our interlocutors are telling the truth, or a more general assumption of their
reliability, we unreflectively accept x as evidence for p the same way we would automatically
recognize a natural sign as evidence of p. Whether I rely on the weatherman’s predictions or
my own observation of black clouds, I take this as evidence that entails the conclusion that it
will rain–I implicitly accept the conditional: Al Roker says so → rain just as I implicitly
accept the conditional black clouds → rain. I don’t (at least I don’t think I do) check the
weather report because I want to know the weather man’s beliefs, intentions or thoughts.13
It’s not clear why I should characterize my goal in this way, unless there’s a reason to
think that it’s necessary to identify Roker’s mental states in order to understand what he’s
saying. In fact, as I will discuss below, this is precisely what Sperber and Wilson claim: that
interpreting even the literal meaning of an utterance calls on intention attribution.
13

One might argue that Al Roker’s word only entails rain insofar as what he says is evidence of what
he believes and that it is the fact that he believes there will be rain that actually entails rain. Thus, the
reasoning would be Al Roker says so → Al Roker believes so and Al Roker believes so → rain. I
don’t think that this intermediate appeal to Al Roker’s mental states necessarily plays a role in my drawing
the conclusion that it will rain.
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3.2.3

Conversational implicature

Grice holds that communication between U and A succeeds when A understands what U
meansNN . In some cases, the literal meaning of U’s utterance is insufficient for interpreting
what U means because, for example what U explicitly says can be interpreted in several
possible ways (Grice 1989, 24). In such cases, Grice explains, A must infer which interpretation is correct, guided by assumptions about the constraints generally imposed on rational
conversation by, what he calls, the Cooperative Principle, which he formulates as follows:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you
are engaged (26).

This principle is accompanied by the maxims of Relation (“Be relevant (27)”), Quantity
(“Make your contribution as informative as is required (26)”), Quality (“Do not say what
you believe to be false (27)”) and Manner (“Be perspicuous (ibid)”). So, if the weather man
says “it’s not a good day to have a picnic in Central Park,” and I assume that he’s observing
the Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims, I will probably infer that he meansNN
“it’s going to rain today,” even though this is not what he literally says. I assume that the
weather man is being cooperative, which means that his contribution is appropriate to the
circumstance–his role being to provide information to viewers about the weather–he is being
relevant–he is saying what he does because it is relevant information given his role–he is
offering sufficient information for me to draw a conclusion about what he means by what he
says, and he is telling the truth. My assumptions help me narrow in on the correct meaning
of his utterance. However, if the weather man simply utters the sentence “it will rain in New
York City from 1pm to 5pm today” and I am familiar with the words he is using, I can rely
on my linguistic competence and bypass this inferential process of working out the weather
man’s meaning.
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3.3

An assessment of Grice’s theory

Aspects of Grice’s theory have been subject to criticism by Daniel Sperber and Dierdre Wilson. They offer their own view, “Relevance Theory”, as an alternative to the Gricean picture.
Sperber and Wilson define their project as an extension of Grice’s. They begin from “the
broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading,
involving the inferential attribution of intentions (2002, 3).” They credit Grice with formulating the first alternative to the “classic code model of communication,” the shortcomings
of which I discussed in the introduction to this chapter. To review, according to this model
the sender, or speaker, codes the message that she wants to transmit into a public language.
The receiver, or audience, receives the coded utterance and then decodes it to arrive at the
speaker’s intended message (2002, 5). Coded communication does not necessarily draw on
metapsychological abilities. According to this theory it should be possible to decode a public
utterance without attributing it to a speaker or trying to identify the speaker’s communicative intentions (ibid.). Grice recognized that verbal communication involves both coding and
inference-based intention attribution. Sperber and Wilson agree with Grice’s assessment of
the code model’s shortcomings as an explanation of linguistic communication. They agree
that the information that is conveyed through verbal communication always exceeds what
can be conveyed simply by means of coded utterances or symbols. However, they criticize
Grice’s “literalist” approach to what is said (2005, 3). Although Grice acknowledges that
inference is necessary to recover what a speaker implies (i.e. it facilitates implicit communication (2002,6)), he doesn’t think it is necessary to comprehend what a speaker says (i.e.
explicit communication). Sperber and Wilson dispute Grice’s characterization of explicit or
literal communication.
Sperber and Wilson explain that for Grice “[w]hat a speaker says is determined by truthconditional aspects of linguistic meaning, plus disambiguation, plus reference assignment
(2005, 9).” So for Grice, what U says, e.g. by uttering “He was in the grip of a vice,”
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depends on the linguistic meaning of the sentence as well as the context of utterance which
specifies the referent of “He” and the correct sense of the phrase “in the grip of a vice”
(Grice 1989, 27). Sperber and Wilson take it to follow from Grice’s distinction between
saying and implicating (i.e. what U explicitly and implicitly communicates), that he thinks
these ambiguities can be resolved by linguistic and contextual decoding rather than inference
(Sperber and Wilson 2005, 7). However, they argue that a code-based model is inadequate
to deal with the complexities involved in disambiguating what is said. Literal meaning is not
determined independently of a speaker’s intention and cannot be interpreted wholly without
reference to these (Wilson 2000, 416). Morevoer, Wilson cites evidence of a developmental
correlation between inferential intention attribution and lexical comprehension. Studies of
language acquisition indicate that children learn lexical meanings by attributing speaker
intentions, and anecdotal evidence suggests that subjects with Asperger’s syndrome, whose
mind-reading abilities are impaired, have difficulty grasping intended lexical meaning (417).
Wilson concludes that inferential intention recognition does, in fact, play a significant role in
explicit communication (Wilson 2005, 2). Thus, Sperber and Wilson maintain that linguistic
communication, even at the level of lexical comprehension, is an exercise in mind-reading
that necessarily involves a process of inferential intention attribution. This is one respect in
which their view differs from Grice’s; they argue that pragmatic inference is just as necessary
to explicit communication as it is to implicit communication.
Identifying the depictive content of a picture does not rely on lexical decoding and reference
assignment. Lexical decoding requires understanding how to correctly apply vocabulary
elements and a grasp of the syntactic rules governing their combination into meaningful
strings. If the interpretation of pictures is naturally generative, as I have argued it is, this
type of understanding is not entailed in pictorial interpretation. Rather, it depends on the
psychological and perceptual mechanisms of recognition and seeing-in. The depictive content
of a picture could be thought of as an analogue to the literal or explicit meaning of a sentence.
The depictive content consists of what can be seen-in a picture’s design and it’s not obvious
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that apprehending this content entails inferential intention attribution. Moreover, if a picture
maker’s intentions do not determine the depictive content of a picture, then it would follow
that to apprehend the depictive content of a picture it is not necessary to identify a picture
maker’s intentions. I take it that the reason the explicit meaning of an utterance cannot
be reliably interpreted without inferential intention attribution is because the meaning of
the utterance is, at least partly, determined the speaker’s intentions. Sperber and Wilson’s
claim is not that individual words and lexical constructions themselves cannot be understood
without recourse to a speaker’s intentions. A sentence can still have independent literal
meaning, but when it is uttered by a speaker to communicate some content, its explicit
meaning is determined by the intention of the speaker. Accordingly, these intentions must
ultimately figure into apprehending the explicit meaning of the utterance. I take it that,
according to Sperber and Wilson, this is what Grice fails to appreciate.
If the depictive content of a picture is like the meaning of a sentence, rather than the meaning
of an utterance, then the picture maker’s intentions do not ultimately determine what it
depicts and, therefore, a viewer does not need to take such intentions into account in order
to apprehend its content. Moreover, the distinction that is pertinent to linguistic meaning,
between a sentence and an utterance of that sentence, does not neatly translate to the case
of pictures. It’s not clear that we can draw an analogous distinction between the depictive
content of a picture and a particular iteration of that content in a given context. Regardless of
how or where a picture is displayed its content remains the same–it remains what can be seenin the picture. The picture may be put to different uses–to convey some state of affairs, to
illustrate a point, to express some meaning–but this does not alter the content of the picture
itself. The use of a picture and the communicative goals this achieves can be separated from
the depictive content of the picture itself. Therefore, I think that the Gricean distinction
between literal or explicit meaning, which can be apprehended without taking intentions
into account, and implicit meaning, which requires recognizing underlying intentions, can
be preserved when discussing pictorial interpretation. If we can draw an analogy between
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sentence meaning and the content of depiction–we can call this basic content–it may be
possible to assign basic pictorial content a role in pictorial communication that is analogous
to the role of sentence meaning in linguistic communication.
It might be argued that this proposed notion of basic pictorial content is too narrow because
it rules out the possibility of basically depicting, e.g., the Virgin Mary and Jesus. It might
be argued that a painting of a woman dressed in robes and holding a baby cannot be
construed as a picture of Mary and Jesus without appealing to the picture maker’s intention
to specifically depict them. It would follow that either it’s impossible to basically depict
Mary and Jesus or that, if it is possible, that basic pictorial content must be determined by
picture maker’s intentions. There are two possible responses to this challenge. First, insofar
as basic pictorial content is determined by what can be recognized in a picture the range of
things that can be depicted includes only those things that can be recognized. So, if it is
possible to recognize two individuals as Mary and Jesus, it is, in principle, possible to depict
Mary and Jesus by exploiting this recognition ability. One might argue that since the earliest
known pictures of the Virgin Mary dates to the year 3 CE,14 long after anyone capable of
recognizing the historical Mary had died, this earliest depiction could not have exploited an
ability to recognize Mary. Therefore, unless we allow that a picture maker’s intentions, at
least partially, determine what a picture basically depicts, it follows that this picture doesn’t
depict Mary. One might concede that this early picture of Mary does not basically depict
Mary. Rather it depicts a woman and this woman-depiction is used to represent Mary. I
think for this particular example this is a plausible explanation.
However, I don’t think this concession is necessary for all pictures of Mary and Jesus and
this brings me to my second response. Just as the ability to recognize a unicorn can be
generated by experiences of pictures of unicorns rather than experiences of flesh and blood
unicorns, the ability to recognize Jesus and Mary can be generated by other pictures of Jesus
14

Peppard, Michael. “Is This the Oldest Image of the Virgin Mary?” January 30, 2016, nytimes.com.
http://tiny.cc/wf51tz
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and Mary. This explanation would not, of course, work for the earliest picture of Mary–there
are no previous pictures from which to transfer the requisite recognition ability. However, it
might be possible to acquire the ability to recognize an individual without prior (mediated
or immediate) visual exposure to that subject. Perhaps a vivid description can yield this
recognition ability. If descriptions can yield recognition ability for real life objects, they would
also yield recognition ability for depicted objects. It seems that description clearly can yield
recognition ability for real life objects: I can impart the ability to recognize the Chrysler
Building to some one by describing it as an Art Deco-style skyscraper that is shorter than the
Empire State Building and is decorated by gargoyles and oversized hubcaps that are arranged
to give it a vaguely Gothic look. Based on this description one could recognize the building
both in person or in a picture–as long as the aspect of the building presented in the picture
included the features mentioned in the description. So, in the first ever picture of Mary she
may be recognizable in virtue of its conformity to some particular, well-known description of
Mary. To the extent that the picture engages the ability to recognize Mary, it depicts Mary.
In lieu of a detailed description, a vaguer knowledge of the stereotypical features typically
associated with an individual–e.g. her typical clothing, expression, posture, activity–could
as effectively engender recognitional ability. In fact, I would suggest that it is in virtue of
invoking stereotypical features that caricatures, like the Washington Post caricature by Ann

Figure 9: Ann Talnaes cartoon from Washington Post
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Talnaes in Figure 9, engage the viewer’s recognition ability for the depictum. I believe that
it’s precisely by presenting stereotypical features of Mary and Jesus that pictures trigger
our recognitional ability for this depicted duo. This reliance of stereotype would explain
why renderings as disparate as a Byzantine icon and a Botticelli are still both recognizable
as depicting Mary and Jesus. An accrual of stereotypes, rendered visible, is sufficient to
trigger recognition ability and thus sufficient for depiction. I would contend that a picture
that lacked the stereotypical features characteristic of Mary and Jesus portraits would fail
to trigger recognition ability for Mary and Jesus and thereby fail to depict them–although
it may still be used to represent them if this were the picture maker’s intention. However,
if a picture does trigger recognition ability (however this ability is attained) of Mary and
Jesus it thereby basically depicts them and this holds independently of the picture maker’s
intentions. That is to say: for the picture to depict Mary and Jesus it is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the picture maker to intend to depict them. What’s more, to identify Jesus
and Mary as the depictum of a particular picture does not require appealing to the picture
maker’s intentions.
Besides descriptions and awareness of stereotypes there are other things that might contribute to our ability to recognize objects, both in real life and in pictures. It’s possible that
a picture maker’s intention could be among the background information that contributes to
our recognition of a depicted object. For example, an illustrator may have a very distinctive
style of drawing celebrities such that they aren’t immediately recognizable until the viewer
is told who it is supposed to be. If, given this knowledge, the viewer can recognize and see
(an idiosyncratic aspect of) the celebrity in the picture, then we would say that the picture
depicts that celebrity. Thus, while knowledge of the artist’s intentions may contribute to our
recognitional ability and thereby help us to interpret the proper content of some pictures,
the significance of artist’s intentions should not be overstated. Recognition and seeing-in
ultimately determine pictorial content, not artist’s intentions. I hope the arguments presented in this aside have enhanced the plausibility of the analogy that I have drawn between
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pictorial content and sentence meaning insofar as they are not determined by picture maker’s
or utterer’s meaning, respectively.
Sperber and Wilson identify three further shortcomings of Grice’s view. First, they’re dubious of the conditions that Grice imposes on the possibility of successful communication.
Wilson writes: “For a Gricean speaker’s meaning to be conveyed, the speaker’s intentions
must be not merely recognized but transparent, in a sense that seems to be definable only
in terms of an infinite series of metarepresentations (Wilson 2000, 415).” In order for A
to understand what U means by x, U must: (1) intend to inform A that p; (2) intend A
to recognize (1); and (3) intend for A to recognize the higher-order intention in (2); and
so on, Wilson claims, ad infinitum. In other words, Grice requires that “[A’s] informative
intention [and] every contextual assumption needed to identify it [must] become mutually
known (ibid.).” This entails that an infinite series of embedded intention must–in its entirety–be fully apparent to A in order for A to apprehend U’s communicative intentions. The
consequence is that the conditions for the possibility of successful communication are unrealizable. Wilson reports that Grice responded to this problem by proposing that, although
in practice U’s communicative intentions can never be fully transparent to A, both communicators might stipulate that at some point U’s intentions have been sufficiently realized
and that communication has succeeded (2000, 419). Wilson rejects this solution, asserting
that it has the “unfortunate consequence of making speaker’s meaning an idealization that
is never achieved in real life (ibid.).” She argues that this result is avoidable and makes this
a priority of her own theory.
I’m not sure that Grice’s formulation entails the kind of infinite embedding of intentions
that Wilson is worried about. However, I do not think it would be inherently problematic if
Grice’s conditions on communication made its realization a goal that is difficult to achieve.
We shouldn’t necessarily expect it to be easy to fully grasp what another subject means
by what they say. Nor should we expect speaker’s meaning to be made public and taken
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up automatically. The fact that we can manage to understand each other almost instantly
most of the time implies only that, as Grice suggested, we accomplish this well enough.
This doesn’t mean that we succeed fully or that we cannot understand each other better.
Moreover, Grice has laid out, at least conceptually, the conditions that define successful
communication: communication succeeds when a speaker’s communicative intentions are
transparent to their audience and the audience’s recognition of these intentions grounds
their apprehension of the speaker’s meaning. Speaker’s meaning is defined in terms of the
transparency of the complex intentions underlying it. Wilson may be correct in claiming
that Grice’s account of successful communication describes an ideal. Her suggestion seems
to be that speaker’s meaning should be redefined as something more reliably accessible to
the audience. I am not convinced that the end this serves is worth abandoning Grice’s ideal.
Secondly, Sperber and Wilson are skeptical of Grice’s account of the way that conversational
implicatures are understood. This, in part, follows from their view of the role of inferential
intention attribution in explicit communication. If Sperber and Wilson are right about that,
a consequence is that the inferences underpinning successful communication are much more
complex than Grice had envisioned. Sperber and Wilson acknowledge the pressure this puts
on the inferential approach and they respond, by denying that inferential comprehension is a
form of conscious, discursive reasoning (Wilson 2000, 415). According to Grice, to work out
what U implicates by uttering x, A infers this from what U says on the basis of: (1) the literal
meaning of the words that constitute x; (2) the Cooperative Principle and conversational
maxims; (3) the context of U’s uttering x; (4) additional relevant background knowledge; and
(5) the fact that everything covered by (1)-(4) is mutually available and recognized by both
U and A (Grice 1989, 41). This data grounds a “working out schema” for conversational
implicature. According to Grice, A works out what U means by going through the following
chain of inference:

[U] has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that [U] is not observing the
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maxims or at least the Cooperative Principle; [U] could not be doing this unless
he thought that q; [U] knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can
see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; [U] has done nothing
to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow
me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q (Grice 1989, 50).

For example this working out schema could play out as follows:

→ Oliver says to Ping “If you’re going out, you’d better bring your umbrella.”
→ Ping believes that Oliver must be observing:
(i) The Cooperative Principle–making his contribution appropriate, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which they are engaged;
(ii) The maxim of Relation–it is relevant;
(iii) The maxim of Quantity–it is as informative as is required given the context of
the conversational exchange;
(iv) The maxim of Quality–it is true;
(v) The maxim of Manner–it is perspicuous.
→ Oliver could not be doing this unless he thinks that it will rain.
→ Oliver knows (and knows that Ping knows that Oliver knows) that Ping can see that
the supposition that Oliver thinks that it will rain is required.
→ Oliver does nothing to stop Ping from thinking that it will rain.
→ Oliver intends Ping to think, or is at least willing to allow Ping to think, that it will
rain.
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→ Therefore, Oliver has implicated that it will rain.

Sperber and Wilson question the psychological plausibility of this explanation. It’s highly
unlikely, they contend, that interpreters consciously go through this chain of inference to
attribute speaker meanings. It’s even less likely, they point out, in light of evidence that
preverbal infants–who quite clearly cannot engage in this type of deliberation–are capable
of inferential communication (2002, 10). Moreover, because of the substantial role that inferential intention recognition plays in explicit communication (as discussed above), Grice
would have to supplement this working out schema for implicit communication with analogous schemas for explicit communication to deal with, e.g. disambiguation and reference
assignment (ibid). They observe that although this type of deliberate, reflective process of
reasoning does occasionally occur, inferential comprehension is much more frequently accomplished spontaneously by an intuitive, unreflective process below the level of consciousness
(ibid). They conclude that “all of this is more consistent with a view of inferential comprehension as falling within the domain of an intuitive ‘theory of mind’ module (ibid).” Sperber
and Wilson insist that Grice was, in fact, amenable to the possibility that inferential comprehension was intuitive rather than reflectively rational (11). His only requirement was that
the inference, even if it was intuitively grasped, could, in principle, be replaced by rational
argument (ibid.).
In fact, I will argue, Grice’s working out schema may not offer an apt description of the
way that we understand what I take to be the kind of implicature that is entailed in pictorial communication. Nevertheless, I can identify two important differences between pictorial
and linguistic interpretation. First, as I argue above, the explicit or literal meaning of a
picture–i.e. its depictive content–can be apprehended without inferential intention attribution. The picture’s content is just what can be recognized and seen-in the picture’s design.
Therefore, in the case of pictures, Grice’s working out schema does not need to be extended
to cover explicit communication as Sperber and Wilson suggest it must be in the case of
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linguistic comprehension. This is good because, insofar as we seem to apprehend the content of most pictures the moment we look at them, it would be difficult to explain how
this is possible if it entailed the type of deliberative process that Grice describes. Secondly,
although we can grasp the content of a picture at a glance, we often look at pictures for
extended periods of time. We may re-read a passage of text multiple times in one minute,
but this is not comparable to looking at a picture for a minute. In the previous chapter I
discussed Walton’s distinction between description and depiction. Walton noted that one
distinguishing feature of depiction lies in the way in which we grasp its content. We grasp
the content of a picture by looking at it and the way we look is rather like the way we look
at actual things in the world. As he puts it:

The process of investigating the “world of a picture” by examining the picture
is analogous in important ways to the process of investigating the real world by
looking at it. Visual examinations of picture men and picture mountains, to
speak loosely, are like visual examinations of real men and real mountains (1990,
302).

There is no comparable analogue between the way that we read descriptions of objects and
scenes and the way that we visually study the objects and scenes themselves. If the viewer
of the painting of Beebo in Figure 1 is especially interested in studying the shape of the
painted cat’s face, for example, her investigation will take the same form that it would if
she were to study the cat himself. She would spend more time looking at the features that
interest her and the longer she looked the more she would discover about these features.
Of course, there are important differences between looking at a picture of Beebo and and
looking at Beebo himself. For example, were she examining Beebo himself, she might be able
to use an ophthalmoscope to get a closer look at his retina. This tool would not be useful
with the picture. Conversely, if she spends time studying the picture of Beebo she may start
to notice things about how Beebo has been depicted and this quite conceivably leads the
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viewer to consider the choices that the artist has made. Moreover, the viewer’s extended
study of the work may lead her to consider what these choices reveal about the picture
maker’s communicative intentions and what the maker means to convey through their work.
Just as it takes time to appreciate the details of pictorial content–simply in virtue of the
temporally extended means by which we apprehend this content–it takes time studying a
picture to uncover levels of intended meaning. In many instances, grasping a picture maker’s
intentions is quite unlike instantaneously grasping the intended meaning behind a sarcastic
quip. Nevertheless, I don’t think it’s plausible that we engage in the kind of deliberation that
Grice describes when we try to parse what a picture’s maker conveys through their work.
However, although we may not use precisely the working out schema that Grice outlines,
it’s possible that we use some analogous line of reasoning that is suited to the task. In any
case, I do not think that working out the meaning of a picture is necessarily accomplished
spontaneously by a sub-personal, intuitive and unreflective process.
Finally, Sperber and Wilson propose to revise Grice’s account of the expectations that
guide inferential communication and dispense with the Cooperative Principle–they point
out that uncooperativeness and self-interest do not necessarily impede successful communication (2004, 611)–and maxims of Quantity, Quality and Manner. They introduce two
new principles in place of these: (1) The Cognitive Principle of Relevance, which states
that human cognition tends towards the optimization of relevance (2004, 609), and (2) The
Communicative Principle of Relevance, which states that every utterance, insofar as it is
an “overt act of communication,” implies its own relevance (610). According to the latter
principle, which itself follows from the former, every utterance conveys the presumption of
optimal relevance. This presumption guides inferential comprehension (Sperber and Wilson
2005, 8). These two principles serve as the main premises of Relevance Theory, the theory
of pragmatic interpretation that Sperber and Wilson develop and endorse.
For Sperber and Wilson, relevance can be a property of either external stimuli (e.g. ob-
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servable phenomena, utterances), or internal representations (e.g. thought, memories, inferences). They explain that “[i]n relevance-theoretic terms any external stimulus or internal
representation which provides an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an individual at some time (2004, 608).” There is a negative correlation between the relevance of
a stimulus or representation and the amount of cognitive processing effort (e.g. effort of
perception, memory or inference) required to access it (ibid). Conversely, there is a positive
correlation between the relevance of a stimulus or representation and its positive cognitive
effect. An input has a positive cognitive effect when, e.g. it provides evidence that strengthens true beliefs or corrects false beliefs, when it answers a question, improves knowledge,
settles doubt or confirms suspicion...etc. (ibid).
Thus, relevance is a function of cognitive effort and cognitive effect; in virtue of striving to
optimize relevance–i.e. maximizing positive effect while minimizing effort–we also strive to
optimize cognitive efficiency. Based on this correspondence between relevance and efficiency,
Sperber and Wilson offer an evolutionary explanation of the human tendency to optimize
relevance. They write:

As a result of constant selection pressure towards increasing efficiency, the human
cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms
tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval
mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and
our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way (2004, 610).

Inferential communication exploits this evolved, universal tendency to optimize relevance.
By introducing the relevance-theoretic framework to their analysis of linguistic communication, Sperber and Wilson offer a unique interpretation of what it means to understand
another person’s mind. According to Relevance Theory, the biologically determined human
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tendency to optimize relevance makes it possible for me to interpret, predict and influence
the metal states of others (Sperber and Wilson 2002, 18). I attribute intentions and thoughts
to others based on my understanding of the Cognitive Principle of Relevance: insofar as I
see my interlocutor as a standard human subject, I know that she will predictably focus
her attention and processing resources on relevant, easily accessible cognitive inputs (i.e.
external stimuli and internal representations) (Wilson 2000, 420). According to Sperber and
Wilson, I can exploit this tendency and I’m therefore able to “produce a stimulus which is
likely to attract [my interlocutor’s] attention, to prompt the retrieval of certain contextual
assumptions and to point [her] towards an intended conclusion (Sperber and Wilson 2002,
18).”
Manipulating my interlocutor’s mental states does not, in itself, count as inferential communication. Sperber and Wilson, again following Grice, maintain that communication requires
an additional level of intention. I must have both an informative intention–the intention to
affect my interlocutor’s mental states–and a communicative intention–the intention that my
interlocutor recognize my informative intention (2004, 611). According to Sperber and Wilson I would realize these intentions using an “ostensive stimulus,” an overt sign designed to
attract my interlocutor’s attention and direct it towards the relevant cognitive input (ibid.).
My interlocutor approaches our interaction tacitly assuming Sperber and Wilson’s Communicative Principle of Relevance, that “[e]very ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its
own optimal relevance (2004, 612).” That means, according to Sperber and Wilson, that (a)
it is relevant enough to justify the processing effort it requires and (b) it is the most relevant
one compatible with my (the communicator’s) abilities and preference (ibid). Ostensiveinferential communication (i.e. communication proper, in relevance theoretic terms) consists
of my producing an ostensive stimulus, that is recognized as such by my interlocutor, in
order to achieve my informative intention.
I take issue with some aspects of Sperber and Wilson’s proposal to replace Grice’s princi-
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ples with their own. First, although they maintain that cooperation is not necessary for
communication–we can understand people even when they are being uncooperative–they do
not allow for the possibility that we can understand what other people mean even when
they are being irrelevant. However, non-sequiturs are not incomprehensible, and it’s not
clear how their view can account for this. More importantly, while Sperber and Wilson’s
proposal may have the effect of simplifying the process of communication so that it is no
longer an unrealizable ideal, I feel that it betrays the spirit of Grice’s account of communication. Specifically, it collapses the distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning.
On their view understanding what an interlocutor means entails identifying a specific type
of regularity and operating on the expectation that this regularity will predictably govern
their conversational contribution. This interpretive strategy is not essentially different from
that which we would apply to natural phenomena. We identify a regularity–e.g. the fact
that rain predictably follows the appearance of black clouds–and we generalize from this and
assign this natural meaning to black clouds. According to relevance theory, as I understand
it, we have the expectation that conversational contributions will be optimally relevant and
we therefore take our interlocutor’s utterance to naturally mean whatever best satisfies our
expectation of optimal relevance. Even the manner in which they specify communicative
intentions, and contrast them with informative intentions, makes the assumption of optimal
relevance the principal that guides interpretation. They essentially shift the goal of interpretation so that its primary aim is to identify and assign to the speaker that meaning which is
most consistent with the Cognitive and Communicative Principles of Relevance. This goal is
not the same as identifying the meaning that the speaker intended, even if, presumably, the
strategy that Sperber and Wilson outline does reliably home in on the speaker’s intended
meaning.
The relevance theoretic approach assumes that a human activity, like communication, is
governed by the same predictable, regular laws as natural events. Sperber and Wilson believe
they have identified the principle that governs human interaction–i.e. the optimization of
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relevance. While Grice outlines a set of expectations that guide interpretation, in the form of
the Cooperative Principle and maxims, these are different from the principles that Sperber
and Wilson identify insofar as Grice’s expectations assume that our interlocutor has made
a choice to collaborate in the effort at successful communication. This makes the task
of interpreting our interlocutor fundamentally different from that of interpreting natural
events. We rely on their cooperation and trust it as the most reliable guide to their intended
meaning. The distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning reflects an underlying
metaphysical and epistemic principle that I think is worth preserving. It is the metaphysical
and epistemic analogue to the moral distinction that Kant draws between person’s and
things. Kant describes the difference as follows:

Beings whose existence depends not on our will, but on nature’s, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore
called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their
very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which
must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action
(and is an object of respect). (2010: 223)

On Kant’s view persons impose unique moral constraints on our actions, simply in virtue of
their status as rational subjects. I would argue that we should similarly preserve the metaphysical and epistemic distinction between person’s and things. Persons (and their behaviors
and actions) should not be interpreted as though they were (the behaviors and actions of)
mere things. There is a pragmatic, epistemic rationale for preserving this distinction. If we
believe in the free agency of rational subjects it is inefficacious to subject their actions and
behaviors to the type of analysis that is appropriate to natural, law-governed phenomena.
We should not necessarily expect this mode of interpretation to be applicable. However, even
if it is an epistemically sound practice, I think that there is still a legitimate moral basis for
preserving the distinction between persons and things. Kant’s dictum states that we cannot
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treat persons as though they were things and I take this to apply equally to how we treat
their utterances. If we treat their utterances as though they were law-governed outputs of
mere things we make our own understanding of how things in the natural world operate
the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes a valid interpretation. We are understanding them
on our own terms–albeit terms that we take to be objectively valid. However, if we treat
persons as though they were deserving of respect, in the Kantian sense, I believe that we
have to strive to understand them on their own terms. We can do this by, first, genuinely
making their actual intentions the primary and proper object of interpretation–recognizing
the possibility that these might be difficult to uncover and our interlocutor’s contribution
to a conversational exchange may not always coincide with the optimally relevant stimulus.
Secondly, we can, following Grice, take our interlocutor’s own cooperative contribution to
the project of successful communication, and their effort to make their intentions apparent
and transparent, to be the most reliable indicator of what they mean. This may complicate
the task of interpretation, and it may be the case that we rarely make this kind of genuine understanding a priority. Efficiency is likely to be a primary concern in most ordinary
exchanges, and in many cases this may be fine. However, I think it is important to recognize that this efficiency may come at the cost of genuinely understanding our interlocutor’s
meaning, which I take to be the ideal object of communication.
For the reasons that I have outlined, I take Grice’s view to be preferable to Sperber and
Wilson’s alternative and I will use it to guide the discussion of pictorial communication that
follows.

83

4
4.1

Pictorial communication
An application of Grice’s view

The previous discussion of Grice’s theory provides a framework for the discussion of pictorial
communication. Grice’s theory provides us with the concepts of utterer’s meaning–in contrast to utterance and sentence meaning–nonnatural meaning–as opposed to natural meaning–and conversational implicature. When we apply these concepts to pictorial communication they imply the following theses:

(1) when a picture is used as a vehicle of communication, its meaning and the goal of
pictorial interpretation are determined by the picture maker’s intentions;
(2) a picture can bear nonnatural meaning, so interpreting it correctly would require recognizing this; and
(3) a picture may implicate, or suggest, some meaning over and above its “literal” meaning.

Fleshing out these theses and their implications will provide the basis of a Gricean account
of pictorial communication. I should also add to this list of theses, my own, which follows
from the conclusions of my first chapter and which will be assumed in the discussion that
follows. This is:

(4) the depictive content of a picture is analogous to the meaning of a sentence (as opposed
to the meaning of an utterance) insofar as it is determined by facts other than the
picture maker’s intentions and it can be apprehended by the viewer without recourse
to these intentions.
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This fourth thesis, which takes an anti-intentionalist stance towards depictive content, may
seem to be in tension with the first three, which together point towards an intentionalist
theory of pictorial communication. I think that this tension is, to some extent, central to
the theory of pictorial communication that I will develop and it may be distinctive of how
pictures are used to communicate.
Before I present my own theory, however, I will first consider another Gricean approach
to pictures proposed by Catherine Abell. I will discuss both the useful insights and the
shortcomings of her account. A close consideration of the divergence between her view and
my own will help bring certain details of my view into relief and will ultimately influence
the direction of my own discussion.

4.1.1

Abell on pictorial implicature

Abell (2005) suggests one way to apply the Gricean framework to the special case of pictures.
She argues that Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims can form the basis for an intentionbased standard of correctness for pictures.
Abell distinguishes between the visible content of a picture and its depictive content. Abell
assumes a resemblance based account of depiction so she defines visible content as the content
we would attribute to a picture based on resemblance. However, resemblance is not essential
to the concept of visible content, so we can simply define it as the content that can be seen in
the picture–leaving aside the matter of whether seeing-in is explained in terms of resemblance.
She contrasts the visible content of a picture with its depictive content, which she defines as
the content we would actually attribute to the picture in virtue of its visible content and in
accordance with a standard of correctness. In requiring that depictive content conform to a
standard of correctness, Abell’s view diverges from the view I defended in the first chapter.
The key difference between Abell and me is that Abell, in virtue of stipulating a standard of
correctness that governs depictive content, has distinguished two levels of pictorial content.
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Whereas on my view there is no such standard of correctness and therefore the depictive
content of the picture just is the visible content. I will elaborate on this difference in more
detail below. First, I will complete my discussion of Abell’s argument.
According to Abell, the visible content itself is not sufficient to determine the depictive
content of a picture because there are gaps between the visible and depictive content of a
picture. She gives two examples to illustrate this:
For example black-and-white pictures do not necessarily depict black-and-white
objects and stick-figure drawing do not usually depict emaciated beings with
gargantuan heads. Black-and-white pictures often depict colored objects and
stick-figure drawings often depict normally proportioned human beings, despite
the fact we cannot arrive at this interpretation of their content by appeal to the
way they look (55).
The claim that Abell makes, that there is a gap between the visible and depictive content
of a picture, as illustrated by this example, can be understood in two ways. Either:
(i) the visible content of a picture attributes properties to the objects and scenes depicted
in the picture that they don’t actually have–e.g. the stick-figure drawing of a man attributes to the man proportions unlike those of any man that anyone has ever seen–and
the viewer is meant to understand that these attributes are not actually part the object
or scene that is depicted–they must be filtered out to arrive at the depictive content;
or
(ii) the visible content of a picture omits properties of the objects and scenes depicted
in the picture that these objects and scenes actually do have–e.g. a black and white
picture of a leafy tree omits the hues of the the foliage–and the viewer is meant to
understand that these attributes actually are part of the object or scene depicted–they
must be added to arrive at the depictive content.
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Perhaps for some pictures the gap between visible and depictive content would involve a
combination of both (i) and (ii)–the black and white picture of the leafy tree both attributes
colors to the leaves–some shades of gray–that they don’t actually have and omits the hues
of green these leaves actually have, in which case arriving at the depictive content might
require both filtering and supplementing the visible content of the picture. In her footnote
to the above example, Abell seems to suggest that she is primarily concerned with the first
type of difference between visible and depictive content. She explains that:

Although the objects depicted by black-and-white pictures may be colored, the
pictures do not depict them as being of any particular color: rather, they are
depicted as being of indeterminate color. Similarly, while stick-figure drawing
may depict normally proportioned people, they do not depict those people as
having any determinate proportions (55n4).

Additionally, she states that “certain of the properties we perceive may be irrelevant to
determining what a picture depicts (55).” However, in a later example Abell seems to
suggest that, in some instances, the depictive content of a picture contains more than the
visible content. She suggests that there are certain omissions in the visible content that are
filled in by the standard of correctness and which, in virtue of the standard of correctness,
become part of the depictive content of the picture.
In general, for Abell, the purpose of the standard of correctness is to allow the viewer to
deduce the depictive content of a picture from its visible content, and Abell’s discussion has
two stated goals. These are (1) to determine whether a picture maker’s intentions can serve
as the basis for a standard of correctness, and (2) if so, how we can apply this standard if we
do not have independent knowledge of the picture maker’s intentions. For Abell identifying
the picture maker’s intentions amounts to identifying the content that the picture maker
intended for the picture to have. It is the task of identifying, what she terms, the maker
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content of the picture.15
She argues that a picture’s maker content and its visible content need to be consistent. She
writes:

[It is necessary for there to be] consistency between a picture’s visible content
and its maker content because, for something to count as a picture of a certain
object, it is necessary for it not just to have been intended to depict that object,
but also for it to look like that object (57).

The picture maker’s intention, the maker content, is not, on its own, sufficient to determine
the depictive content of the picture, because the picture must ultimately also look a certain
way, have a particular kind of visible content, to count as a picture of whatever object or
scene it depicts. At the same time the maker content must differ from the visible content if
it is to explain the difference between visible content and depictive content. Abell explains
that “[w]hen the maker of a picture succeeds in realizing his or her depictive intentions,
maker content must be equivalent to depictive content (57),” but both of these can differ
from visible content.
Since we have no direct access to maker content–with the possible exception of titles or
captions–Abell contends that we have to rely on the visible content of a picture to help
us to identify maker content. However, since the visible content and maker content differ
we may also need to appeal to additional resources. Abell contends that we can infer the
picture maker’s intentions–the maker content–based on the assumption that the picture
maker was observing Grice’s Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims. Thus, the
choices that are evident in the visible content of the picture are appropriate to conveying
15

Abell allows that a picture’s title may offer insight into an artist’s intentions and would therefore contribute to an intention-based standard of correctness (58n9). My own view is that the title contributes to
determining the pictorial content only if knowledge of the title influences what the viewer recognizes and
sees in the picture’s design.
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the maker content. The picture maker made these choices with the goal of aiding the viewer
in apprehending the maker content in virtue of recognizing that the picture maker intended
for the viewer to apprehend the maker content and this intention is manifest in the picture
maker’s choices of visible content (59-60). Once the viewer has apprehended the maker
content, on the assumption that the picture maker was observing the Cooperative Principle
and maxims, the viewer is able infer the depictive content of the picture.
Abell offers the following example of how this assumption can help us to interpret the
depictive content of a picture. She considers the kind of picture that is typically used to
mark a women’s restroom:

The visible content of the picture in question consists of a woman with perfectly
straight limbs wearing a triangular dress, her head floating free of her shoulders.
If we assume that whoever made this picture adhered to the cooperative principle
in doing so, we assume that he or she set out to communicate something true;
that he or she intended what is communicated to be adequately, but not overly
informative, and for it to be relevant, and that he or she set out to communicate
it clearly. [...] On the basis of these assumptions, we infer that the maker did not
intend to depict a woman whose head floats free of her shoulders. We assume
that he or she did not believe that such women existed, and that, if the maker
had intended to depict such a woman, he or she would have provided evidence of
the reason for doing so to meet the requirement of being adequately informative.
[...] [W]e decide that we need to ascribe the maker the intention of producing
a picture with some content other than its visible content to bring his or her
intentions back in line with the cooperative principle. On this basis, we decide
that the maker must have intended to depict a woman whose head is connected
to her shoulders, whose dress is not perfectly triangular, and whose limbs are not
perfectly straight (61).
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Abell’s analysis raises a few puzzles.16 First, I take her to have reversed the explanatory
priority of utterer’s and utterance meaning. I take it that the distinction between the various
levels of pictorial content map on to Grice’s distinction between various levels of meaning as
follows:
visible content

→

sentence meaning

depictive content

→

utterance meaning

maker content

→

utterer’s meaning

The visible content, like sentence meaning, is what is most immediately available to the
viewer without requiring any appeal to picture maker’s intentions or additional inference.
On Abell’s analysis we rely on the visible content of a picture and our assumptions about the
picture maker’s communicative goals to arrive at the maker content for the sake of deducing
the depictive content of the picture. However, in the course of ordinary communicative
exchange, we do not seek out the utterer’s meaning for the sake of fixing the meaning of
a speaker’s utterance. Our ultimate goal is to understand what the speaker meant, what
they intended to convey by their utterance. It may be argued that this is, in fact, what
distinguishes pictorial communication from ordinary conversational exchanges. In the course
of ordinary communication we are faced with our interlocutor and our ultimate goal is to
understand them, whereas when we look at a picture, the picture itself is our interlocutor
so our ultimate goal is to understand the picture. Moreover, one might argue that this is
not necessarily something that is distinctive of pictorial communication. It could be argued
that something similar holds when we interpret a literary text. The text itself is separated
from its source and insofar as we are concerned with authorial intentions it is for the sake
of enriching our understanding of the text itself and not for the sake of apprehending the
16

Although I will not go into this in depth, it has been suggested that Abell’s example is problematic because the sign marking the women’s restroom is highly conventionalized. If the standard viewer understands
the sign because they are familiar with the convention, then there is no need for the viewer to apply Gricean
inference to their interpretation.
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author’s meaning. I think there is something to this comparison and I will return to this
point later on in my discussion.
Leaving debates about literary interpretation to one side,17 Abell’s analysis of pictorial understanding requires that depictive content, as something that is separate from either visible
or maker’s content, play a meaningful role in our engagement with pictures. However, I do
not recognize anything like what Abell describes entering into the experience or interpretation of the picture of the woman on the door of the public restroom. Abell contends that
in spite of the way that the woman appears to have been rendered, we actually interpret
this as a picture of “a woman whose head is connected to her shoulders, whose dress is
not perfectly triangular, and whose limbs are not perfectly straight”. I don’t know exactly
when or how this happens. It clearly cannot be the case that on the basis of the viewer’s
inference about the maker content she now sees the picture differently. Whereas sentence
meaning can be effaced by utterer’s meaning–we fail to even register the literal meaning of
a sentence that has been uttered once we have grasped the meaning the speaker intended to
convey–the same cannot be said of the visible content of a picture. It always remains visible.
Nor does some additional content become visible in virtue of inferences about the picture
maker’s intention. What would the woman who is actually depicted look like? Where does
she appear? Moreover, considering the purpose of the picture on the door of the woman’s
restroom, I doubt anybody who comes across this picture has any interest in working out the
implicated depictive content of the picture. The picture is designed to convey the requisite
information at a glance.
Abell distinguishes between two kinds of conversational implicatures, those that supplement
the literal meaning of what is said and those that entail a radical revision of literal meaning
(60). An example of the former would be the following: if I were to say that “Obama has
17
Although the comparison between some pictures and some kinds of literary texts, most notably poetry,
could be fruitful. Whereas in ordinary conversation the vehicle of communication lacks intrinsic interest and
is valued for its efficiency at conveying speaker meaning, in the case of poetry and pictures, this vehicle does
have intrinsic interest and value in its own right over and above its efficiency at conveying speaker meaning.
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two daughters,” your assumption that I am observing the maxim of Quantity–providing
no more or less information than required–would allow you to interpret what I’ve said as
implicating that he has exactly two daughters and no sons. The second type of implicature
includes instances of irony, when the actual meaning I intend to convey is the opposite of
the literal meaning of my utterance. For example, if I say, “It’s my lucky day,” after losing
my wallet, the assumption that I am observing the maxim of Quality–only saying what I
believe to be true–allows an interpreter to surmise that I mean the opposite of what I say.
Abell takes the example of the woman silhouette that marks the women’s restroom as a
case of this second type of implicature (62). Her contention is that correctly apprehending
the image involves a radical revision of the visible content of the picture to correctly grasp
the depictive content. But if this is the case, its not clear what end it would serve. It
cannot be necessary to apprehend this depictive content in order to understand that the
image represents a woman, because knowing that the picture depicts a woman–at the level
of its visible content–is required in order to make any further assumptions about the picture
maker’s adherence to the maxim of Quality. According to the chain of inference that Abell
describes it’s only because we recognize the image as a woman that we assume that she
must, contrary to appearances, actually have a neck and flexible limbs. However, once we’ve
recognized the image as a woman, the image has done the job required of it. Unlike an ironic
utterance whose meaning needs to be radically revised in order to be comprehensible, the
image of the woman is immediately understood for what it is. This is why it is a useful
indicator. It seems that, at least in this example, depictive content, as something over and
above both the visible and maker content of the picture, does not play a meaningful role in
our interpretation of the picture.
Abell also considers examples of supplemental pictorial implicatures (2015, 61-2). A picture
that shows only the top half of a person–e.g. a portrait that only shows its subject from the
shoulders up–is not interpreted as a picture of a person whose body ends at the torso. This
interpretation, on Abell’s view, relies on assumptions about the picture maker’s adherence
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to the Cooperative Principle and maxims. It is pictorially implicated that the person has a
body that is not visible because it lies outside of the picture’s boundaries–whether this is the
physical boundary of the frame or just where the artist stopped drawing. So, according to
Abell, what the picture actually depicts is a person with a whole, intact body. In this case
I think Abell is partially correct. In virtue of what they do show, pictures often implicate
things that they do not show. However, what is implicated by the picture is precisely not
part of what the picture depicts. In virtue of what the picture depicts, it implicates things
that it does not depict. Abell is incorrect to conclude that a portrait actually depicts the
whole person in virtue of what it implicates.

4.1.2

Levels of pictorial content

I introduced the first chapter by discussing the potential ambiguity inherent in the term
“depiction”. Those who take the term to be ambiguous distinguish between a relational and
a non-relational sense of the term. What distinguishes these two senses is, in part, that the
relational sense licenses existential generalization—to say that P depicts O, in this sense,
implies that O exists—whereas the non-relational sense does not. I argued that the term
“depicts” is not, in fact, ambiguous in the manner suggested and argued for a single nonrelational sense of the term. It’s clear that Abell is using “depiction” in the relational sense
that I have discarded. This is clear from how she differentiates the different types of pictorial
content. A key upshot of Abell’s discussion is that if we accept that pictorial interpretation
is governed by a standard of correctness we are forced to accept that there are multiple levels
of pictorial content. In maintaining this, Abell’s interpretation of the role of the standard
of correctness diverges from Wollheim’s. To review, for a surface to count as a picture of x,
Wollheim requires that:

(i) it’s possible for some viewer to see x in that surface; and
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(ii) the picture maker intended for x to be seen in the surface.

For Wollheim, there would be a gap or separation between (i) and (ii) when there is a
difference between what is seen in a picture and what the picture maker intended to be
seen in the picture–not, as Abell argues, what the picture maker intends to actually depict.
Wollheim’s two conditions both concern a single level of pictorial content. It is the level that
Abell calls the visible content of the picture–i.e. what can be seen in the picture. The first
condition concerns what can actually be seen in a picture and the second condition concerns
what the artist intends to be seen in the picture. When Abell discusses the standard of
correctness, she introduces two levels of content that can be inconsistent. The standard of
correctness is not applied to the visible content, as it is in Wollheim’s formulation, but rather
to the depictive content. Abell is concerned with pictures in which the content of seeing-in
probably is what the picture maker intended for it to be, but this content is different from
what the picture maker intended to depict.
The implications of Abell’s view can be illustrated with an example. Let’s consider Figure
5, the stick-figure picture of Giannis. With respect to a picture of this nature, Abell has
nothing to say about the role of picture maker’s intentions or a standard of correctness in
determining the visible content of the picture. It seems that, for Abell, resemblance alone
is necessary and sufficient to determine the picture’s visible content.18 As I understand
Abell, she would contend that what the picture maker intended was for this to depict–in
her preferred sense–something other than what can be seen in it: viz. Giannis as he is.
Therefore, according to Abell, this picture has a level of visible content, in which he is thin
as a stick, and a level of depictive content, in which he is not. The problem, I would contend,
with accepting this analysis is that it would seem to suggest that the picture of Giannis in
Figure 5 has the same depictive content as the picture of Giannis in Figure 6, despite the
18

Her view on this is different in Abell 2009. Here she argues, in essence, that artist’s intentions determine
visible content and that the interpreter must appeal to these intentions to discern the visible content of a
picture.
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obvious dissimilarities between how the two pictures look. What might tempt us to think
that the two pictures actually have the same depictive content? It might be the fact that
both pictures are of the same individual. One might take depiction to be a kind of relation
between a picture and its subject and take this relation to be a relation of denotation. In
this case, P depicts Giannis would have a structure analogous to “Giannis” denotes Giannis.
So, if the depictive content of a picture is just what a picture depicts–and Abell seems to use
the two terms interchangeably when she describes the depictive content of a picture as what
it actually depicts–and what a picture depicts is taken to essentially mean what a picture
denotes, it would make sense to say that two pictures that represent the same subject have
the same depictive content.
However, I don’t believe that depiction is a relation between a picture and its subject nor do
I believe that pictures denote their subjects. The picture depicts Giannis in virtue of showing
us Giannis, not in virtue of denoting him. It shows us Giannis because Giannis–at least some
of his visible features–can be seen in the picture. With respect to the nature of pictorial
content, the difference between my view and Abell’s view comes down to the following. First,
she identifies three different types of pictorial content, whereas I only recognize one level of
pictorial content–I take what she calls the picture’s visible content to constitute the entirety
of the picture’s proper content. Second, she argues that two levels of pictorial content are
determined by the picture maker’s intentions, whereas I take the single level of pictorial
content to be determined by brute perceptual facts.

Levels of content:
visible content
Abell’s view

My view

Determined by:
→

resemblance

depictive content

→ picture maker’s intentions

maker content

→ picture maker’s intentions

pictorial content
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→

perceptual facts

The single level of proper pictorial content, as I understand it, is roughly equivalent to Abell’s
visible content insofar as we agree that it is determined by facts that are independent of the
picture maker’s intentions. We disagree on precisely which facts these are, as Abell argues
that it is a matter of resemblance and I have argued that a picture triggers recognition
and sustains a visual experience of its depictum. Moreover, according to the way that I
have defined depiction–i.e. in the non-relational sense–depiction is the manner in which a
picture’s design makes manifest meaningful content. A picture’s content is what it depicts.
It is what can be seen in the picture’s design. We cannot see Giannis as he really is in
the stick-figure drawing, Giannis as he really is not part of the content of this picture and
this picture does not depict Giannis as he really is. It depicts Giannis as a man, holding a
basketball aloft and wearing shoes. In this picture Giannis is, strictly, depicted as naked with
stick-thin limbs. Contrary to Abell, who claims that stick figure drawings don’t depict their
subjects as “emaciated beings with gargantuan heads,” I would argue that this is precisely
how Giannis is depicted in Figure 5. He is depicted this way despite the fact that, in reality,
he does not possess such proportions.
As discussed previously, a stick figure is a peculiar example because I think it could plausibly
be argued that this stick figure does not depict Giannis at all because, in truth, Giannis cannot be recognized or seen in this picture. At most it depicts a generic, stick-thin, basketball
playing human. It could be used in some context to represent Giannis, for example to show
his position on the court relative to his defenders, but so could virtually any other mark like
an X. If the figure does depict Giannis it does so in virtue of rules governing how the viewer
is meant to interpret the omissions characteristic of stick-figure drawings. Because of these
rules, although Giannis is, strictly, depicted as naked with stick-thin limbs, we know that
the picture is neutral on whether Giannis is wearing his Milwaukee Bucks uniform and on
how he is built. Correctly interpreting this omission is not the same thing as ascribing the
picture an unseen level of content.
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I object to the way that Abell has characterized the various levels of pictorial content because,
in distinguishing the visible content from the depictive content of a picture, Abell posits a
level of essentially pictorial content that is not visible. My primary objection to this is
that it muddies the boundaries of the concept of depiction, which, it is frequently noted,
is defined by the fact that it is fundamentally visual (e.g. in Walton 1990 and Hopkins
1998). I think it is useful to preserve the integrity of this concept by not including nonvisible elements as proper parts of pictorial–or depictive–content. Having a clear sense of
what is included in the content of a picture can help us understand how they are used for
communicative ends including how pictures are used to make implicatures. Ultimately, if
a picture maker implicates something in virtue of what they depict this does not alter the
content of the picture but rather it informs our interpretation of what the picture maker
intends to communicate by means of the picture.

4.1.3

Intentions and the standard of correctness

As noted above, Wollheim and Abell assign different roles to the standard of correctness.
I agree with Abell that picture maker’s intentions do not determine the (visible) content
of a picture. On Wollheim view, I take it, the standard of correctness applies precisely to
this level of content. As I understand his view, he would hold that a picture that effects
an experience of seeing x in its design does not actually have the content x unless it was
intended by the picture maker that x be visible in the picture’s design. Another way to put
this is that unless a marked surface satisfies both of Wollheim’s conditions it cannot be said
to depict anything. However, when Wollheim sets forth this view he does not use the term
“depict,” but rather uses the term “represent”. He writes:

In a community where seeing-in is firmly established, some member of the community–let us call him (prematurely) an artist–sets about marking a surface with
the intention of getting others around him to see some definite thing in it: say,
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a bison. If the artist’s intention is successful to the extent that a bison can be
seen in the surface as he has marked it, then the community closes ranks in that
someone who does indeed see a bison in it is now held to see the surface correctly,
and anyone is held to see it incorrectly if he sees, as he might, something else in
it, or nothing at all. Now the marked surface represents a bison...Representation
arrives, then, [when there is established] a standard of correctness. This standard is set–set for each painting–by the intentions of the artist insofar as they
are fulfilled (48, emphasis added).

As I understand this passage he is using “representation” in a way that is synonymous with
the non-relational sense of “depiction.”19 So, he holds that in order for a picture to depict
x it is necessary for the picture maker to intend to depict x. I think this is incorrect, and
I believe that my view is consistent with our intuitions about what determines pictorial
content. For example, we can imagine a couple of ways that a picture make could fail to
satisfy both of Wollheim’s two conditions on depiction. In some instances the gap between
(i) and (ii) can just be a matter of the picture maker’s failure to realize her intentions. She
intended to depict her dog, she had some idea of what she wanted this picture of her dog to
look like, but the result was a mess. This kind of failure is not especially problematic because
it seems that in this case the result is a picture that lacks any kind of legible content. In
an alternative example the picture maker intends to depict her dog, but fails to realize her
intention yet does successfully produce a picture that looks like a sand dune. In this case
the picture has legible content, but it is accidental content, not unlike the charred rendering
of Jesus in the pierogi. Obviously her picture, despite her intention, does not depict a dog.
However, in this case we might further ask whether the requirement of (ii) overrides (i).
Should we say that because the picture maker lacked the relevant intention her picture fails
to depict the sand dune that can, in fact, be seen in it? The standard of correctness has
19

For Wollheim a picture represents x insofar as it furnishes a visual experience of x, which, on my account,
is precisely what is is for a picture to (non-relationally) depict x.
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two purposes. The first is to distinguish pictures from non-pictures. Pictures are created
intentionally and non-pictures are not. The picture maker who created the picture of the
sand dune did intend to create a picture, so her work is, in this respect, different from the
Jesus-pierogi. According to the standard of correctness, the sand dune counts as a picture.
The second purpose of the standard of correctness is to rule out illegitimate interpretations of
a picture’s content. It requires that the viewer interpret the picture according to the picture
maker’s intention. Here it would seem that interpreting the picture as depicting a sand
dune would be ruled out by the picture maker’s lacking the appropriate intention, despite
the sand dune that can be seen in the picture. This conclusion appears to me to be both
counterintuitive and overly strict. I could imagine someone who sees the picture telling the
picture maker that she hasn’t painted the dog she intended to paint, but rather she’s painted
a sand dune.20 In other words, a viewer could tell the picture maker that the content of her
painting is different than what she had intended it to be. This possibility would be ruled out
in principle if the picture maker’s intentions determined the content of her picture. The fact
that this possibility is not ruled out reflects the fact that the picture has the content it does
in virtue of the fact that it is possible to see the sand dune in the picture, despite the fact that
the picture maker did not intend for this to be the case.21 Analogously, someone who neither
speaks or understands French (or possibly a parrot) can utter the sentence “Henri a eu mal
20

John Hyman (2006) argues that picture maker’s intention cannot serve as an adequate standard of correctness because it is not, in conjunction with Wollheim’s first condition, sufficient to determine pictorial
content (138). Although my view is that it is not necessary to determine pictorial content, Hyman’s objection to Wollheim would bolster my position because picture maker’s intention can hardly be necessary to
determining pictorial content if, as Hyman argues, it is simply not up to the task that Wollheim assigns it.
21
We might consider the following counterexample that challenges my conclusion: Imagine a painter drops
a can of paint on a canvass and the result is a marked surface in which it’s possible to see a sand dune. One
might ask (a) whether the result counts as a picture of a sand dune; and (b) whether this surface would
depict a sand dune. In response to (a) one might say that this would simply not count as a picture, since
a picture must be produced intentionally. If one were to hold that only a picture can depict anything, it
would follow that, if a patterned surface is not a picture, then, we’d have to answer (b) in the negative. It
does not have pictorial or depictive content, so it does not depict a sand dune. On the other hand, if the
artist haphazardly splashed the paint on the surface with the intention of producing a picture, but without
the intention of depicting a sand dune, and the result was a rendering of a sand dune, I would say that
this picture depicts a sand dune–even if the picture maker didn’t authorize this interpretation. Similarly I
think that a baby or an ape could mash paint against a surface and the result could plausibly have depictive
content–if it facilitated recognition and an experience of seeing-in.
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aux dents pendant plusieurs jours,” without knowing what it means. They do not have the
intention to express the fact that Henri had a toothache for several days. Nevertheless, this
is what the sentence they have uttered means. Its meaning is determined by linguistic rules.
The content of a picture is not determined by any set of rules, but rather by perceptual facts
and these facts hold independently of the picture maker’s intentions.
Moreover, in this example, I don’t think we would object to the picture maker, despite her
initial intentions, titling her painting “The Dune” once she sees what she has produced–we
wouldn’t insist that she trash the picture because it lacked the appropriate causal history.
This would really depend on how convincing a sand dune the picture depicts, rather than
how closely the picture matches what the picture maker meant to produce at the outset. By
titling the painting in this way, the picture maker is not altering the content of the picture
or changing what it depicts. Rather, I would suggest, she is stipulating by the title that the
picture represents, or stands for or even that it is meant to be seen as a sand dune. The
reason that we would readily accept this stipulation might be that the picture, in virtue of
depicting a sand dune, is perfectly suited to the job of representing a sand dune. However, the
artist does not necessarily need to license the viewer’s interpretation of her picture. Again,
we can imagine the picture maker discarding the picture because it failed to depict her dog
and someone finding it and deciding to display it because it reminded them of their recent
vacation in Oman. The painting can be used this way because, in virtue of depicting a sand
dune, it is well suited to this use. There is no general proscription against using the painting
in this way. In fact, I would argue, people often display pictures simply because they like the
way they look. For pictures that are figurative rather than abstract, this often means that
they like the look of objects and scenes they can see in the picture. When they use pictures
this way they give no thought whatsoever to the picture maker’s intentions. The picture is
like a found object used for decoration, and it fulfills this decorative function, at least partly,
in virtue of its visible content. This is a valid way to use a picture. However, using a picture
in this way may disregard its potential function as a means of communication.
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By denying that picture maker’s intentions determine the content of a picture, I allow for
the possibility that a picture can have ambiguous content. Robert Hopkins (1998) contends
that the standard of correctness exists precisely to resolve ambiguities of content. If a
picture facilitates multiple, inconsistent experiences of seeing-in, the standard of correctness
determines what the picture depicts. Hopkins gives the example of the Batman film logo,
which, although it is intended to depict a stylized bat, can also be seen as two hunched
figures moving away from each other (71). Hopkins argues that this doesn’t depict two
hunched figures, despite the fact that the figures can be seen in the logo, because it wasn’t
created with the intention that these two figures be seen in it. He maintains Wollheim’s
second condition on depiction. In contrast, I would argue that the picture does depict these
two figures because they can be seen in the logo, and despite the fact that this depiction
is unintentional. These two hunched figures, insofar as they they can be seen in the design
of the logo, are part of the picture’s content. It may not be possible to simultaneously see
the logo as a bat and as two hunched figures. Perhaps one interpretation of the content
perceptually negates the other. To the extent that this is the case, this picture is ambiguous.
Whether it is correct or incorrect to see the hunched figures is relative to how the picture is
used, and there is no general requirement that a picture be used in the way that the artist
intended.
It is not uncommon for a picture to have unintentional content. A photograph taken under
conditions that the photographer cannot control might have content and depict things unintentionally. Some philosophers, including Hopkins (1998), argue that photography is subject
to a different standard of correctness than a manually produced picture (74). Whereas
the picture maker’s intentions govern the standard of correctness for manual pictures, photographs are governed by a specific causal standard of correctness. I argue that the content
of both manual pictures and photographs is determined in the same way. Either a manual
picture or a photograph depicts O insofar as O can be seen in the picture.
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4.1.4

Depiction versus representation

Wollheim and Abell both reverse the concepts of representation and depiction. Whereas
Wollheim uses the term “representation” to mean “depiction,” Abell uses the term “depiction” to mean “representation.” I would accept Wollheim’s claim that a standard of
correctness–viz. the artist’s intentions–determines what a picture represents, as long as
“representation” is not taken to be synonymous with “depiction.” Wollheim clearly uses
the former term to mean the latter and, insofar as he does, I have argued that his view is
incorrect. I think that Abell better captures the role of the standard of correctness, insofar
as she does not take it to apply to the visible content of a picture. However, I obviously
disagree with her contention that the standard of correctness determines what a picture
actually depicts, insofar as she uses “depicts” in the relational sense that I have rejected.
Rather, I think that it would be more appropriate for Abell to claim that the standard of
correctness determines what a picture actually represents. I think this claim is essentially
correct.
In the first section of this paper I distinguished between depiction, representation and pictorial representation as follows:

Representation: P represents O if P is used to, e.g., stand for, pick out, denote, refer to O
Depiction: P depicts O if the design of P facilitates recognition of and sustains a visual
experience as of O–i.e. P has the content O
Pictorial Representation: P pictorially represents O if P is used to represent O and P
depicts O

On the the above definition the term “depiction” is not ambiguous. It has a single, nonrelational sense. The term “pictorial representation” designates the relation between a pic102

ture and the subject that it simultaneously depicts and represents. The standard of correctness determines what a picture represents, and therefore it determines what a picture pictorially represents. Pictures are frequently used to pictorially represent their subjects–they
depict their subjects and they are used to represent them. However, just as it is possible
for an object to be used to represent O without depicting it, it’s possible for something to
depict O without being used to represent it. For example, a photograph of my dog that is
placed on the table next to other objects to represent the location of my bedroom relative
to the rest of my apartment still depicts my dog, even when its not used to represent her.
It is easy to confuse or conflate the concepts of depiction and representation because the
practice of making and displaying pictures very often entails using pictures to pictorially
represent their subjects. This means that for many pictures depiction and representation
occur together. We often take it for granted that a picture that depicts some subject is being
used to represent that subject–we take it for granted that pictures are pictorial representations. Nevertheless, I think that this distinction is important because it gives us a better
understanding of the picture maker’s dual task. In order to pictorially represent a subject,
a picture maker must create a marked surface that depicts that subject and use that picture
to represent the subject. While these two tasks are often achieved together they can come
apart. There are many pictures that depict objects and scenes but do not thereby represent
these objects and scenes. This is because the pictures are not used to represent the objects
and scenes that they depict. For example, Richard Prince’s Untitled (Cowboys) (Figure 10)
depicts a cowboy, but it does not represent a cowboy. It represents an advertisement for a
certain brand of cigarettes, and maybe it thereby represents the cultural factors that form
and sustain American mythologies. It does not represent a cowboy because in order to represent a cowboy it would have to stand in a special kind of relation to a cowboy. It would
have to refer to, stand for, pick out, or denote some cowboy. In order for it to stand in any
such relation to a cowboy the picture maker would have to use the picture in one of these
ways, which he does not. Of course, because the picture depicts a cowboy, a viewer could
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Figure 10: Richard Prince’s Untitled (Cowboys)
easily confuse it for a pictorial representation of a cowboy, and treat it as though it were a
pictorial representation of a cowboy. This would not transform the picture into a pictorial
representation of a cowboy. Rather, it would be a misinterpretation of the work. The interpreter does not have the power to effect this transformation. The picture represents what
it does in virtue of the picture maker’s intentions. Similarly, I think it could be argued that
Figure 11, depicts a plate of peaches but does not represent the peaches. While it’s certainly

Figure 11: Matisse painting of peaches
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possible that Matisse painted these peaches because he wanted to convey the appearance
of some particular plate of peaches, I think there is another interpretation of his activity.
Matisse intended, among other things, to demonstrate the potential of pictorial design to
reveal novel dimensions of pictorial content. He intended to make the viewer appreciate the
painted surface’s potential to disclose unexamined visual aspects of mundane objects and,
perhaps, to help the viewer discover the elasticity of their own perceptual and recognitional
abilities. To this extent, Matisse is not using the picture to represent peaches. In fact, I
think something similar may hold for many traditional still-life paintings that are produced
with the intention of demonstrating painterly technique. They are not principally used to
represent their subjects.

4.2
4.2.1

Pictorial meaning
Pictorial meaning as utterance meaning

Above I distinguish between two senses of the term “utterance”. An utterance can be an
act–remember that Grice uses “utterance” to designate “any act or performance which is
or might be a candidate for nonnatural meaning (1989, 92).” Secondly, an utterance can
be a symbol or string of symbols–i.e. the product of an act. When we discuss the meaning
of a picture, qua utterance, we seem to have the second sense of “utterance” in mind. The
picture is the product of an act or performance and we are interested in its meaning as such.
I previously compared the content of a picture to the meaning of a sentence. I additionally
distinguished the meaning of a sentence from the meaning of an utterance. The latter is
determined by a speaker’s intentions, whereas the former is determined by semantic and
syntactic rules. Analogously, the content of a picture is determined by perceptual facts,
rather than by a picture maker’s intentions. However, I haven’t considered whether or not
there is a pictorial analogue to utterance meaning, and if so, what it might be. For starters,
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we can consider three potential candidates for what constitutes pictorial utterance meaning.
The meaning of a picture (qua utterance) may be:

(i) what the picture depicts–i.e. it’s meaning may be equivalent to its content
(ii) what a picture represents
(iii) what picture pictorially represents

Based on what I’ve already said we can rule out (i). In general, the meaning of an utterance
is a type of nonnatural meaning, so it is determined by a speaker’s, or in this case picture
maker’s, intentions. This suggests that pictorial utterance meaning would not simply be
equivalent to depictive content because depictive content is not determined by the picture
makers intentions. I think we can also rule out (ii). What a picture represents is determined
by the picture maker’s intentions, so we might consider the possibility that what a picture
means is just what it represents. In the above discussion of Abell’s argument, I took her
to hold essentially this view. In the overall scheme of her argument, the notion of what a
picture actually depicts aligned with Grice’s notion of utterance meaning and upon analysis
this notion turned out to be equivalent to what a picture refers to or represents. However,
the meaning of an utterance does not seem to be as arbitrary as what a picture represents.
I’ve argued that a picture represents the same way that any object represents. It is simply
stipulated that the picture represents its subject. Whereas nothing constrains what a picture
can represent, the meaning of an utterance does seem to be, at least partially, constrained
by the meaning of the sentence that is uttered. This suggests that the meaning of a picture
might be what it pictorially represents. It is simultaneously a matter of what it represents
and what it depicts. We might say that pictorial utterance meaning consists of what a
picture represents insofar as this is evident in what the picture depicts. For example, Figure
12, is a photograph of buttered bread by Martin Parr. This picture depicts the plate of
bread resting on a gingham tablecloth and it is being used to represent this bread. The
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Figure 12: Martin Parr photograph
picture’s meaning would be that the bread looks as depicted. However, the picture may be
being used to represent other things that are not actually depicted, e.g. it may represent
the overall state of British gastronomy. This might be implicated by what the picture
depicts–the picture may implicate that all British food has the unappealing quality of the
depicted slices of bread. It may even further implicate something about British culture
more generally. However, the meaning implicated by the picture does not count as a part of
the proper meaning of the picture, but rather is part of the picture maker’s (i.e. utterer’s)
meaning.22 Moreover, truly understanding the picture entails grasping what is implicated. It
is not enough to simply register the fact that the picture represents the bread as having the
depicted qualities. In fact, an interpreter may not even consciously register this fact because
they are able to instantaneously grasp what is implicated–albeit this may rely on some
background knowledge about the work of Martin Parr. If the picture’s implicated meaning
is equivalent to utterer’s meaning rather than utterance meaning, and if the implicated
meaning is what the viewer is actually concerned with, it seems that pictorial utterance
meaning is not especially important.
Moreover, there is a line of argument that suggests that utterance meaning is a spurious
concept. Stephen Neale (2004) argues that, in light of the goals of ordinary communication,
22

See Horn 2004, 3
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the notion of utterance meaning is superfluous to a theory of interpretation. Neale explains
that interactions between speakers and interpreters are structured with a view to achieving
specific goals—most basically speakers want to be understood, interpreters want to understand. The strategies and goals underpinning ordinary communication are of a kind with
those involved in interpreting non-linguistic purposeful behavior. In either case, interpretation aims at identifying intentions (75). Neale stresses the epistemic asymmetry between
the speaker’s and interpreter’s respective situations and the corresponding fundamental difference between their respective tasks. This epistemic asymmetry reflects the difference
between, on the one hand, the metaphysical issue of what determines the speaker’s meaning—what, in fact, makes it the case that the speaker meant x—and, on the other hand,
the epistemological question of how to identify the speaker’s meaning (76). According to
Neale, the metaphysical issue exclusively concerns the mental states of the speaker. What
the speaker means is solely determined by her communicative intentions—i.e. her intention
to communicate x by producing a specific utterance. No interpretation of the speaker’s utterance can fix the speaker’s meaning. The interpreter’s judgment that the speaker means
x does not make it the case that the speaker means x; this is beyond the interpreter’s power
(77). Consequently, the epistemic situation of the speaker with respect to what she means is
different from the interpreter’s. To the extent that the speaker is aware of her communicative
intentions, she already knows what she means. In contrast to the interpreter, the speaker
does not have to figure out what she meant by her utterance. The speaker’s and interpreter’s
perspectives on what the speaker said, i.e. the meaning of her utterance, corresponds to the
divisions outlined above. Neale emphasizes the conceptual distinction between: (i) what a
speaker intends to say by uttering y on a given occasion, and (ii) what a rational, reasonably
well-informed interpreter among her intended audience would think the speaker intended to
say by uttering y on that occasion. In some cases (i) = (ii). When it does, Neale tells us,
“we can talk freely about what the speaker said (77).” However, when (i) and (ii) are not
identical, neither one definitively qualifies as “what was said.” According to Neale, we have
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no reason to choose either (i) or (ii) over the other and there’s no third entity, over and
above these, that might qualify. Neale writes:

[W]hat third thing distinct from (i) and (ii) could be of any significance to a
theory of interpretation? There is simply no rôle for a transcendent notion of
what is said upon which (i) and (ii) converge when all goes well. [Moreover], why
is a choice between (i) and (ii) even needed in cases where (i) 6= (ii)? Conceptually
they are distinct, and they are both needed in a theory of interpretation. When
all goes well, they coincide, and it’s just too bad they don’t always do so (2004,
78).

We can account for cases where a speaker’s communicative intentions are not realized in terms
of the divergence between (i) and (ii). If we accept the plausibility of Neale’s explanation of
the fact that speakers occasionally fail to say what they mean, we do not have to resort to
any conception of utterance meaning.
Following Neale, we might distinguish between:

(i) what a picture maker intends to convey by producing a picture; and
(ii) what a rational, reasonably well-informed viewer among her intended audience would
think the picture maker intended to convey by producing the picture.

Communication between the picture maker and the viewer would succeed when (i) = (ii). On
this view there would be no role for a concept like the actual meaning of the picture, or what
the picture conveyed. There would simply be the meaning intended by the picture maker,
and the interpreter’s goal would be to accurately discern this meaning. It seems that, on this
view, it is essentially irrelevant how a picture maker communicates what she intends to convey and it is equally irrelevant how a viewer goes about uncovering what the picture maker
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intended to convey. The only thing that matters is that, ultimately, the viewer’s interpretation aligns with the picture maker’s intention. In theory, the interpreter could find a way to
determine the picture maker’s intention without even looking at her picture. For example,
the interpreter may have a conversation with the picture maker in which the picture maker
explicitly states what she intends to convey. Or, in an alternate, sci-fi scenario, the picture
maker and interpreter could have their consciousnesses linked by futuristic mind-reading
technology that allows the interpreter direct access to the picture maker’s intentions. Were
such means available it would render not only the concept of pictorial utterance meaning,
but the picture itself superfluous to achieving successful communication.
However, in pictorial communication, how the picture maker conveys her intended meaning
is frequently as significant as what she conveys. The viewer can only appreciate how the
picture maker’s intended meaning is conveyed by consulting her picture. The picture–a
marked surface whose design manifests determinate content–mediates between the picture
maker and the viewer. Pictorial communication is necessarily, not just incidentally, mediated
by pictures. Moreover, what a picture conveys is partially constituted by how it is conveyed.
The viewer of Martin Parr’s photograph is meant not simply to form the belief that the
bread has an anemic, unwholesome quality, but to actually see its anemic unwholesomeness
in virtue of how the bread is portrayed. This experience is part of the response the picture
maker intends to elicit by producing the picture. In general, we can say that the goal of
pictorial interpretation is not just to discern the picture maker’s intended meaning, but
to apprehend the picture maker’s intentions as they are pictorially conveyed–i.e., as they
can be drawn from the content and design of the picture. This is why it seems natural to
to talk about the meaning of a picture or what a picture conveys as though this can be
distinguished from what a picture maker conveys by producing the picture. This inclination
may also be due to the fact that we can legitimately talk about what a picture depicts, since
this is something that holds independently of picture maker’s intentions. When pictures are
used for purposes other than communication, e.g., to document appearances, I think it can
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be perfectly appropriate to talk about what a picture conveys or means–although we need
to specify the precise sense of “meaning”. However, when pictures are used as vehicles of
communication the interpreter is not concerned with what the picture conveys but rather
with what the picture maker conveys through the picture. Nevertheless, even in these cases
I think it is fine to continue to talk, as it seems most natural to do, about what a picture
conveys as long as we recognize that this actually signifies what the picture maker conveys
through the picture. In general, what x meansNN is reducible to what is meantNN by x.
The same holds for what a picture conveys, or pictorial meaning, insofar as this is a type of
meaningNN .

4.2.2

Natural and nonnatural meaning

Pictures can be used for purposes other than communication. They can be used to document
the appearances of objects and scenes. When pictures are used in this way, their authority
as documents is grounded in the fact that they bear natural meaning. For example, an ID
photograph naturally means–and thereby entails–that the photograph’s subject looks the
way she is portrayed. Walton (1984) argues that this is a universal and distinctive feature
of photography (265-7). He argues that the appearance of a manual picture reflects the
beliefs and the communicative intentions of the picture maker, therefore manual pictures
bear nonnatural meaning. In contrast, photographs can capture the appearances of objects
mechanically, without relying on mediating beliefs or intentions. Thus a photograph of,
e.g., a dinosaur, naturally means that the dinosaur existed and had certain visible features,
whereas a sketch of the dinosaur would only meanNN that the dinosaur existed and had these
features. Lopes (1996) objects to Walton’s contention that manual pictures are necessarily
belief-dependent (184). He describes the causal chain that links a subject and the manual
rendering of the subject in a way that would allow that manual pictures may also bear
natural meaning. I think there are certainly some manual pictures that are used as though
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they bear natural meaning and derive their authority from the viewer’s assumption that they
bear natural meaning. For example, the entomological diagram in Figure 13 is taken by the

Figure 13: Entomological diagram
viewer to naturally mean that the praying mantis has the indicated anatomical features. If
the drawing were simply taken as evidence that the picture maker believed that the praying
mantis has these features it would be a less effective educational tool. In general, whether
a picture bears natural or nonnatural meaning is not strictly a matter of how the picture is
produced. It is also a matter of how the picture is used. A picture that is used to document
appearances does so in virtue of its natural meaning. A picture that is used as a vehicle of
communication–to convey a picture maker’s meaning and communicative intentions–achieves
its function by bearing nonnatural meaning. Its possible for a picture to simultaneously bear
both natural and nonnatural meaning. This is the case for many photographs. For example,
the Martin Parr photograph in Figure 12 naturally means that the bread that is depicted
existed and had certain visible features. However, this bit of documentary evidence was
produced and displayed by the artist for the sake of communicating his unique perspective on
the state of British gastronomy. Insofar as the picture is used as a vehicle of communication
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it bears meaningNN . The picture maker intends for the photograph to be interpreted as an
expression of his point of view and intends for the viewer to recognize that he is using the
picture to convey this.
However, some photographs exploit the viewer’s assumption of their naturalness for rhetorical effect. This is evident especially in documentary photography. Documentary photographs
can generate implicatures much like Parr’s photograph does. For example, Dorothea Lange’s
Migrant Mother may generate the implicature that the Great Depression is a severe humanitarian crisis by furnishing evidence of a especially harrowing and symbolically loaded example
of its effects. However, unlike Parr’s photograph, it is supposed to be read as naturally meaning what it implicates. It would be far less rhetorically effective were it read as evidence
that the photographer believed and wished to convey that there was a humanitarian crisis. Rather, it is supposed to be taken as reliable documentary evidence that bears natural
meaning. Insofar as bears natural meaning it entails such a crisis. It accomplishes this by
exploiting the fact that we already the trust the photograph as a document, and we have a
particular understanding of the documentary photographer’s role.23 This would be deceitful
if the photograph was presented as documenting the hardships facing America’s poor. We
trust that the documentary photographer is presenting images that exemplify the state of
affairs she wishes to bring to light–and in this respect they adhere to the Cooperative Principle and the maxims of relevance, quality, quantity and manner. Thus, the photograph is
taken not only to naturally mean that its subject exists and has the features she is depicted
to have, but also the photograph is taken to naturally mean what it implicates–i.e. that the
broader state of affairs is as exemplified.
23

The rhetorical effect of a photograph’s presumed natural meaning could be stretched to a point of deceitfulness. If the picture maker had found an actress to pose s the migrant mother–without making it clear
that this was the case–given the norms of documentary photography we would naturally take this photograph to present the true living conditions of an actual member of the suffering underclass. Documentary
photographs are reliable insofar as they naturally mean that a certain exemplified state of affairs holds. A
viewer without reason to believe that the photograph is staged would take it to bear natural meaning and to
derive its documentary authority from this fact and the photograph would have the same rhetorical effect,
in virtue of its presumed naturalness as a genuine documentary photograph.
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Thus far I have considered what the natural meaning of a picture reveals about its subjects.
Paul Taylor’s (2014) discussion of the natural meaning of art and literary works urges us
to consider what pictures naturally mean about their makers. He argues that a proper but
neglected goal of literary and artistic interpretation is to identify the natural meaning of a
work. Taylor distinguishes between interactive interpretation, that aims at uncovering the
nonnatural meaning of the work, and external interpretation, that aims at the work’s natural
meaning (384). He insists that both are essential to criticism. He argues that, in virtue of its
natural meaning, an artwork reveals facts about the artist–including her feelings, attitudes
and other mental states–that the artist may not intend to convey. Taylor writes:

[A] quality of feeling or an attitude unintentionally shows through in the way a
work is written, which is to say the work gives the impression–offers evidence–that
it was written under the influence of that feeling or attitude without the author
having composed the work in order to convey that impression and hence without
her cuing or inviting her readers to view the writing as expressive in that way
(383).

In fact, I would argue, they can reveal more than even Taylor admits. Most significantly,
insofar as an artist exists within and is influenced by their specific cultural and historical
context, their work can reveal things about the time and place that it comes from. For
example, some stories in The Adventures of Tin Tin, contain problematic racial stereotypes.
The works naturally mean, not only that their author, Hergé, harbored prejudiced attitudes,
but, insofar as Hergé’s attitudes reflect those of his cultural milieu, reveal the attitudes
common in early 20th Century Europe. In fact, especially for the purposes of criticism, I
think we are interested in the natural meaning of art and literary works just as much, if not
more, for what they reveal about the broader cultural context from which they are produced
as we are for what they reveal about their particular creators.
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In this way, artworks are like various other human activities which may reveal our feelings
and attitudes despite our intentions. However, I think it is questionable whether or not
external interpretation, as Taylor describes it, is a proper part of communication. In the
course of a conversation, I may unintentionally reveal many things about myself in virtue
of not only what I say, but in virtue of how I behave, how I speak or how I look. My
interlocutor may surmise that I am nervous because I stumble over my words and wring
my hands. She can tell that I’m nervous without my having to tell her so. In this case
we would not say that I’ve communicated my nervousness to my interlocutor. She infers
my internal states by taking an objective, or even objectifying, stance towards my behavior,
which she takes as evidence of my internal states (see Taylor 384). This is not the process
that underlies communication. In the course of communication the interpreter’s goal is to
understand what the speaker intends to convey. One could argue that an interpreter may be
able to get a better grasp of what a speaker (or artist or picture maker) intends to convey
by first understanding their internal state as evidenced by their behavior. For example, I
may be better able to understand that when my interlocutor says, “You’re the best!” she is
being sarcastic and actually means the opposite if I first observe that she is angry. I may
observe that she is angry on the basis of the look on her face and her body language–I may
come to realize she is angry despite the fact that she does not intend to reveal her anger.
However, while it’s possible that external interpretation may aid interactive interpretation,
I would argue that communication proper is strictly interactive. This is as much the case for
pictorial communication as it is for other forms of communication. What a picture maker
communicates is encompassed and conveyed by the nonnatural meaning of her work. To
the extent that Taylor is correct about the goals of literary and artistic interpretation, these
goals are not identical to those of communication.
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4.3

Pictorial implicature

To my knowledge, with the exception of Abell, there has been no serious philosophical
treatment of pictorial implicature. I have already cited what I take to be examples of
pictorial implicature. In this section I will offer a more detailed account of this device. In
my discussion of Abell’s account of pictorial implicature I disputed the main part of her
argument, but allowed that her description of “supplemental” implicature (2005, 62) was
partially correct. She offers the following illustration of this type of implicature:

For example, I would usually infer that a picture that depicts a man front-on
depicts a man who, if seen from behind, would look like men generally look when
seen from behind (I assume, that is, he does not have electric cables protruding
between his shoulder blades). I do this on the basis that, if the picture maker
had wanted to depict a man with protruding cables, he or she would have shown
these cables so as to meet the requirement of being adequately informative (2005,
61-2).

I might allow that in virtue of actually depicting the front of a man, in accordance with the
maxim of Quantity and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the picture maker has
implicated that this man has a normal back. I would stop short of claiming, as Abell does,
that the picture depicts a man with a normal back. This is because a man with a normal
back is not part of picture’s content. This picture only depicts the front of a man, and that
is the extent of its content. As we saw, Abell contends that pictorial implicatures contribute
to the depictive content of a picture and I want to avoid wording that would imply this view.
The content of a picture–i.e. what it depicts–is determined by perceptual facts and does not
include what it implicates. What it depicts determines what it implicates.
We can distinguish between two types of pictorial implicatures. Both types of pictorial
implicatures are generated by the Cooperative Principle and Gricean maxims. However,
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the first type relies on symbolic cues and the second on perceptual cues. The first type of
implicature is at play in Figure 14, Barron Clairborne’s iconic “King of New York” portrait

Figure 14: Biggie Smalls photographed by Barron Clairborne, 1997
of Biggie Smalls. The photograph depicts Biggie Smalls wearing a casually off-kilter crown.
The picture implicates that Biggie Smalls is the king of New York City hip hop. The
symbolic meaning of the crown is familiar and because we assume the picture maker is being
cooperative we can assign the symbol the meaning most immediately associated with it.
The symbolic significance of the crown is part of the depictive content of the picture. It has
this symbolic significance independently of the picture maker’s intentions–the meaning of a
crown is a fixed cultural fact, which the picture maker deploys for the purpose of achieving
his communicative goals. The symbolic meaning of the crown is apprehended as immediately
and in the same way as other aspects of the picture’s content, e.g. the fact that it is Biggie,
and the fact that he is wearing a crown. Its symbolic meaning is an inherent and perceptible
feature of the crown. In general, pictures are laden with meaning simply in virtue of the
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fact that they represent objects and properties that are themselves laden with meaning. The
picture maker cannot depict these objects and properties without thereby conveying these
associated meanings, and picture maker cannot arbitrarily stipulate the meanings of the
objects and properties that she depicts.24 Insofar as a crown has this meaning independently
of anyone’s intentions it is tempting to say that it bears natural meaning–a crown naturally
means royalty. The picture maker has exploited the natural meaning of this symbol to
implicate that Biggie Smalls is the equivalent of hip hop royalty. So, in this picture, this is
what the crown meansNN .
Secondly, pictures like Figure 15, a photograph of Baryshnikov mid-jump, generate implica-

Figure 15: Jumping Baryshnikov
tures on the basis of perceptual cues. Here it is notably a lack of spatial indicators–the lack
of any visible boundaries, like a floor, delineating the space that he occupies–that creates
the impression that he is not just jumping but flying, unmoored and unrestrained by the
24

No doubt there is some extent to which a picture maker can attribute a novel meaning to a familiar
object in virtue of the way that she depicts it and its relation to the rest of the picture. Additionally, there
could be multiple meanings associated with an object, and the picture maker may emphasize one over the
others. For example, depending on how its depicted, water can be a symbol of purity or a symbol of danger,
among other things. However, no matter how symbolism works in these cases, I would argue that it is
something that is apprehended as part of pictorial content. In some respect, we recognize the meaning of
these symbols, just as recognize depicted objects and scenes. There is certainly more to be said about this,
but if falls outside the scope of this essay.
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pull of gravity that confines normal bodies to the ground. Although it is not depicted, it
is implicated that Baryshnikov is in movement and that he has jumped. The height of the
jump is exaggerated by the fact that the floor is cropped out of the frame. In virtue of
presenting us Baryshnikov in this light the picture implicates his extraordinary talent as a
dancer. The picture meansNN that Baryshnikov is possessed of such talent.
The mechanism by which perceptual cues generate implicatures has parallels to the ways in
which, according to Walton, fictional truths are generated in games of make-believe. Specifically, Walton distinguishes a class of fictional truths that are implied rather than directly
generated. He offers the following example of an implied fictional truth: In Eisenstein’s
silent film Battleship Potemkin a character steps on the keys of a piano and this implies that
piano sounds are produced.25 The piano sounds are implied because, since the film is silent,
no actual piano sounds are produced (1990, 145). We could say that by showing the piano
keys being pressed, the filmmaker has implicated that piano sounds are produced.26 I have
argued that Walton’s theory does not offer an adequate theory of pictorial content determination because his theory of make-believe does not explain the phenomenon of seeing-in.
However, I think that a version of his theory may help us to understand how pictures convey
meaning. I think that he is essentially correct that picture makers use pictures to direct
viewer’s imaginings and that the viewer’s imaginings are reflexive–they are imagining about
her own activity of looking at the picture.27 Part of what is conveyed by the photograph
of Baryshnikov is a prescription to imagine seeing him the way that he is portrayed. It is
important that the viewer is an active participant in this imagining for two reasons: First,
the viewer’s imaginative engagement with the picture is grounded in her real-life percep25

Walton would put this differently. He would say that in Eisenstein’s film it is fictional that a character
steps on the keys of a piano and this implies that it is fictional that piano sounds are produced.
26
Noël Carroll has suggested that this is not a good example because silent films were normally scored
by live piano player, and during the scene in question the piano player would have pounded the keys to
provide an aural accompaniment to the visual. We could, therefore, imagine an alternate example of a still
photograph of a piano player depressing several piano keys. We could say that this image implicates that
some corresponding sound is produced.
27
See Walton 1990, Chapter 8 for a discussion of the reflexive imagining characteristic of engagement with
pictures.
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tions and expectations. It is the viewer’s embodied understanding of what human beings are
normally capable of that makes Baryshnikov’s aptitude as a dancer impressive. The viewer
is imagining that she herself (i.e. someone with a deep personal familiarity with what the
human body is normally capable of) is witnessing Baryshnikov in action when she looks at
the picture. Her judgment about his abilities is grounded in her own embodied perception of
and imaginings about what she sees. Secondly, the picture is designed to compel the viewer
to not only form the belief that Baryshnikov’s feats are impressive, but to be impressed. If
the viewer is not impressed by what she sees, then Baryshnikov’s feats are not impressive
and the picture does not implicate that they are.
At play in pictorial implicatures that rely on perceptual cues is a version of what Walton calls
The Reality Principle (RP) (1990, 147). Essentially, in the case of pictures, this principle is
as follows:

RP: If in reality perceiving x would normally lead one to believe y, then in a picture the
presence of x implicates y

We can consider how this principle informs our interpretation of the photograph of Baryshnikov. Normally, seeing someone jump so high in the air that the ground beneath them is out
of view and seeing them do so in a way that is both graceful and apparently effortless would
lead us to believe that the person is exceptionally talented.28 Thus insofar as the picture
presents Baryshnikov in precisely this way, it implicates that he is exceptionally talented.29
We can apply the same analysis to Abell’s example of the picture depicting a man front-on.
It could be that we take this picture to implicate that the man has a normal back because
we assume RP. Normally when we see a man front-on we assume that he has a normal back,
28

The fact that we interpret this as a picture of Baryshnikov jumping rather than floating or falling
cannot be explained by RP, nor is this interpretation based strictly on perceptual cues. It is in virtue of our
understanding of photography and expectations of the kinds of things that are normally photographed that
we interpret this as a picture of him jumping.
29
I don’t think it is especially significant that it is Baryshnikov. Were the picture to present any individual
in this way it would imply that this individual is tremendously talented.
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rather than assuming, to use Abell’s example, that he has electric cables protruding between
his shoulder blades. Because of RP we make the same inference when we look at the picture.
Abell argues that we understand this implicature on the basis of our assumptions about
the picture maker’s communicative intentions. Specifically, she argues that this implicature
follows from the assumption that the picture maker is being cooperative and observing the
maxim of Quantity–i.e. being adequately informative. However, I would argue, explicitly
indicating nothing about the depicted man’s back is only adequately informative, and only
thereby implicates that his back is normal, if RP is in play. If RP is assumed to hold, then, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, things in pictures are as we would normally expect
them to be. However, if we have RP to guide our interpretation of pictorial implicatures,
one might ask why and if we actually need to refer to the picture maker’s communicative
intentions. Moreover, if RP dictates our interpretation of pictorial implicatures that rely on
perceptual cues then we might ask whether these actually count as genuine implicatures as
Grice defines them.
Walton points out that one problem with RP is that it leads to an over-proliferation of
fictional truths. Similarly, if RP generates implicatures it generates an excess of implicatures.
If we consider the picture of the man depicted face-on, to the extent that RP generates the
implicature that his back is normal, it also generates the implicatures that he has blood in
his veins, that he was once a baby, that he eats three meals a day, that he exists in a world
in which Obama was the first black president, among countless others. However, it seems
clear that the picture does not implicate all of these facts about its subject. In part, this
is because there are facts about the subject that are entailed by RP that the picture maker
might not be aware of. However, pictorial implicatures are, by definition, determined by an
picture maker’s intentions. A picture cannot implicate something that the picture maker
does not intend for it to implicate. It follows that the body of facts that are yielded by RP
is greater than those that are pictorially implicated.
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Generally, an implicature is the point of an utterance. A speaker produces the utterance that
they do for the sake of conveying their meaningNN , which is often implicated by what they
say. Similarly, we might say that a pictorial implicature is the point of a picture–and the
reason for its having the content it does. The point of the Baryshnikov picture is (apart from
providing the viewer with an opportunity to revel in his beauty) to implicate that he is an
exceptionally talented dancer. To the extent that this implicature relies on perceptual cues it
is grounded in RP. However, not everything entailed by RP is implicated by the photograph.
To identify what the photograph implicates the viewer must consider the picture maker’s
communicative intentions, which can be inferred on the assumption that the picture maker is
being cooperative and following the maxims. According to Grice, the Cooperative Principle
requires the speaker to “[m]ake [her] conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
[she is] engaged (1988, 26).” A picture is not necessarily displayed in the context of a
communicative exchange that has a clearly defined, mutually recognized purpose. Pictures
pop up all over the place and are frequently viewed outside of the conditions in which
they are produced. However, even if the picture maker does not conform her communicative
contribution to the requirements of a mutually recognized purpose, in order to be cooperative
her contribution must, at a minimum, have a point. Making a pointless contribution would
be uncooperative. We can reframe Grice’s maxims in light of the picture maker’s effort
to communicate her point: The maxim of Quantity requires the picture maker to provide
as much information as needed to convey the point; the maxim of Relevance requires the
content she displays to be relevant to her point; the maxim of Manner requires her to get
to the point.30 In the case of the Baryshnikov photograph our assumption that the picture
maker is being cooperative and adhering to the maxims helps us understand why they have
presented us with a picture with this exact content. They have done so in order to make
a point–the point that Baryshnikov is exceptionally talented. The content of the picture is
30

I have left out the maxim of Quality. I think it is debatable whether the assumption of truthfulness is
necessary for successful communication.
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necessary and sufficient (in conjunction with RP) to make this point–it shows his facility in
action. It is also relevant to making this point–there would be no other obvious reason to
produce or present such a picture. Other things that are entailed by RP are not implicated
by the picture insofar as they have nothing to do with the point of the picture. It’s not
clear exactly what the point of Abell’s hypothetical picture of a man depicted face-on is.
However, I doubt that the point of depicting the man face-on is to convey the fact that he
has a normal back. Although this may be entailed by RP, I do no think it is implicated by
the picture. It’s not implicated by the picture insofar as it is not the point of the picture
to convey that the man has a normal back. Contrary to what Abell claims, it would be
rather uncooperative to try to make the point that a subject has a normal back by depicting
him in a way that obscures his back. My sense is that, having recognized the role that RP
plays in generating perceptually grounded pictorial implicatures, Abell has conflated what
the picture implicates with what is entailed by RP. This discussion shows that RP only
generates perceptually grounded pictorial implicatures insofar as these are consistent with
our assumption that the picture maker is being cooperative and adhering to the maxims.
I have distinguished between two kinds of pictorial implicature, those that are generated
by symbolic cues and those that are generated by perceptual cues. It’s likely that these
two types of implicatures often overlap and interact. For example, a picture maker may
depict a landscape using a gray and blue palette to convey a sombre mood. In such a case
it might be difficult to decide whether color conveys meaning symbolically or perceptually.
31

However, I believe that I have provided examples that illustrate how pictorial implicature

works and I have presented an alternative to Abell’s view, which is the only other welldeveloped discussion of this phenomenon.
31

We might also ask whether the mood conveyed by a picture is implicated or directly and immediately
perceived. It’s likely that there are many cases where it is difficult to definitively say whether the meaningNN
of a picture is conveyed directly or it is implicated. This could be a fruitful topic for further discussion.
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4.4

Pictorial communication

At the beginning of my discussion of pictorial communication I put forth three theses that,
I argued, would be central to a Gricean account of pictorial communication. These were:

(1) when a picture is used as a vehicle of communication, its meaning and the goal of
pictorial interpretation are determined by the picture maker’s intentions;
(2) a picture can bear nonnatural meaning, so interpreting it correctly would require recognizing this; and
(3) a picture may implicate, or suggest, some meaning over and above its “literal” meaning.

In the previous section I developed these theses. The first two theses are closely related.
Insofar as a picture is used as a vehicle of communication it bears nonnatural meaning. A
picture’s meaningNN is reducible to the picture maker’s meaningNN , so the goal of pictorial
interpretation is to identify the picture maker’s meaningNN as it is expressed in the picture.
With respect to the third thesis, I considered Abell’s account of pictorial implicature and
rejected it insofar as it failed to distinguish between what a picture depicts and what it
implicates. I argued that what a picture depicts is distinct from what it implicates and
that the former determines the latter. Additionally, I distinguished between two kinds of
pictorial implicatures, those that rely on symbolic cues and those that rely on perceptual
cues. A picture’s content–what it depicts–furnishes these cues. Thus pictorial implicatures
are grounded in and generated from pictorial content. Nevertheless, what a picture implicates
is part of the picture maker’s meaningNN .

4.4.1

Objections considered

In general, I hold the position that pictorial communication succeeds when a viewer correctly
apprehends the picture maker’s intended meaningNN . I can foresee at least two potential
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objections to this claim. These are:

(1) that pictures have an existence of their own, independently of the artist, and we are
often interested in them for their own sake; and
(2) that we often look at, interpret and appreciate pictures with little regard for who
produced them, let alone what their maker intended to communicate.

In response to the first of these objections, as I think follows from my discussion in the first
chapter, it is true that pictures have an existence independent of their makers’s. They have
significant content in virtue of the fact that they satisfy specific perceptual conditions–i.e.
they facilitate recognition and sustain a visual experience of their depictum. However, understanding a picture often involves more than seeing its depictum in its design. It entails
understanding what the picture maker is doing with the picture.32 For example, Martin
Parr represents a picture of buttered bread in order to convey his perspective on British
tastes. An adequate interpretation of the picture requires taking account of the activity of
producing and presenting it–this activity is performed purposefully and, insofar as this is the
case, by an agent who is capable of purposeful behavior. Thus, understanding the picture as
an object produced and displayed for some purpose inevitably makes reference to the picture
maker.
One might object that because pictures exist independently of their makers, the only legitimate purpose that a picture maker can have in producing and displaying a picture is for the
picture to be seen and interpreted on its own merits, without regard for the picture maker’s
intentions. One could take this objection as implying that successful communication, as I
have defined it, is not an essential goal of picture making or interpretation. It’s certainly
32

This is not true of all pictures. For example, it could be argued that one fully understands an identify
photo when one recognizes the photo’s subject in its design. This type of documentary photograph does not
have a communicative function insofar as the viewer does not look at the photo with the goal of apprehending
the picture maker’s meaningNN .

125

true that communication is not the only goal of picture making or the only reason we engage
with pictures. I have already identified two other non-communicative functions of pictures:
they can have a documentary function and a decorative function. I previously discussed
the use of pictures as documents that obtain their authority as such–ie. their purported
objective validity–by being dissociated from the idiosyncratic perspectives of their makers.
We also engage with pictures purely for the sake of aesthetic enjoyment. Whether we take
enjoyment in the appearance of the picture’s subject or we take enjoyment in the formal
properties of the picture itself, it’s arguable that this does not require any consideration of
the picture maker’s goals or intentions. However, the objection under consideration makes
the stronger claim that communication–as I have defined it–is never a legitimate purpose of
picture making or a reason for engaging with pictures. This view must hold that the goal of
pictorial interpretation is something other than uncovering the meaningNN of a picture–it’s
not clear that this view would even recognize that pictures have meaningNN . Insofar as this
view still holds that pictorial interpretation is a worthwhile endeavor, if it rejects that identifying communicative intention is the proper goal of pictorial interpretation, it would have
to specify a different goal.
I can think of a few possible candidates for this role. First, one might hold that the goal
of pictorial interpretation is to identify anything that is directly entailed by the picture’s
content. What is entailed by the content could be very much like what is implicated by
the content, but without reference to the picture maker’s intentions. So, the picture may
entail certain propositions in virtue of its symbolic content and it may entail certain other
propositions in virtue of its perceptible content, perhaps in conjunction with something like
RP. We can state this view as follows:
(IDE): Pictorial interpretation aims to uncover anything that is directly entailed by pictorial
content
Secondly, one might take the goal of pictorial interpretation to be uncovering a picture’s
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natural meaning. As discussed above, Taylor maintains that uncovering natural meaning is
an often overlooked, but essential dimension of artistic and literary interpretation. Taylor
is especially interested in natural meaning insofar as it reveals information about the artist
or picture maker and their mental states. I argued that interest in the natural meaning of a
picture, insofar as this offers insight about the picture maker, is especially compelling when
we consider the picture maker as representative of their social and cultural milieu. In this
case the natural meaning of a picture provides a view into the social and cultural context
from which it originated. We can state this view as follows:

(INM): Pictorial interpretation aims to uncover the natural meaning of a picture to the
extent that this offers insight into the picture maker’s social and cultural context

A third possibility is that pictorial interpretation does not aim at uncovering any predetermined meaning, but is rather an exercise in creating and projecting meaning onto the work.
This is a view that is traditionally associated with Roland Barthes’s account of the “Death
of the Author”, which endows the reader with the power to determine the meaning of the
work. It follows from this that the work would have multiple meanings, i.e. up to as many
as it has interpreters. Barthes begins from the premise that the author (or picture maker)
creates a work whose value and meaning are disconnected from their origin. In creating this
independent object, the author silences herself, or “enters into [her] own death (1977, 143).”
This view may seem most consistent with the fact that the content of a picture is determined
by perceptual, viewer-dependent factors. We can state this view as follows:

(IDA): The goal of pictorial interpretation is to invent novel meanings and project them
on to the picture

Note that IDA is consistent with INM and IDE. Presumably the interpreter can choose any
criteria for generating pictorial meaning including those specified by these views. Note also
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that IDA does not entail that the interpreter has the absolute freedom to assign any meaning
they choose to a picture. IDA requires that a viewer’s interpretation must be sufficiently
grounded in pictorial content to be a plausible reading of this content. The key upshot of
IDA is the answer it implies to the metaphysical question of what determines the meaning
of a picture.33 According to IDA this is determined by the activity of the interpreter rather
than that of the picture maker.
None of these three proposals offers, in and of itself, a satisfactory account of the goal
of pictorial interpretation and, in my view, certainly none that can supplant the goal of
communication. I will consider each in turn. The first view, IDE, holds that the goal of
interpretation is to identify anything directly entailed, either symbolically or perceptually,
by a picture’s content. For example, interpreting Figure 14, the picture of Biggie Smalls,
entails apprehending that, in virtue of the symbolic significance of the crown that he is
wearing, he is the equivalent of hip hop royalty. According to IDE understanding this does
not require attributing this assertion to anyone in particular. Perhaps a proponent of IDE
might suggest that this assertion can be attributed to the picture itself. The latter claim
would require accepting the view that pictures are capable of making assertions, which, if
it is taken literally, seems improbable. Nor do I think there is any appeal to the view that
an assertion like, “Biggie Smalls is the king of New York,” can be made by nobody. An
assertion seems, by its very nature, to necessarily issue from someone. Ultimately, “what a
picture says” is shorthand for “what someone says by means of producing and displaying a
picture.” With respect to what is perceptually entailed by a picture, I have already discussed
the problem with interpreting pictures in accordance with RP. The Reality Principle entails
such an excess of information on the basis of the picture’s manifest content, that it’s hard to
imagine that it’s an effective tool for interpretation. As I suggested above, homing in on the
relevant information entailed by RP required having a sense of the point of the picture, which
33

See Abell 2009 for a discussion of and distinction between the metaphysical and epistemological questions
facing a theory of depiction.
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required assuming a purposeful agent who was making a point with the picture. Without
this, an interpretation guided by RP would be aimless and unwieldy. Thus, I would argue,
IDE is only a plausible theory of pictorial interpretation if it assumes, at least an implicit,
picture maker.
The second view, INM, argues that the goal of pictorial interpretation is to identify the
natural meaning of the picture for the sake of ascertaining information about the social and
cultural context in which it was produced. This view does presuppose a picture maker whose
stylistic and substantive choices are evident in the picture. These choices are assumed to
reveal the nature of her social and cultural milieu to the extent that they are its products.
While the goal stated by INM may be part of pictorial interpretation, INM fails to fully
capture the nature of our interest in pictures. Pictorial interpretation is not just an exercise
in archeology. We are also interested in them for their meaningNN . As Taylor himself
acknowledges, this is the primary motivation of pictorial interpretation. However, I would
allow that INM captures a very legitimate, albeit extra-communicative, goal of pictorial
interpretation.
Finally, according to IDA, pictorial interpretation actually consists in the invention of meaning. As I noted this view seems most consistent with the fact that pictorial content is determined by viewer-dependent, perceptual facts. While I don’t think that this understanding of
pictorial content entails IDA, I can see the appeal of this view. Pictures often inspire imagining and can prompt bursts of free-association. Identifying these personal associations may
help us to relate to a picture and enjoy it more. To a certain degree I think this is a perfectly
appropriate and widely accepted way to engage with pictures. However, I think that IDA is
an incomplete account of the goals of pictorial interpretation. There are two reasons for this.
First, we generally recognize that there are more and less apt interpretations of pictures. If
we took IDA at face value, in its most extreme form, we could question the legitimacy of
such judgments. What would make one interpretation more apt than another if the meaning
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of a picture were determined solely by the viewer’s idiosyncratic reading? Perhaps a viewer’s
interpretation might be required to fold in pertinent information about a picture’s historical
context, tradition and style. Accordingly, a more apt interpretation would be one that is
better informed. However, given this, the onus would be on the proponent of IDA to defend
their principled objection to including the picture maker’s communicative intentions among
the pertinent information grounding an apt interpretation. Secondly, as suggested above,
the act of producing and displaying a picture can be construed as a type of utterance. Thus,
in some respect it is akin to producing a utterance in the context of a conversation. In the
course of a conversation it would be rather irregular to take your interlocutor’s utterance as
a spring board for associative riffing. This would defy the point of the conversation, which
is to understand your interlocutor’s meaningNN . Insofar as pictures are types of utterances,
the defender of IDA must offer a compelling reason to adopt an interpretive strategy for
pictures that is completely different from that which is appropriate in the course of ordinary
conversation.34
This brings us to the second objection: in truth, when we look at a picture we frequently have
little genuine interest in the person who made it. I don’t claim that we are never interested
in the picture maker’s identity when we look at a picture. Often, knowing that a picture
was created by, e.g., a Japanese woman rather than a Danish man, can inform and enrich
our interpretation of it. The identity of picture makers is also, obviously, important for art
historians and collectors. A picture is of much greater interest if it’s painted by Bruegel
than it would be if it were painted by some random Dutch nobody.35 Nevertheless, when
I look at Bruegel’s Wedding Dance, there are many things that catch my eye and capture
my imagination. The picture is so lively and dynamic that I can practically hear the music
being played by two musicians in the lower corner of the frame. I find many things about the
34

This argument follows Noël Carroll’s (1992) discussion of the conversational nature of literary interpretation.
35
Another notable exception could be the self-portrait. However, here we are interested in the picture
maker as the subject of the work rather than as its creator.
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depicted scene curious, however I am not at all curious about Bruegel himself. Why, then,
should my engagement with his picture be motivated by an interest in what he meansNN ?
Part of the answer to this can be found in my response to IDE. I argued that interpreting
a picture entailed identifying a rational purpose or point underlying its production. If there
is such a purpose, it must be attributable to an agent. Moreover, insofar as my interpretive
goal should be to identify the meaningNN of the work, and this is reducible to the picture
maker’s meaningNN , I must ultimately aim to uncover the picture maker’s meaningNN . Thus,
I take both of these theses to be true:

(i) when we engage with a picture, we frequently have little interest in the identity of the
picture maker; and
(ii) when we interpret a picture, our goal should be to apprehend the meaningNN intended
by the picture maker.

There is not necessarily a contradiction between (i) and (ii). The truth of one does not entail
the falsity of the other. However, there is a strange tension between the two at least insofar
as normally interest in what a person has to say tends to coincide with some degree of interest
in who the person is. One potential way to resolve the tension between these two theses is to
deny (ii) and take a position akin to that proposed in Jerrold Levinson’s (1992) account of
hypothetical intentionalism.36 This would amount to positing a hypothetical picture maker
in place of the actual picture maker. It is the hypothetical picture maker whose meaningNN
we are interested in. A hypothetical picture maker fills the role of the agent to whom we
could attribute the purposiveness evident in the picture. Positing a hypothetical picture
would make sense of the fact that we are often not especially interested in the identity of
the actual picture maker. Since the hypothetical picture maker is hypothetical, not actual,
36

This discussion of the hypothetical picture maker is inspired by Levinson’s view. It does not strictly
conform to his view, in part because Levinson’s argument hinges on a distinction between utterer’s and
utterance meaning that is inconsistent with the arguments I have presented.
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they lack actual intentions and therefore, these cannot determine the hypothetical picture
maker’s meaningNN . Loosely following Levinson, we could say that the hypothetical picture
maker’s meaningNN is identical to an ideal viewer’s most plausible interpretation of what
the picture maker intended to convey in virtue of the picture they produced, assuming they
were being cooperative and observing the maxims.37 Insofar as the interpreter’s goal is to
identify hypothetical picture maker’s meaningNN , her goal is to identify the most plausible
interpretation from this ideal viewer’s perspective. The ideal viewer is, presumably, one who
possesses adequate contextual and background information about a work and its maker and
who understands how the Cooperative Principle and maxims constrain the picture maker’s
activities.
Hypothetical intentionalism is an unattractive position for at least two reasons. First, as
Carroll (2000) points out, it is counterintuitive. He writes:
The very methodology of hypothetical intentionalism seems predicated upon
tracking actual authorial intention. Indeed, why else would it select precisely
the desiderata it does?...[I]t is somewhat perplexing that hypothetical intentionalism recommends going with the ideal reader’s hypothesis, since the methodology of hypothetical intentionalism is itself designed to track the author’s actual
intention (82-3).
Given the overlapping strategies of the actual and hypothetical intentionalist, why would the
hypothetical intentionalist maintain such a radically different objective? The second problem
with hypothetical intentionalism is that it construes the goal of pictorial interpretation, and
of picture making more generally, in a way that completely denies their potential to serve
as a means of communication. Unless we take (i) to necessarily rule out the communicative
function of pictures or entail a rejection of (ii), hypothetical intentionalism has little appeal
in its own right.
37

See Levinson 1992, 235.
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However, I think that there is a way to resolve the apparent tension between (i) and (ii)
that takes both of these theses seriously. My claim is that often we simply aren’t interested
in a picture maker’s identity, yet we can and should still be interested in the meaningNN
she herself–not an ideally constructed version of her–intends to convey. What hypothetical
intentionalism shows us is that it’s not conceptually impossible to regard a picture as the
product of purposeful activity, which thereby bears meaningNN , while denying the relevance
of the actual picture maker’s intentions. We can, in principle, attribute its purposefulness
to a hypothetical picture maker. However, I do not think that this is the correct approach,
even if it does, at first glance, seem like the approach most consistent with (i). I think that
we should be interested in the actual intentions and purposes of the actual picture maker. A
picture provides a viewer with access to a perspective on the world–specifically the objects
and scenes depicted–that issues from another, actual, mind. Even when a picture’s maker
remains anonymous it is valuable to attribute the work they produce to an actual mind
because it enlarges our understanding of the possible ways the world can be apprehended.
Even if we don’t know, or care, who they are we know that there is someone, situated in
a particular point in space and time, for whom the world appears the way it is depicted.
Insofar as the way the world looks is constituted of the sum total of the ways that it appears
to different subjects, recognizing that a picture is the product of an actual, albeit anonymous,
subject expands our awareness of how the world looks. This does not necessarily require us
to know the identity of or anything about the picture maker.
Note that my argument doesn’t entail that every picture presents a replica of an actual,
direct visual experience of the object or scene it depicts. Many pictures present aspects
of objects that could only possibly be experienced through pictures of the objects. Yet
these pictures bring to light new facets of how the world looks insofar as they engage our
recognitional and perceptual abilities in relation to depicted objects in order to emphasize
their otherwise unnoticed visible features.38 Additionally, some pictures depict completely
38

Munch’s The Scream depicts a scene that could only be experienced to look as it does in a picture.
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imaginary objects and scenes. It could be argued that these don’t expand our understanding
of how the world looks because they furnish visual experiences of things that don’t exist in
the world. Yet, I think it is valuable to attribute even pictures of imaginary objects and
scenes to actual subjects. While these pictures don’t necessarily expand our understanding
of how the world looks they expand our understanding of the ways it is imagined to look.
The way the world is imagined to look is constituted by the sum of all the ways that it is, in
fact, imagined to look, these pictures augment our understanding when we attribute them
to actual subjects.

4.4.2

What picture makers meanNN

We have considered some examples of picture maker’s meaningNN where the essence of this
meaningNN can be expressed, at least to a certain extent, using propositions. For example,
the meaningNN conveyed by the picture of Biggie Smalls is that Biggie is the king of New
York hip hop. The meaning conveyed by the photograph of Baryshnikov is that he is an
exceptionally gifted dancer. It’s more difficult to state precisely what is conveyed by Martin Parr’s photograph of buttered bread. It could be that British food is gross, but this
paraphrase seems inadequate to fully capture what is conveyed by the image. One problem
with discussing pictorial communication is that words are often simply not up to the task of
translating what is contained in a visual message. There tends to be an irreducibly visual
element to pictorial communication that cannot be transmitted verbally without significant
loss. In some cases it simply can’t be verbally encapsulated. This may be a problem for
a theory that emphasizes the significance of picture maker meaningNN , not least because
Grice defines nonnatural meaning in part by the fact that a sentence like “x meansNN that
p,” can be restated as one “in which the verb ‘mean’ is followed by a phrase in quotation
marks (Grice 1989, 215).” In other words what is meantNN is something that can take the
Carroll has suggested this expressionist work does not aim to present a way the world could possibly look,
but rather it portrays the way the world feels. This relation between the way things (especially in pictures)
look and the way they feel could certainly benefit from further examination.
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form of a proposition. Nevertheless, I think there are ways to state the picture maker’s
meaningNN even in cases where the total visual message conveyed cannot be precisely put
into words. We might say that, in general, the (albeit minimal) meaningNN conveyed by
any picture maker is something like: this is the way (or a way) the world (or this object or
scene) looks. As discussed above, a picture can naturally mean that a picture’s subject looks
as depicted. This is often the case when a picture is used to document appearances. The
difference between a picture having this natural meaning and a picture maker conveying this
meaningNN is that in the latter case the picture’s subject looks as depicted according to the
picture maker. What the picture maker conveys by way of the picture is an invitation to
share a way of seeing the subject.39 I take this to be an apt, if minimal, description of the
meaningNN conveyed by Rinko Kawauchi in her untitled photograph of an illuminated rose
(Figure 16).

Figure 16: Photograph by Rinko Kawauchi

Alternately, it we might say that the meaningNN conveyed by a picture is: this is a significant
aspect of the world (or this object or scene). Aspect here is used more or less in Lopes’s sense.
39

It seems that it’s simultaneously possible for a picture to naturally mean and a picture maker to meanNN
that the picture’s subject looks as depicted. I take this to be the case with Martin Parr’s photograph of the
bread.
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It is a highly selective, yet recognizable manner of presentation.40 The aspect presented may
be perceptually significant or symbolically significant or, likely most often, an inextricable
combination of the two. The aspect presented may convey something like a mood, feeling,
visual association...etc. The aspect can be highly stylized, exaggerated, schematic, etc. and
look nothing like anything one is likely to ever come across in reality. It may take effort to
recognize the picture’s subject in the aspect that is presented–e.g. as it’s difficult to discern
the individual figures in some of Picasso’s iterations of Las Meninas. If we take this to be
the picture maker’s meaningNN we may say she is extending an invitation to share a way of
visually understanding or visually construing the world.

5

Conclusion

In the first chapter of my dissertation I defended an anti-intentionalist theory of depiction
and pictorial content determination. I argued that:

(i) “depiction” was not synonymous with “representation” or “pictorial representation”;
(ii) what object or scene a picture depicts is a matter of what object or scene can be
recognized and seen-in its design–I identified what a picture depicts as the picture’s
content;
(iii) a standard of correctness–particularly an intentional standard of correctness–is not
necessary to determine pictorial content;
(iv) the symbolic and perceptually discernible meanings of depicted objects and scenes (and
the ways they are depicted) are part of pictorial content to the same extent that the
visible features of these objects and scenes are part of pictorial content;
40

Lopes defines the aspect that a picture presents of its subject as the total of all of a picture’s commitments
and non-commitments with respect to the features of its subject it presents.
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(v) symbolic and perceptual cues–which may ground pictorial implicatures–are part of
pictorial content.
I haven’t outright denied that picture maker’s intentions can have some bearing on pictorial
content–to the extent that knowledge of these may contribute to the viewer’s recognition
ability. However, I have stressed the anti-intentionalist theory of content determination because I believe that it’s most consistent with the way that pictures work and the myriad ways
that they can be used. It’s also consistent with the fact that pictures are most cognitively,
emotionally and psychological effective when they conform to certain basic compositional
rules. For example, Molly Bang (2016) claims that “[w]e associate the same or similar colors
much more strongly than we associate the same or similar shapes (97).” For example, if
there are several elements in a pictorial composition that all red, we will take this to signify
a strong affinity between these objects. In Bang’s view, a composition that contains many
elements of the same shape–e.g. several triangles–may give us a similar but weaker impression of the relation between them. Bang’s particular example of the way that compositional
elements work together may be debatable. I think that–no less than color cues–the reiteration and juxtaposition of similar shapes in a composition can be extremely effective and
evocative–e.g. consider how a critic might stress the significance of the echo of similar forms
in a composition. However, the accuracy of this example is beside the point. The point
is that compositional principles–the complete mastery of which amounts to, what Donis A.
Dondis (1973) calls, “visual literacy”–are fundamental to the very possibility of a picture
bearing meaning and serving–qua picture–as a vehicle of communication. Although theorist
often stress the conventional nature of pictorial meaning, many of these compositional principles reflect the perceptual and psychological dispositions of viewers. Ultimately depiction
exploits the quirk of human perception that allows us to see faces in stained walls. Similarly,
compositional principles may exploit how we prioritize and organize visual information. In
either case, the perceptual, cognitive, emotional effects of a picture’s design are facts about
the picture itself, an entity that exists independently of its maker. A picture maker may
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create a picture with certain intentions in mind (e.g. to depict Obama as statesmanly) but
these intentions have bearing on the depictive content of the picture only to the extent that
they are realized in a picture that has a particular effect on the viewer (i.e. that it prompts
recognition and sustains seeing-in of Obama and visually evokes his statesmanship.) That a
picture has this effect–and thereby depicts this state of affairs–is a fact that does does not
depend on picture maker’s intentions.
As the topic of my dissertation is pictorial communication, in the second chapter I set out
to define communication and ultimately settled on an account grounded in Grice’s theory of
conversation. I argued that communication could be defined in terms of its success conditions:
communication succeeds when A understands what S means. This amounts to A grasping
S’s communicative intentions. Thus, I adopted a intentionalist theory of communication,
which would have to be combined with my anti-intentionalist theory of depiction to arrive
at an account of pictorial communication. What this amounts to is a view that is optimistic
about the possibility of genuine intersubjective understanding–this is achieved through the
transparent expression and successful apprehension of intentions. But that also recognizes
that this understanding is necessarily mediated by objects that bear their own intrinsic
significance and affective power. Pictorial communication thus requires negotiating and
successfully wielding these objects to convey one’s intended meaning. I suggested that one
(perhaps fundamental) form that this takes is that of an invitation to share a common visual
interpretation and appreciation of an object, a scene or, more generally, the world.
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